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Chapter 1
Introduction
Every day individuals make numerous choices. What is important for making the
right choice is that individuals have good information about the consequences of the
different alternatives. However, investigating the full consequences of the different
alternatives is complicated and costly. Consequently, individuals sometimes do not
possess all relevant information to take a decision.
This thesis discusses models in which an agent decides whether or not to perform
a task on behalf of the principal. A key element in the models we consider is
incomplete and asymmetric information. Broadly, the thesis can be split up into
two parts. The first part of the thesis deals with models in which the principal is
better informed than the agent. The agent has to decide whether or not to perform
a task, but lacks information about his ability. We analyze how the agent makes
a self-assessment of his ability, based on appraisals of others (the principal) and
experience. Based on this self-assessment the agent takes a decision. The second
part of the thesis deals with models in which the agent is better informed than the
principal. On behalf of the principal the agent takes a decision about a project.
Sometimes agents do not act in the interest of the principal. We analyze how the
principal can use retention contracts to discipline the agent.
In the remainder of the Introduction we discuss the two parts of the thesis and
we provide an overview of the chapters of this thesis.
2 Introduction
1.1 Self-assessment
Individuals often misjudge their abilities. There is a considerable amount of evidence
that agents rate themselves above average on certain domains. For instance, 93%
of US drivers and 69% of Swedish drivers find themselves to be better drivers than
the median (Svenson, 1981). College Board (1976-77) reports this so-called ‘above
average’ effect for a couple of abilities. For example, a majority of students rate
themselves above average on the ability to get along with others and leadership
ability (see Kruger, 1999). When asked about their ability to play chess, however, a
majority of individuals rate themselves as below average (Kruger, 1999).
The relationship between an individual’s perception of his ability and an individ-
ual’s actual ability has predominantly been discussed by social psychologists. Social
psychologist have shown that an individual’s perception of his ability may affect
the choices he makes. For example, Felson (1984) shows that more favourable self-
appraisals of ability of high school boys have a positive effect on later grades. One
possible reason for this result is that students with favourable self-appraisals work
harder in school. Given that an individual’s perception is important for the choices
he makes, it is hardly surprising that economists have become interested in the topic.
Recently, several economic papers have appeared on the topic of self-assessment of
abilities. These papers investigate why people are overoptimistic about certain life-
events (see Van den Steen, 2004) and why people may decide not to collect infor-
mation for strategic purposes (Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) and Bénabou and Tirole
(2002)). Weinberg (2005) shows that moderately overestimating one’s ability makes
an individual choose more often a challenging task, resulting in a higher expected
utility. Extreme overconfidence, however, involves considerable costs.
A shortcoming of these studies is that they only explain overconfidence, while
underconfidence is also important. Underconfidence also affects the individual’s
choice. For instance, intellectually competent children with a low perception of
their abilities may avoid tasks that could provide evidence about their abilities.
An implication is that negative and distorted self-appraisals may persist (Phillips,
1984). One possible reason why women disproportionately avoid careers in science
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is that they underestimate their scientific reasoning ability (Ehrlinger and Dunning,
2003). Both examples point out that a possible consequence of underestimating
one’s ability is passivity. On the basis of his perceived ability an individual decides
not to perform a task and as a consequence does not obtain new information to
adjust his perception.
The economic literature focuses primarily on overconfidence. In Chapter 2 and
3 we try to fill this gap in the literature by explaining both overconfidence and
underconfidence. To our knowledge, there is only one other paper in which a negative
self-image is theoretically possible, namely Santos-Pinto and Sobel (2005).
1.2 Retention contracts
Delegation of tasks is necessary for a variety of reasons. For instance, in an organi-
zation, the director (the principal) lacks time to take decisions concerning the daily
routine. Therefore, the director delegates these decisions to a manager (the agent).
In representative democracies, citizens have a weak incentive to investigate the full
consequences of alternative policies. Therefore, citizens delegate policy decisions
to politicians. In both situations there is a clear advantage to delegating decision-
making. However, delegation may be problematic if the agent does not share the
same preferences as the principal. Specially, when there is asymmetric information.
The classical example of principal-agent problems is the conflict of interest be-
tween shareholders and the CEO. The board of directors, on behalf of shareholders,
has the power to run the organization. Directors, however, lack the time and infor-
mation necessary to take decisions. Therefore, decision-making is delegated to the
CEO. The task of the board of directors is twofold. First, the board has to select and
hire executives. Second, the board has to monitor the executives’ performance and
replace them when necessary (see Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). The problem is that
to carry out these tasks the board has limited information. To discipline executives,
the board may have to stick to a norm or rule. Sometimes sticking to a rule is the
only means to discipline executives. "Social behavior, particularly in small groups,
is more complex, and norms of behavior that are culturally inculcated or developed
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over time play a large role in shaping societies." (Laffont and Martimort, 2002, p.
2).
In this thesis, we consider the use of retention contracts as a means to discipline
and screen executives in an environment in which the board has limited information
about the outcomes of executives’ actions. Similar, we consider the use of re-election
strategies to discipline politicians. The contracts we consider are implicit and are
not enforced by a third party. The contract specifies the conditions under which
an agent (executive or politician) is retained or dismissed. We can think of the
contract as a norm shared by the principal and the agent. For example, a CEO who
has implemented an extremely unprofitable project knows he will have to leave the
organization once this becomes public. If the executive is competent, the board may
find it difficult to dismiss the executive, but the board has to stick to the norm. In
this case dismissals stemming from bad performance are considered regrettable, yet
inevitable.
1.3 Overview
This thesis deals with a variety of principal-agent problems in which asymmetric
information is a key feature. As mentioned in the previous section, the chapters can
be grouped in two parts. The first part contains two chapters (chapter 2 and 3)
on self-assessment. In these chapters we pay attention to both overconfidence and
underconfidence. The second part contains three chapters (chapter 4, 5 and 6) in
which the principal uses retention contracts to discipline the agent. In chapter 4
we consider the relationship between the board of directors and the top executive.
Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the relationship between voters and politicians.
Chapter 2 presents a model that describes individuals’ self-assessment of their
abilities. In line with the self-assessment theory in social psychology (Trope, 1979;
Dunning, 1995; Taylor et al., 1995), individuals want to learn their abilities to make
better decisions in the future. They can learn about their abilities from appraisals
of others and from experience. We find that if communication is imperfect, then (i)
appraisals of others tend to be too positive, and (ii) overconfidence leading to too
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much activism is more likely than underconfidence leading to too much passivity.
The reason is that underconfidence is permanent and overconfidence is temporary
because of learning by doing.
The model can be used to describe the interaction between a senior and a junior.
We find that the senior tends to deflate the ability of a junior who is just able.
For such a junior, the costs of overconfidence (too much effort) exceed the costs of
underconfidence (mistaken passiveness). The senior tends to inflate the ability of a
talented junior. The senior wants to avoid the situation that such a junior abstains
from performing a task. On average, the senior exaggerates the junior’s ability.
In Chapter 3 individuals use their performance on a task to make an inference of
their abilities. However, performance not only depends on the individual’s ability,
but also on the unknown difficulty of the task. In line with Kruger (1999), we show
that an individual who has performed a difficult task underestimates his ability and
an individual who has performed an easy task overestimates his ability. A junior
employee could be an example of an individual who faces the uncertainties that lead
to this finding. The implication of underestimating one’s ability after performing
a difficult task may be that a talented junior decides not to perform a task in the
future. An organization can prevent this by appointing a senior employee who acts as
the junior’s mentor. A senior employee has more experience and therefore is better
able to determine the difficulty of different tasks. Besides, the senior employee has
seen many junior employees and may, therefore, be better able to assess the junior’s
ability. The benefits of appointing a mentor, with the same preferences as the junior,
are that a mentor takes care of a better match between task difficulty and the junior’s
ability.
In many settings the preferences of the mentor and the junior are not perfectly
aligned. A reason may be that the junior has to incur costs to perform a task and
the mentor does not. In such an environment, the mentor may have an incentive not
to reveal all information to the junior. The reason is that performing a task is costly
for the junior, therefore, if the mentor reveals all information a low ability junior
may decide not to perform a task. The mentor, however, wants all juniors to perform
a task. Consequently, he decides to lie to low ability juniors. An implication is that
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some juniors do not learn their ability and sometimes a talented junior, performing
a difficult task, decides to stop performing the task. To prevent a talented junior
from not performing a task, the mentor assigns an easy task to him. After observing
performance on an easy task, the junior decides to continue and he learns his ability.
In chapter 4 we consider the use of retention strategies as a means to discipline
and screen executives in an environment in which the board has limited informa-
tion about the outcomes of executives’ actions. Each period an executive designs
a project and decides whether or not to implement the project. The quality of the
project depends on the competence of the executive and on exogenous circumstances.
The executive knows his competence and observes the exogenous circumstances, im-
plying that the executive knows the full consequences of his decision. The board of
directors only observes whether a project has been implemented and it sometimes
learns the quality of the project. A key feature of the model is that a competent
executive designs better projects than a less competent one. Therefore, he is more
likely to implement a project than a less competent executive. Consequently, the
fact that a project has been implemented signals competence. The board can use
the implementation decision to screen executives. The drawback of using the imple-
mentation decision as a screening device is that it creates a moral-hazard problem.
An executive who cares much about prestige may decide to implement an unprof-
itable project to reduce the probability of being replaced. The board may reduce
the moral-hazard problem by dismissing an executive who has been found to have
implemented too bad a project. However, because of the signalling function of the
implementation decision an undesirable project is more likely to be implemented by
a competent executive. Occasionally dismissing competent executives is the price
the board has to pay for discipline.
Chapter 5 and 6 focus on electoral competition in two-party systems. A well-
known rationale for representative democracy is that direct democracy leads to a
free-rider problem as to the collection of information. A problem with this rationale
is that it takes for granted that representatives collect information. In chapter 5 we
examine whether or not electoral competition induces political parties or candidates
to collect information about policy consequences. We consider a model in which two
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parties compete for office. Before elections are held, parties may collect information.
In a campaign, parties may use this information to make a case for their platform.
We show that whether or not parties collect information depends on the cost of
information collection. More surprisingly, we find that endogenizing information
may lead to divergence of policy platforms.
The model we consider in chapter 5 relates to the literature of spatial models
of elections in which each voter compares the platforms of the political parties,
and votes for the party whose platform yields highest expected utility. Chapter 6
presents a principal-agent model in which voters are modeled as a principal who has
to keep the officeholder, the agent, in check. The electorate wants parties to perform
two task. The first task is acquiring information. Both the incumbent party and
the opposition party can collect information concerning different policy alternatives.
The second task is making a decision about policy. The incumbent party performs
this task. We identify the conditions under which voters can induce political parties
to collect information and to select policies which are optimal from the representative
voter’s point of view. We show that when parties are office motivated the voting
rule should encourage parties to collect information. Voting rules that focus on
the opposition party sometimes dominate voting rules that focus on the incumbent
party. When parties are policy motivated, parties have also to be motivated to select
good policies. Generally, it is easier to stimulate policy motivated parties to collect
information than office motivated parties. However, in contrast to office motivated
parties, policy motivated parties will sometimes select policies that conflict with the
representative voter’s interest.
Chapter 7 summarizes the main findings.

Part I
Self-Assessment
9

Chapter 2
A Simple Model of
Self-Assessment
Co-author: Otto H. Swank
2.1 Introduction
A person’s perception of his abilities may have substantial consequences for his
actions.1 If Shakespeare had had a low perception of his writing ability, perhaps
nobody would have known Hamlet. A young musician’s impression of her talent for
music may determine whether she decides to become a professional violinist. One
possible reason why women disproportionately avoid career in science is that they
underestimate their scientific reasoning ability (see Ehrlinger and Dunning, 2003).
Given that people’s assessments of their abilities are important for their choices, one
would expect that economists have paid much attention to the relationship between
people’s perceptions of their own abilities (self concepts) and people’s actual abilities
(the self). After all, isn’t economics pre-eminently the study of how people choose?
However, until very recently, research on this relationship has been done predomi-
nantly by social psychologists. Their research has resulted in "a large, fascinating,
1Phillips (1984) shows a strong correlation between children’s subjective perceptions of their
abilities and their achievement behavior.
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yet sometimes confusing and contentious literature" (Sedikides and Strube, 1995, p.
1277). Baumeister (1998) gives a very interesting survey of this literature.
A high degree of consensus among social psychologists seems to exist on the
following three findings. First, people often misjudge their own abilities. For exam-
ple, College Board (1976-1977) reports small correlations between objective abilities
and persons’ perceptions of their own abilities for a wide range of domains (see also
Kruger, 1999). Of course, this finding is the raison d’être of a voluminous liter-
ature on self-assessments. Second, although many individuals have distorted self-
concepts, people are neither generally overconfident nor generally underconfident. It
is well-known that for some dimensions a majority of people see themselves better
as average (famous examples are intelligence, attractiveness and car driving). For
other dimensions, a majority of people see themselves as worse than average (music,
art, mechanics, chess playing).1 Ackerman et al. (2002) report experimental results
suggesting that for broad items, say intelligence, people have higher self-estimates
of ability than for specific items, say being able to study long hours (see also Klar et
al., 1996). The third important finding of social psychologists is that accurate feed-
back on one’s ability is rare (see Jones and Wortman, 1973). In particular, feedback
tends to be too positive (Brown and Dutton, 1995; Felson, 1993). Own perceptions
of abilities often do not resemble the way abilities are perceived by others. On the
other hand, in their survey of the early literature Shrauger and Schoeneman (1979)
conclude that own perceptions of abilities are closely related to how people believe
they are perceived by others.
In this chapter we develop a simple model that yields predictions that are broadly
consistent with the three findings discussed above. Our model describes the inter-
action between a senior and her junior. The senior cares about her junior. She
knows the junior’s ability, but the junior does not know his own ability. In line with
the self-assessment theory in social psychology (Trope, 1979; Dunning, 1995; Taylor
et al., 1995), the junior wants to learn his ability to make better decisions in the
1Of course, the observation that a majority of people see themselves better (worse) than the
average does not imply the existence of overconfidence (underconfidence). It may also be the result
of a skewed distribution of abilities.
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future. Specifically, the junior has to make decisions on two successive tasks. For
each task, the junior must choose between performing the task or not. Furthermore,
if the junior chooses to perform the task, he has to determine how much effort to
put in it. Effort and ability are complementary, in the sense that the higher is the
junior’s ability, the more effort he wants to put in a task. If the junior’s ability is
below a certain threshold, he should not perform the task at all. At the beginning
of the game, the senior sends a noisy message to the junior. Noisy in the sense that
with some probability the junior receives another message than the senior has sent.
Apart from learning about his ability through his senior’s message, the junior can
learn his ability by doing. Performing the first task yields information about his
ability which can be used when making a decision on the second task.
We derive the following results. First, the senior tends to deflate the ability of a
junior who is just able to perform a task. For such a junior, the cost of overconfidence
- too much effort - is higher than the cost of underconfidence - mistaken passiveness.
Second, the senior is inclined to inflate the ability of a talented junior. For a very able
junior, the cost of overconfidence is smaller than the cost of underconfidence. The
senior wants to avoid a situation that a talented junior abstains from performing a
task. She does so by exaggerating the junior’s ability. Third, we show that on average
the senior exaggerates a junior’s ability. The reason for this result is that the cost
of underconfidence (passiveness) is permanent, whereas the cost of overconfidence
(too much effort) is temporary because of learning by doing. This last result is in
line with Felson (1989) who observes that experience is a better predictor of self-
appraisals than appraisals of others.
Recently, several economic papers have appeared on the topic of judgement bi-
ases. Here we discuss some papers that focus on self-assessments of abilities. We
thereby ignore the literature that is concerned with questions like when and why
are people too certain about events or why are people overoptimistic about cer-
tain life-events (see Van den Steen, 2004). Why should economists be interested in
self-assessments of abilities in the first place? At the beginning of this introduc-
tion, we have already mentioned that people’s choices may depend on how they see
themselves. Fang and Moscarini (2005) nicely illustrate this point in the context of
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a principal-agent problem. Assuming that effort and ability are complements, and
that agents overestimate their abilities, they show that performance evaluations may
reduce a firm’s profit. The reason is that through performance evaluations agents
may learn their actual abilities. Because agents on average overestimate their abili-
ties, learning may reduce average effort.
In Fang and Moscarini, overconfidence is assumed, not explained. Let us now
discuss economic studies that try to explain self-assessments. Two strands in this
literature can be distinguished. In the first, people form beliefs about their abili-
ties that are most useful to them. The benefit of a particular belief can be direct or
indirect. A direct benefit exists when a positive view of your abilities makes you hap-
pier. In the social psychological literature, this is referred to as the self-enhancement
approach to self-appraisals. Brunnermeier and Parker (2004) and Weinberg (2005)
show that the optimal belief depends on the direct benefit of a positive self view and
the cost of making incorrect decisions. In Hvide (2002), the benefit of a particular
belief is indirect. He shows that overconfidence strengthens the agent’s bargaining
power versus firms. Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) show that individuals with time
inconsistent preferences may decide not to collect information for strategic purposes.
Building on Carrillo and Mariotti (2000), Bénabou and Tirole (2002) show that time
inconsistent preferences are the reason that people may want to forget information
on their ability. Forgetting negative information on your ability makes that you feel
better now. The cost of forgetting information is distorted future decision making.
Time inconsistent preferences may imply that the present benefit outweighs the fu-
ture cost. By relying on time-inconsistent preferences Bénabou and Tirole follow the
self-enhancement approach. Concerning the supply of information on ability, Bén-
abou and Tirole focus on communication between two selves, your current self, who
possesses information, and the future self who may receive information. Because of
the time-inconsistent preferences, the two selves have conflicting preferences.
In the second strand of the literature, people learn their abilities. Zábojník
(2004) presents a model in which an agent can choose for receiving a signal about
his ability at the cost of foregone production. He shows that an agent keeps buying
signals until his self-assessment is sufficiently favourable (see also Brocas and Car-
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rillo, 2002). Compte and Postlewaite (2004) assume that an agent’s confidence has
a direct effect on his performance. The agent’s confidence depends on his perception
of the frequency of past successes. Thus agents learn by doing.2 Our model belongs
to the second strand in the literature. The agent learns his ability from others and
may learn by doing.
A drawback of most of the studies mentioned above is that they only explain
overconfidence. It is true that many studies have reported a bias toward overconfi-
dence. However, one cannot deny that people exist who are plagued by self-doubt,
and hold unrealistically negative impressions of their abilities. This suggests that
self—enhancement cannot be the only explanation of self-assessments. More gener-
ally, we need a theory that can explain the existence of both overconfidence and
underconfidence.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents
the model. Section 2.3 discusses an equilibrium of the model. Section 2.4 presents a
numerical example. Section 2.5 discusses the consequences of relaxing two assump-
tions for our main results.
2.2 The model
We consider a simple model of a senior (she) and a junior (he). The model consists
of three stages. The last two stages represent the junior’s future. In the first stage
the senior coaches the junior. In each of the last two stages, the junior must inde-
pendently make a binary decision, say, whether or not to perform some ambitious
task.
At the beginning of the game, the junior’s ability (the self), a, is drawn from a
distribution, f (a), on [0, 1]. The senior observes a, but the junior does not. The
junior only knows f (a). In stage 0, the senior tries to inform the junior about his
ability by sending a message m ∈ [0, 1]. Communication is not perfect. We model
this as follows. Let r denote the message the junior receives. We assume that r
2Another way of learning is through the performance incentives offered by an informed principal.
Bénabou and Tirole (2003) show that performance incentives affect the agent’s perception of his
own ability.
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results from a continuous density function, gm (r) defined over [0, 1]. Moreover, we
assume that gm(r) > 0 and that it has one maximum, defined by g0m(r = m) = 0.
This assumption implies that small communication errors are more likely to occur
than large communication errors. Finally, we assume that gi (r = i) = gj (r = j).
This assumption ensures that in equilibrium E (a | r) is an increasing function of m.
Our way of modeling the communication between the senior and the junior tries
to capture the psychological model of the reflected appraisal process (see Kinch,
1963, and for a more recent discussion, Felson, 1993). This process consists of three
elements. The first element is self-appraisal. Self-appraisal refers to the way a person
views a certain feature of himself. Examples of features are academic ability, an
ability to perform a task, physical attractiveness and popularity. In our model, self-
appraisal is modeled as the junior’s equilibrium belief about his ability. The second
element is actual appraisals of others. In our model, this is denoted by m. The last
element is reflected appraisals, meaning a person’s perception of actual appraisals.
In our model, this is denoted by r. Empirical research by social psychologists shows
that there are only weak correlations between actual appraisals, m, and reflected
appraisals, r (Felson, 1993). We capture this by gm(r). Furthermore, experimental
research suggests that if reflected appraisals are taken into account, actual appraisals
do not explain self-appraisals (Schrauger and Schoeneman, 1979). In our model,
reflected appraisals lead to self-appraisals through Bayes’ rule.
As mentioned above, in stage t = 1 and stage t = 2, the junior chooses whether
or not to perform a task. In these stages, the junior works independently and cannot
rely on the senior anymore. The payoff of performing a task depends on the junior’s
ability and his effort, et > 0:
Ut (Xt = 1) = aet −
1
2
e2t (2.1)
Not performing a task Xt = 0 yields,
Ut (Xt = 0) = z > 0 (2.2)
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The implication of z is that only if a exceeds a certain threshold, then the junior
should perform the task. Throughout, we assume that z < 1
2
, implying that juniors
exist who should perform the task.
If the junior chooses X1 = 1 in stage 1, then he observes his payoff and con-
sequently infers a. If X1 = 0, then the junior does not obtain new information
about his ability. Our model thus allows for two ways of developing a self-concept:
appraisal (the senior’s message) and experience. Notice that z > 0 implies that
learning is possibly costly. If z = 0, then he junior could exert a little effort to learn
a.
The senior cares about the junior. Her payoff is also given by (2.1) and (2.2).
The problem of both the senior and the junior is that the latter should perform the
task only if the task yields a payoff higher than z. This requires that the junior is
sufficiently able. Another problem is that in case the junior performs the task, he
must choose an effort level that accords with his ability.
Remark. In our model the senior provides information about the junior’s ability
by means of a simple message. For us, this simple message is a shortcut for something
much broader. For example, a message may reflect the way the senior coaches a
junior. A senior who gives the junior responsibilities may signal something else as a
senior who always assists her junior.
2.3 Equilibrium
Our game is a dynamic cheap-talk game. To solve the game, we apply the standard
Nash-Bayesian equilibrium concept, so that strategies are best responses to each
other, given beliefs, and beliefs follow from the strategies according to Bayes’ rule.3
2.3.1 Stage 2
Suppose that in stage 1 it is a best response of the junior to choose X1 = 1 with
e1 = aer = E (a | r) if r > r∗, and to choose X1 = 0 if r ≤ r∗. When analyzing the
3It is well-known that in cheap-talk games a pooling equilibrium always exists (see Crawford
and Sobel, 1982). This is also true for our model. We ignore this pooling equilibrium.
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second stage of the game, two cases have to be distinguished.
Case 1: X1 = 0
If it were optimal for the junior to choose X1 = 0 in stage 1, it is also optimal for
him to choose X2 = 0. To understand why, first recall that if X1 = 0, the junior
does not learn his ability. Learning requires that X1 = 1. As learning has not taken
place, the junior’s view on the project has not changed. Thus, there is an indirect
benefit of performing the task in stage 1. By choosing X1 = 1, the junior would have
learned his ability. This knowledge could be used when making a decision on X2.
The total expected benefit of X1 = 1 therefore exceeds the total expected benefit of
X2 = 1. Hence, if it were optimal for the junior to choose X1 = 0, it is optimal for
him to choose X2 = 0 too.
Case 2: X1 = 1
In this case, the junior has learned his ability. His decision on X2 is then relatively
easy. From (2.1) and (2.2) it is easy to see that if a junior opts for X2 = 1, he
chooses e2 = a. Moreover, X2 = 1 yields a higher payoff than X2 = 0 if 12a
2 > z or
a >
√
2z.
Notice that ideally the senior wants the junior to act similarly in stage 1. The
senior knows the junior’s ability from the beginning, and the senior’s and junior’s
preferences are perfectly aligned. Consequently, if the senior’s message were without
any noise, r = m, then an equilibrium would exist in which the senior sends m = a.
This strategy would induce the junior to act in his own interest. For future references,
we would like to emphasize three features of the outcomes for the case that r = m.
First, the senior’s appraisal would not be biased. Second, underconfidence (a > aer)
or overconfidence (a < aer) would not exist. Finally, learning by experience would
not play a role. Performing the task in stage 1 would not deliver useful information
for the junior’s decision on the task in stage 2 in addition to the senior’s message.
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2.3.2 Stage 1
The senior
For the moment we assume that in stage 1 it is a best response of the junior to
choose X1 = 1 with e1 = aer if r > r∗, and to choose X1 = 0 if r ≤ r∗. Furthermore
we assume that the junior’s beliefs imply that a higher value of m increases aer.
Let us begin by showing why truthfully revealing, that is always sending m = a,
cannot be part of an equilibrium. First suppose that a is low. We have already
established that if a ≤
√
2z, the junior should not perform the task. Therefore, for
a ≤
√
2z, the senior should minimize the probability that the junior performs the
task. She does so by sending m = 0.
Now suppose that a is just above
√
2z. In that case, e1 = a would yield a
payoff to the junior that is slightly higher than z in both periods. However, as a
result of imperfect communication, it is unlikely that the junior actually chooses
e1 = a. In particular, overconfidence would result in e1 > a and consequently in
U1 (X = 1) < z. The implication is that for a just above
√
2z performing the task
is likely to yield a payoff below 2z. The more a deviates from
√
2z, the higher is the
expected payoff of performing the task and the lower is the cost of overconfidence.
More generally, a value of a = a∗ >
√
2z exists, for which the senior is indifferent
between sending m = 0 and sending m > 0.
Now consider high values of a. Let us start with a = 1. Clearly, in that case, the
senior has no incentive to sendm < 1. She wants the junior to perform the task with
e1 = 1. The best the senior can do is sending m = 1. Now suppose that a is slightly
below 1. Through the posterior beliefs, sending m < 1, in expectation, impels the
junior to choose a lower level of effort than sending m = 1. We now argue that also
in this case it is optimal for the senior to send m = 1. The reason is twofold. First,
by sending m = 1, the senior maximizes the probability that the junior performs
the task (Pr (r > r∗ | m) increases in m). Staying passive rather than performing
the task does not only affect the payoff in period 1. As learning by doing does not
take place when X1 = 0, period 2 payoff falls from 12a
2 to z. The benefit of sending
m = 1 instead of m < 1 is thus an increase in the probability that the junior learns.
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The cost of sending m = 1 is a higher probability that the junior exerts too much
effort because of overconfidence (E (a | m = 1) > a). However, as a is close to 1,
both the probability of overconfidence and the cost of overconfidence are low. The
second reason why the senior may want to send m = 1 is that communication errors
are to some extent systematic. When a is close to 1, noise of communication is likely
to imply that aer < a. To compensate, the senior sends m = 1.
From the above discussion it follows that for high values of a, there are two ben-
efits of sending m = 1 rather than sending m < 1: first, it increases the probability
of learning, and second, it may correct a systematic error. The magnitude of these
benefits increases in a. The cost of sending m = 1 is a higher probability of over-
confidence. This cost diminishes as a increases. More generally, there exists a value
of a = a∗∗ for which the senior is indifferent between sending m = 1 and sending
m < 1.
So far, we have established three ranges of a: a ≤ a∗, a ≥ a∗∗ and a∗ < a < a∗∗.
For each of the first two ranges, the senior does not discriminate among juniors. For
a ≤ a∗, she sends m = 0, and for a ≥ a∗∗, she sends m = 1. For a∗ < a < a∗∗,
the senior neither wants to protect the junior fully against overconfidence nor wants
to protect the junior fully against passiveness. That is, the senior trades off the
costs of overconfidence and the costs of passiveness. Clearly, the higher is a, the
higher are the costs of passiveness, and the lower are the costs of overconfidence.
For a∗ < a < a∗∗, the senior’s strategy can now be characterized by m (a) with
m ∈ (0, 1) and m0 (a) > 0. For a’s just above a∗, m is smaller than a, whereas for
a’s just below a∗∗, m is larger than a.
The junior
After the junior has received r, he forms a belief about a. Let the density function
hr (a) [with cumulative distribution Hr (a)] denote this belief. Asm0 (a) ≥ 0 and the
probability of small errors exceeds the probability of large errors, the expected value
of a, aer =
1Z
0
ahr (a) da, is an increasing function of r. It is now easy to characterize
the junior’s best response. First, suppose that X1 = 1. Then, (2.1) implies that the
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junior chooses e1 = aer. Second, the junior chooses X1 = 1 if and only if r > r∗, with
r∗ solving
1
2
⎡
⎣
1Z
0
ahr∗ (a) da
⎤
⎦
2
+Hr∗
³√
2z
´
z +
h
1−Hr∗
³√
2z
´i
1Z
√
2z
1
2
a2hr∗ (a) da
£
1−Hr∗
¡√
2z
¢¤ = 2z
1
2
⎡
⎣
1Z
0
ahr∗ (a) da
⎤
⎦
2
+Hr∗
³√
2z
´
z +
1Z
√
2z
1
2
a2hr∗ (a) da = 2z (2.3)
The first term of (2.3) simply denotes the expected period 1 payoff when e1 = aer.
The second and third term of (2.3) denote the expected period 2 payoff for a junior
who has exerted effort in period 1. Because the junior only exerts effort in period
2 if a >
√
2z, together the second and third term are larger than z. This reflects
learning by doing. The implication is that the junior chooses X1 = 1 even if the
expected payoff for period 1 is lower than z. The difference between the first term
of (2.3) and z can be interpreted as the price the junior is willing to pay for learning
his ability.
Finally, we have to ensure that 0 < r∗ < 1. Two conditions must hold. First,
for r = 1, the left-hand side of (2.3) must be larger than 2z. Second, for r = 0,
the left-hand side of (2.3) must be smaller than 2z. These conditions require that
communication is not too noisy. In case communication is very noisy, it is optimal
for the junior not to rely on his senior when deciding on whether or not to perform
the task. For instance, if for r = 1, the left-hand side of (2.3) is lower than 2z,
the junior always abstains from performing the task. In that case, only a pooling
equilibrium exists. If for r = 0 the left-hand side of (2.3) is larger than 2z, then the
junior always performs the task. The senior’s message may affect the junior’s effort.
If an interior solution of r∗ exists, then the equilibrium is best characterized as a
semi-separating equilibrium. For some kinds of junior the senior chooses the same
action (for a ≤ a∗, the senior sends m = 0 and for a ≥ a∗, she sends m = 1), while
for other kinds the senior chooses different actions (for a∗ < a < a∗∗, the senior
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sends m (a)).
The discussion above can be summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1 Suppose a value of r∗, 0 < r∗ < 1, for which (2.3) holds. An
equilibrium exists in which (i) the junior chooses X2 = 0 if X1 = 0 ∨ a <
√
2z, and
chooses X2 = 1 with e2 = a if X1 = 1 ∧ a ≥
√
2z; (ii) the junior chooses X1 = 1
with e1 =
1Z
0
ahr (a) da if r > r∗, and X1 = 0 if r ≤ r∗; (iii) the senior sends m = 0
if a ≤ a∗, m = 1 if a ≥ a∗∗, and 0 < m (a) < 1 with m0 (a) > 0 if a∗ < a < a∗∗, and
0 < a∗ ≤ a∗∗ < 1; and (iv) posterior beliefs, hr (a), result from the senior’s strategy
according to Bayes’ rule.
How does Proposition 2.1 relate to the psychological literature discussed in the
introduction? One finding by social psychologists was that appraisals by others
are not accurate (Jones and Wortman, 1973). In our model seniors systematically
distort their feedback to the juniors. In particular, feedback is too positive to highly
able juniors (Brown and Dutton, 1995; Felson, 1993), and too negative to the least
able juniors. Another result of our model that is consistent with the literature is
that both over- and underconfidence exist (Kruger, 1999). A novel implication of
our model is that underconfidence leads to passivity and is therefore more persistent
than overconfidence. To produce more comparative-static results, we consider an
example in the next section.
2.4 An example
Assume that a is drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, 1], that is f (a) = 1.
Moreover, assume that the senior can send three messages, m ∈ {l, n, h}, m = l,
meaning "low ability", m = n, meaning "normal ability", and m = h, meaning
"high ability". The junior receives r ∈ {l, n, h}. Because of noise of communication
r may deviate from m. As to this noise, we assume:
Assumption 2.1 Pr(r = l | m = l) = Pr(r = n | m = n) = Pr(r = h | m = h) = α
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Assumption 2.2 Pr(r = n | m = l) = Pr(r = n | m = h) = 1− α
Assumption 2.3 Pr(r = l | m = n) = Pr(r = h | m = n) = 1
2
(1− α)
Assumption 2.4 α > 1
2
.
Assumption 2.1 states that the probability that the junior receives the correct mes-
sage equals α, and that this probability is independent of m. Assumption 2.2 and
2.3 imply that small communication errors are more likely than large ones. Notice
that by sending m = l (m = h), the senior can avoid that the junior receives r = h
(r = l).4 The assumption that α > 1
2
implies that the probability that r = m, is
higher than the probability that r 6= m. This assumption ensures that if the senior
wants the junior to receive message r = i the best she can do is sending message
m = i.
Finally, we simplify the model of the previous section by restricting the choice of
effort to three alternatives, et ∈
©
0, 1
2
, 1
ª
. As before, et = 0 amounts to maintaining
status quo, and learning requires et > 0. As in the present model the junior cannot
learn his ability by exerting an infinitesimal level of effort, we can assume that z = 0.
Let us now discuss the equilibrium for this example.
2.4.1 Stage 2
Suppose that in stage 1 it is a best response of the junior to act in line with the
message he has received: choose X1 = 0 if r = l, X1 = 1 with e1 = 12 if r = n,
and X1 = 1 with e1 = 1 if r = h. Suppose X1 = 0. Then, as in the general model,
it is also optimal for the junior to choose X2 = 0. Now suppose X1 = 1, implying
that the junior learns his ability. His decision then depends on the answer to the
question: for which values of a should the junior choose X2 = 0, X2 = 1 with e2 = 12 ,
or X2 = 1 with e2 = 1? Let aL denote the value of a for which the junior, knowing
a, is indifferent between X2 = 0 and X2 = 1 with e2 = 12 . aL follows from [see (2.1)
4We have set Pr(r = h | m = l) = Pr(r = l | m = h) at zero rather than at small positive
values to reduce notation. What matters for the results is that by choosing m = h (m = l), the
senior minimizes the probability that the junior receives r = l (r = h).
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and (2.2) with z = 0]
1
2
a− 1
8
= 0⇒ a = aL =
1
4
(2.4)
Furthermore, let aH denote the value of a for which the junior, knowing a, is indif-
ferent between X2 = 1 with e2 = 12 and X2 = 1 with e2 = 1. aH follows from
1
2
a− 1
8
= a− 1
2
⇒ a = aH =
3
4
(2.5)
Equations (2.4-2.5) imply that in stage 2 all three options may be optimal for the
junior. For a ∈ [0, 1
4
], the junior chooses X2 = 0; for a ∈ (14 ,
3
4
), the junior chooses
X2 = 1 with e2 = 12 ; and for a ∈ [
3
4
, 1], the junior chooses X2 = 1 with e2 = 1.
2.4.2 The senior
Generally, the senior wants the junior to choose X1 = 0 for low values of a, to
choose X1 = 1 with e1 = 12 for intermediate values of a, and to choose X1 = 1 with
e1 = 1 for high values of a. Against this background, it is natural to assume that
the senior’s strategy can be represented by:
m (a) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
m = l if a ≤ a∗
m = n if a∗ ≤ a < a∗∗
m = h if a ≥ a∗∗
(2.6)
Let us first establish that α < 1 has consequences for the senior’s strategy.
Lemma 2.1 Suppose that the junior chooses X1 = 0 if r = l, X1 = 1 with e1 = 12
if r = n, and X1 = 1 with e1 = 1 if r = h. Then, aL < a∗ and a∗∗ < aH.
Proof. Suppose that a = aL. Then, for α = 1, both players are indifferent between
X1 = 0 and X1 = 1 with e1 = 12 . Clearly, X1 = 1 with e1 = 1 yields a lower payoff.
The inequality α < 1 implies that m = n may impel the junior to choose X1 = 1
with e1 = 1. Sending m = l, by contrast, never leads the junior to choose X1 = 1
with e1 = 1. Hence, the senior strictly prefers sending m = l to sending m = n.
Now suppose that a = aH . Then, both players are indifferent between X1 = 1 with
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e1 = 12 and X1 = 1 with e1 = 1, while X1 = 0 yields a lower payoff. By sending
m = h, the senior can avoid that the junior chooses the inferior option X1 = 0.
Hence, the senior strictly prefers sending m = h to sending m = n. Q.E.D.
To understand the intuition behind Lemma 2.1, first consider a junior whose
ability is just above aL. In this situation, the senior ideally wants the junior to
perform the task with moderate effort. However, the senior really wants to prevent
the junior to exert too much effort. The costs of overconfidence are much higher
than the costs of underconfidence. To avoid overconfidence, and in turn e1 = 1, the
senior sends r = l. Now consider a junior whose ability is just below aH . In that
situation, the worst case is that the junior chooses not to perform the task. Then,
the benefits of the project in period 1 are foregone, and the junior will not learn
his ability. Clearly, the cost of underconfidence are now higher than the costs of
overconfidence. By sending m = h the senior is sure to avoid a situation in which
the junior chooses not to perform the task.
Let us now determine the equilibrium values of a∗ and a∗∗. For a = a∗, the
senior is indifferent between sending m = l and sending m = n. Suppose that the
senior sends m = l. Then, with probability α, the junior receives r = l and does
not perform the task. With probability 1−α, the junior receives r = n and chooses
X1 = 1 with e1 = 12 . In that case, the junior learns that a = a
∗ > aL, implying that
he will also choose X2 = 1 with e2 = 12 in stage 2. Thus, m = l yields an expected
payoff to the junior equal to
2 (1− α)
µ
1
2
a∗ − 1
8
¶
(2.7)
Now suppose that the senior sendsm = n. Then, with probability 1
2
(1−α) the junior
receives r = l and does not perform the task. With probability α the junior receives
r = n, and performs the task with e1 = 12 . Finally, with probability
1
2
(1− α), the
junior performs the task with effort e1 = 1. In the latter two cases, the junior learns
that a = aL, leading him to choose X2 = 1 with e2 = 12 in stage 2. Sending m = n
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yields an expected payoff to the junior equal to
3
4
a∗ +
1
4
αa∗ − 5
16
+
1
16
α (2.8)
It is easy to verify that (2.7) equals (2.8) for
a∗ =
1 + 3α
20α− 4 (2.9)
Equation (2.9) illustrates the trade-off the senior faces when she must choose between
sending m = l and sending m = n. On the one hand, she knows that the junior
is (just) sufficiently able to perform the task when a = a∗. Therefore, the more
confident the senior is that m = n induces the junior to choose X1 = 1 with e = 12
(that is the higher is α), the more she tends to send m = n. On the other hand, the
senior fears that by sending m = n the junior will put too much effort on the task.
For a = a∗∗, the senior is indifferent between sending m = h and sending m = n.
Lemma 2.1 states that for a = a∗∗, a junior, knowing his ability, chooses to perform
the task with moderate effort. Thus, if the junior chooses X1 = 1 in stage 1, he will
choose X2 = 1 with e2 = 12 in stage 2. Consequently, sending m = n yields a payoff
equal to (2.8) with a∗∗ instead of a∗. Moreover, straightforward algebra shows that
sending m = h yields a payoff to both the senior and the junior equal to
a∗∗ +
1
2
αa∗∗ − 1
4
− 3
8
α (2.10)
Equation (2.8), with a∗ replaced by a∗∗, equals (2.10) for
a∗∗ =
7α− 1
4 (1 + α)
(2.11)
Equation (2.11) shows that the lower is α, the more the senior is inclined to send
m = h. In deciding to send m = h or m = n, the senior compares two costs. First,
the costs of underconfidence. By sending m = n, the senior runs the risk that the
junior receives r = l and consequently does not perform the task in stage 1. In that
case, the junior does not learn her ability and will not perform the task in stage
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2 either. Second, the costs of overconfidence. By sending m = h the junior will
expend too much effort (recall a∗∗ < aH = 34). Notice that this cost is limited to
stage 1. As learning by doing takes place, the junior will choose X2 = 1 with e2 = 12
in stage 2.
The following proposition summarizes the above discussion.
Proposition 2.2 Suppose that the junior chooses X1 = 0 if r = l, X1 = 1 with
e1 = 12 if r = n, and X1 = 1 with e1 = 1 if r = h. Then, the senior sends m = l if
a ≤ 1+3α
20α−4 , m = h if a ≥
7α−1
4(1+α) and m = n otherwise.
A direct implication of the above proposition is that if α = 1
2
, then the senior
never sends m = n.
2.4.3 Evaluation of the example
Let us now go back to the social psychologists’ findings on self-assessments discussed
in the introduction. Data on self-assessments are usually based on experiments. In
these experiments, persons - often undergraduates - are asked to rate a certain skill
on some scale. Researchers use different scales. For example, Kruger (1999) uses a
scale from 1 to 10, while Ehrlinger and Dunning (2003) use a 3-point scale in one of
their experiments. How would juniors from our model rate themselves?
In our example 25 percent of the juniors should not perform the task; 50 percent
should perform the task with moderate effort; and 25 percent should perform the
task with high effort. Suppose that the juniors are asked to rate their abilities in
stage 1, that is, after they have received message r. In line with the senior’s message
space we assume a 3-point scale: low ability, normal ability, and high ability. It seems
natural to assume that when asked to their ability, the juniors from our model report
the message they have received from their senior. This means that if α = 1, abilities
and self-assessments do not differ (see Figure 2.1)
28 A Simple Model of Self-Assessment
25%
50%
25%
low ability normal ability high ability
Figure 2.1
Now suppose that α = 0.7. With the help of Proposition 2.2, it is easy to
calculate the frequencies with which the senior sends the three possible messages.
Figure 2.2 gives the distribution of m.
31%
26%
43%
low ability normal ability high ability
Figure 2.2
Using Assumption (2.1-2.3) and the percentages given in Figure 2.2, we can
calculate the messages the juniors receive and thus their self-assessments. Figure
2.3 gives the results.
2.4 An example 29
26%
40%
34%
low ability normal ability high ability
Figure 2.3
A comparison between Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.3 shows that the tails in Figure
2.3 are thicker than in Figure 2.1. Almost 35 percent of the juniors report that
they have a high ability, while only 25 percent of the juniors actually have a high
ability. Another feature of Figure 2.3 is that the distribution of self-assessments
is skewed to the right. It is tempting to conclude from this skewness that our
model predicts inflated self-assessments. As the distribution of actual abilities is
symmetric, there is an "above average effect". However, as long as the juniors make
correct statistical inferences, overconfidence (or underconfidence) does not exist on
average. To understand why, consider a junior who has received r = h. If rational,
this junior takes into account that (1) the senior may have sent m = n or m = h;
and (2) the senior has sent a message in line with the values of a∗ and a∗∗ reported
in Proposition 2.1. In that case, the junior does not make a systematic error when
assessing his ability.
In our model overconfidence induces juniors to put too much effort in the task.
Underconfidence induces juniors to remain passive, while they would have benefited
from performing the task. Misperceptions of abilities are partly caused by noise in
the communication (α < 1). For example, a moderately talented junior may abstain
from performing a task because he mistakenly infers from his senior’s message that
he is untalented. More interesting are the cases in which the junior’s misperception
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is "intended by the senior". We have seen that when a ∈ [a∗∗, aH), the senior sends
a message which is likely to induce a junior to expend too much effort on the task.
Such a junior is overconfident. Notice that overconfidence is temporary. Because
the junior performs the task, he will learn his ability. This feature of the model
is consistent with the observation that "performance is a better predictor of self-
appraisals than the appraisals of others" (Felson, 1989, p. 965). When a ∈ (aL, a∗]
the senior is likely to induce a junior who would benefit from performing the task
to abstain from performing the task. In that case, the junior is underconfident. As
for a ∈ (aL, a∗] underconfidence leads to passiveness, underconfidence is permanent.
Also notice that because underconfidence leads to passiveness and overconfidence
leads to activism, underconfidence is relatively hidden. It is easier to observe that
somebody has overestimated his ability than that somebody has underestimated his
ability.
In Figure 2.2, the distribution of the senior’s messages is skewed to the right. To
show that this result does not depend on the specific value of α chosen, we compare
the length of the interval (aL, a∗] with the length of the interval [a∗∗, aH). Straight-
forward algebra shows that aH−a∗∗ = (1−α)1+α > a∗−aL =
1−α
10α−2 for
1
2
≤ α < 1. Hence,
consistent with the empirical findings, our model predicts that on average appraisals
are too positive. The reason for this result is that the costs of causing overconfi-
dence (too much effort) are lower than the costs of underconfidence (passiveness).
As discussed above, overconfidence disappears in stage 2, but underconfidence does
not disappear in stage 2. Indeed, one can verify that if we eliminate stage 2 from
our model, then we obtain aH − a∗∗ = 14α −
1
4
= a∗ − aL.
2.5 Concluding remarks
We have developed a simple model of self-assessments in order to explain some
observations made by social psychologists. In this model, a junior has limited in-
formation about his ability. He can learn about his ability by information provided
by a senior and by experience. We have shown that when communication between
the senior and the junior is noisy, the senior may have an incentive to give too
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positive appraisals to more talented juniors and too negative appraisals to less tal-
ented juniors. On average, the senior’s appraisals are too positive. Concerning
self-assessments, our model predicts the well-known "above average effect": the dis-
tribution of self-assessments is skewed to the right, while the distribution of actual
abilities is symmetric. Nevertheless, in our model some juniors believe they are less
able than they actually are. In this respect, our model deviates from most other
economic models of self-assessments that predict that all agents are overconfident
(references are in the introduction). Finally, we have argued that when overcon-
fidence or underconfidence matters for behaviour, there is an important difference
between the two. Underconfidence leads to passiveness, which obstructs learning by
experience. In contrast, overconfidence leads to activism, which enhances learning
by experience. The implication is that underconfidence is more permanent, while
overconfidence is more temporary.
In order to highlight the role of imperfect communication and the possibility
of learning by doing in the self-appraisal process, we have made several restrictive
assumptions. We have already discussed some of them. Let us elaborate on two
other ones.
First, we have assumed that by performing the task, the junior fully learns his
ability. In many situations, this assumption is not realistic. However, assuming that
by performing the task the junior receives a noisy signal about his ability rather
than a fully informative signal does not affect our results qualitatively. Relative to
underconfidence, overconfidence remains a temporary phenomenon. Things become
more complicated when the degree of learning depends on effort. One can imagine
situations in which the degree of learning is positively related to effort. In that case,
the junior will be more biased towards performing the task with higher effort.
A second important assumption is that the junior’s and senior’s preferences
are perfectly aligned. A natural extension of our model is to allow for conflict-
ing preferences. Suppose, for example, that the senior’s preferences are identical to
those of the junior, except that the senior attaches less cost to the junior’s effort:
Ust (Xt = 1) = aet−λse2t , with λs < 12 . The junior’s preferences are still represented
by (2.1). It is easy to verify that in the resulting model, three types of equilibria
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exist. A separating equilibrium exists if λs is close to 12 . The outcomes are simi-
lar to those discussed in the previous section, save that the senior has a stronger
incentive to exaggerate her junior’s ability. Thus, λs < 12 strengthens the senior’s
tendency towards too positive feedback. If λs is smaller than a certain threshold,
it is not a best reply for the junior anymore to act in accordance with his senior’s
message. The senior inflates the junior’s ability too much. For moderate values
of λs a partially separating equilibrium exists, in which the senior only sends two
messages, say m = n and m = h. Finally, for very small values of λs, it is a best
response for the junior to ignore the senior’s message completely, and to base his
decision on the task on his prior information. That is, only a pooling equilibrium
exists. The upshot of this discussion is that λs < 12 increases the senior’s incentive
to give too positive feedback. This stronger incentive may partially or fully distort
communication between the senior and the junior.
Chapter 3
The Effect of a Mentor on a
Junior Employee’s Self-Assessment
3.1 Introduction
An individual’s perception about his ability affects the choices he makes. A junior
employee who has a low perception of his ability may decide that he is not sufficiently
able to continue with his current job. As long as his perceived ability corresponds to
his actual ability the junior takes the correct decision. A low perception, however,
is problematic if the actual ability is high. Then, a low perception may be the
reason that a talented junior employee decides to resign and leave the organization.
Phillips (1984) shows that highly competent children with a low perception of their
ability adopt lower standards and hold lower expectations for success than highly
competent children with a more positive view of their ability. An implication may be
that negative and distorted self-appraisals persist, because intellectually competent
children avoid tasks that could provide evidence about their abilities. Ehrlinger and
Dunning (2003) point out that one possible reason why women disproportionately
avoid careers in science is that they underestimate their scientific reasoning ability.
The relationship between the individual’s perception of his ability and the indi-
vidual’s actual ability has predominantly been investigated by social psychologists.
A well-known finding in social psychology is that agents rate themselves above av-
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erage. For car driving Svenson (1981) shows that individuals believe themselves to
be better drivers than others in the group. Kruger (1999), however, shows that
this bias is only observed if individuals are asked to rate their performance on easy
tasks. He shows that for domains in which absolute skills tend to be high (using
mouse, driving, riding bicycle, saving money), a majority of people see themselves
better than average, while for domains in which absolute skills tend to be low (telling
jokes, playing chess, juggling, and computer programming), a majority of people see
themselves worse than average.1 ,2
We present a model that underpins the finding that people rate themselves above
average on easy tasks and below average on difficult tasks. We consider a setting
in which agents do not observe their ability, but they use their performance on a
task to make an inference. The problem faced by the agent is that performance
not only depends on the agent’s ability, but also on the unknown difficulty of the
performed task. Hence, an average performance may be the result of a competent
agent performing a difficult task, or of an average agent performing an easy task.
The agent only observes performance. Therefore, when making a self-assessment on
the basis of his performance on a difficult task, the agent must take into account
the possibility that the performed task was easy and he is of lower ability. The
consequence is that an agent who has performed a difficult task underestimates his
ability. A similar argument holds for an agent performing an easy task.
A junior employee could be an example of an agent who faces the uncertainties
that lead to the above finding. At the beginning of his career, a junior employee
rarely knows his own ability. Besides, a junior who has recently joined the organiza-
tion is unable to assess the difficulty of different tasks in the organization. Frequently,
the only available information to the junior is his performance on a task. Based on
1Kruger’s result has been replicated in other experiments (Hoelzl and Rustichini, 2005; Moore
and Kim, 2003; Hales and Kachelmeier, 2005).
2Within the psychology literature there is a strand that finds the opposite relationship between
task difficulty and confidence. This strand presents evidence that greater task difficulty leads to
greater absolute confidence, the so-called hard/easy effect in overconfidence (see Klayman et al.
(1999) and other studies cited therein). The distinction is that Klayman et al (1999) investigate
confidence in predicting absolute performance, whereas Kruger (1999) and related studies, look at
performance relative to others (see Moore and Kim (2003) and Hales and Kachelmeier (2005) for
greater detail on this distinction).
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this performance, the junior can make an inference on his ability and the difficulty
of the task. Having a more precise image of his ability, enables the junior to improve
future decisions. The drawback of using performance to make an inference about his
ability is that a junior who has performed a difficult task underestimates his ability.
An implication is that sometimes a talented junior may decide to stop performing a
task after learning his performance on a difficult task. The organization can prevent
this by appointing a senior employee who acts as the junior’s mentor. A senior em-
ployee has more experience and therefore is better able to discern easy tasks from
difficult tasks. Besides, she is better able to assess the junior’s ability.
The benefit of appointing a mentor, if the preferences of the junior and the
mentor are perfectly aligned, is that a mentor takes care of a better match between
task difficulty and the junior’s ability. In many settings, however, the preferences
of the mentor and the junior are not perfectly aligned. A reason may be that the
junior incurs costs to perform a task and the mentor does not. In this situation
the mentor sometimes has an incentive to conceal information. Consequently, some
juniors do not learn about the difficulty of the task and about their ability. The
implication is that if performing a task is sufficiently costly for the junior, some
talented juniors may decide to stop performing the task. Having talented juniors
leave the organization is both costly for the organization and for the mentor. The
mentor can prevent these juniors from leaving the organization, by assigning them
an easy task. After observing the performance on an easy task, the junior decides
to continue performing a task and eventually he learns his ability.
This chapter sheds light on the benefits of appointing a mentor. The mentor
relationship has been widely investigated in the management literature.3 Kram
(1985) defines the mentor relationship as "a relationship between a young adult
and an older, more experienced adult that helps the younger individual learn to
navigate in the adult world and the world of work" (p.2 ). Specially in early adult-
hood a mentor relationship can enhance development (see Kram, 1983). Fagenson
(1989) shows that "mentored individuals reported having more satisfaction, career
mobility/opportunity, recognition and a higher promotion rate than non-mentored
3See Burke and McKeen (1990) and Ehrich and Hansford (1999) for a review of the literature.
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individuals" (p. 309). This chapter not only considers the benefits of introducing
a mentor, but it also considers what happens if the preferences of the mentor and
the junior are not perfectly aligned. Most of the management literature compares
non-mentored to mentored individuals. Ragins, Cotton and Miller (2000), however,
point out that a mentor alone does not automatically lead to better outcomes. What
is important for outcomes is the quality of the mentor relationship. Ragins et al.
show that satisfaction with the mentor relationship has a greater impact on atti-
tudes than the presence of a mentor. Allen and Eby (2003) performed a survey
under mentors. They find that the more similar the protégé and the mentor are,
the higher the reported quality of the mentor relationship is. This chapter presents
a similar result. The more aligned are the preferences of the mentor and the junior,
the greater are the benefits the mentor and the junior derive from the relationship.
A key aspect in this chapter is that the mentor is better informed and therefore
has information that is valuable to the junior. A recent paper by Ertac (2005)
pays attention to the decision of a principal about the amount of information to
disclose about the agent’s performance and the performance of other agents in the
organization. She also considers a model in which performance depends on a common
shock (for example, task difficulty) and the agent’s ability. Her analysis focuses on
exploring whether and when it is optimal for the principal to inform agents about
each other’s performance. Information about the performance of other agents is
useful to separate the effect of the common shock from the effect of ability. The
focus of this chapter is more on the consequences of incomplete information. In this
chapter, the junior always observes his performance and he uses this information to
make an inference on his ability and the difficulty of the task. The role of the senior
is to take away some uncertainty on the part of the junior.
More broadly, this chapter is related to several economic papers that recently
have appeared on the topic of self-assessment of abilities. These papers investigate
why people are overoptimistic about certain life-events (see Van den Steen, 2004),
why people may decide not to collect information for strategic purposes (Carrillo
and Mariotti (2000) and Bénabou and Tirole (2002)), and why people may keep
buying signals until their self-assessment is sufficiently favourable (Zábojník (2004)
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and Brocas and Carrillo (2002)). A drawback of these papers is that they only pay
attention to overconfidence. In the experiments we have mentioned above, however,
people exist who hold unrealistically negative impressions of their abilities.
In Chapter 2 we have presented a model that pays attention to both overconfi-
dence and underconfidence. The main difference is that in this chapter individuals
not only lack information about their ability but also have no information about the
difficulty of the performed task.
Besides the model discussed in Chapter 2, there is one economic paper that
takes into account underconfidence. Santos-Pinto and Sobel (2005) present a model
in which negative self-image is a theoretical possibility. However, the skill acquisi-
tion model discussed in their paper provides a setting in which positive self-image
can arise, but no negative self-image. "Negative self-image is a theoretical possibil-
ity within our model, but we do not have a realistic model to choice that generates
negative self-image" (Santos-Pinto and Sobel, 2005, p. 1390). In their model, ability
consists of different skills and individuals have heterogeneous production functions
that determine ability as a function of multiple skills. Using their own production
function, individuals make skill-enhancing investments to maximize ability and com-
pare their final skills to the skills of other individuals. One result of their paper is
that the easier is the task, the greater is the individuals positive self-image.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the
model. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 discuss an equilibrium of the model. Section 3.5 presents
the consequences of introducing a mentor. Finally, section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Model
We consider a simple model in which a junior has to perform a task in an organi-
zation. Tasks can be easy (d = 0) or difficult (d = 1). With a probability of γ the
task is difficult and with a probability of 1 − γ the task is easy. The junior does
not know which type of task he is performing. He only knows the prior probability
that the task is difficult. Furthermore, we assume that juniors differ in ability. The
junior does not know his own ability. He only knows that abilities are uniformly
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distributed on the interval [0, 1].
At the beginning of the game, Nature draws the difficulty of tasks and the junior’s
ability. In stage 1, the junior performs a task. He observes his performance on the
task. The junior’s performance (p) on a task depends on the difficulty of the task
and on the junior’s ability (a). We model this in the following way.
Assumption 3.1 If the performed task is difficult, then performance is p = a2,
implying a density function of p: g (p) = 1
2
√
p .
Assumption 3.2 If the performed task is easy, then performance is p = a, implying
a density function of p: f (p) = 1.
Assumption 3.1 and Assumption 3.2 capture that the same ability leads to a better
performance on an easy task than on a difficult task. Notice that, on average, the
junior attains a better performance on an easy task (E [p | d = 0] = 1
2
) than on a
difficult task (E [p | d = 1] = 1
3
).
In stage 2, the junior decides whether to (i) stop performing the task (X = 0),
(ii) continue performing the same task (X = 1) or (iii) perform a new task (X = 2).
In the latter case, Nature draws the difficulty of the new task.
The junior wants to make a contribution to the organization by performing a
task, but performing a task is costly. Specifically, the utility of the junior is given
by
U = dαp+ (1− d) p− c (3.1)
where d ∈ {0, 1} is the difficulty of the performed task and c denotes the cost of
performing a task.4 The first two terms of (3.1) correspond to the junior’s contribu-
tion to the organization. The junior’s contribution depends on the difficulty of the
performed task and on the junior’s ability. The junior does not observe his contri-
bution to the organization, he only observes his performance on the task. At this
point my model deviates from traditional economic models where the junior knows
4We have assumed that performing an easy task costs the same to the junior as performing a
difficult task. Assuming that the costs of performing a difficult task are larger than the costs of
performing an easy task, does not change the results qualitatively.
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the utility he derives from his actions.5
We assume that α > 1. This assumption implies that, given p, the junior derives
a higher utility from performing a difficult task than from performing an easy task.
The idea behind this assumption is that, given the junior’s performance, his contri-
bution to the firm is greater if he performs a difficult task than if he performs an
easy task. If the junior does not perform a task his utility is normalized to zero.
Let us summarize the timing of the model. (1) Nature determines the difficulty of
tasks and Nature draws the junior’s ability, a, from a uniform distribution on [0, 1].
(2) In stage 1, the junior performs a task and learns his performance, p1 ∈ [0, 1]. (3)
In stage 2, the junior decides whether to (i) stop performing the task, (ii) continue
performing the same task, or (iii) perform a new task. In the latter case, Nature
draws the difficulty of the new task, d ∈ {0, 1}. If the junior stops performing a
task, the game ends.
3.3 First stage
In the first stage of the model, the junior does not have to take any decision. This
stage can be seen as a learning stage for the junior. The junior performs a task to
obtain information about his ability. By performing a task, the junior learns his
performance on the task. The first thing a junior does, is updating his ability. The
junior’s expected ability, given his performance of p, equals
aep = E [a | p]
= Pr (d = 0 | p)E [a | d = 0 ∧ p] + Pr (d = 1 | p)E [a | d = 1 ∧ p]
=
f (p) (1− γ)
f (p) (1− γ) + g (p) γ · p+
g (p) γ
f (p) (1− γ) + g (p) γ ·
√
p
=
(2p (1− γ) + γ)√p
2
√
p (1− γ) + γ
Because of the positive relation between ability and performance, it is not sur-
5Recently some economic paper assume that individuals derive utility from their beliefs (see
Brocas and Carrillo (2003) for a discussion).
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prising that the better is the observed performance, the higher is the expected ability
(∂a
e
p
∂p > 0). Furthermore, the expected ability depends on the prior probability that
the task is difficult. An increase in γ, has a positive effect on aep (
∂aep
∂γ > 0). The
reason is that an increase in γ indicates a greater probability of having performed
a difficult task. To attain a performance of p on a difficult task the junior needs to
have a higher ability than to attain the same performance on an easy task. Hence,
the greater is γ, the greater is aep.
Determining how juniors rate themselves
Next, we want to determine how juniors rate themselves on two tasks, task 1 (t1)
and task 2 (t2). Task 1 is a difficult task and task 2 is an easy task. The junior does
not know the difficulty of the task, he only observes his performance on the task.
Suppose that a junior in the model is asked to rate himself after performing task 1.
Then, the junior will report
aet1 =
1Z
0
aep · g (p) dp =
1Z
0
(2p (1− γ) + γ)√p
2
√
p (1− γ) + γ ·
1
2
√
p
dp
The average ability reported by juniors performing a difficult task is smaller than the
average ability of juniors in the model (see Appendix A). This means that juniors
performing a difficult task, on average, tend to rate themselves below average. The
intuition is that a junior does not know that he has performed a difficult task. There-
fore, when he determines his expected ability he takes into account the possibility
that he has performed an easy task and is of lower ability.
Next, suppose that a junior in the model has performed task 2 (t2). Then the
average expected ability reported by juniors that have performed task 2 equals
aet2 =
1Z
0
aep · f (p) dp =
1Z
0
(2p (1− γ) + γ)√p
2
√
p (1− γ) + γ dp
The average expected ability reported by juniors performing a difficult task is greater
than the average ability of juniors in the model (see Appendix A). This means that
juniors, who have performed an easy task, on average, rate themselves above average.
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Again the explanation for this result lies in the fact that a junior does not know the
difficulty of the task. Consequently, when determining his expected ability, the
junior takes into account the possibility that he performed a difficult task and is of
higher ability.
Proposition 3.1 On average, juniors performing a difficult task rate themselves
below average and juniors performing an easy task rate themselves above average.
This feature of the model is consistent with the observation by Kruger (1999)
that for easy domains a majority of people see themselves better as average, while
for more challenging domains, a majority of people see themselves as worse than
average.
3.4 Second stage
In this section we consider the decision of the junior in the second stage. We assume
that the junior performs a task in the first stage.
Assumption 3.3 If the junior has no information about his ability and the difficulty
of the task, then he decides to perform a task.
In the second stage, the junior has to decide whether to stop performing a task,
continue with the same task, or perform a new task. First, We consider the bench-
mark situation where the junior is fully informed about the difficulty of tasks and
about his ability. Second, we consider the situation where the junior only observes
his performance on the task.
3.4.1 Benchmark: junior observes performance and diffi-
culty of the task
Given his ability, the junior has to choose between (i) not performing a task, (ii)
performing an easy task, and (iii) performing a difficult task.
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Let a0 be the ability of a junior who is indifferent between not performing a task
and performing an easy task.
ao − c = 0 −→ a0 = c
Let a1 be the ability of a junior who is indifferent between performing an easy task
and performing a difficult task.
αa21 − c = a1 − c −→ a1 =
1
α
If c < 1α , the strategy of the junior is: (i) perform no task if a ∈ [0, c), (ii) perform
an easy task if a ∈
£
c, 1α
¢
, and (iii) perform a difficult task if a ∈
£
1
α , 1
¤
. Throughout
the rest of the chapter we assume that c < 1α .
3.4.2 The junior only observes performance
In many settings, however, the junior does not know the difficulty of the task.
Therefore, in this section, we consider the situation where the junior only observes
his performance. Based on his observed performance, in stage 2, the junior decides
whether to (i) stop performing the task (X = 0), (ii) continue performing the same
task (X = 1), or (iii) perform a new task (X = 2). Suppose that the junior
observes a performance of p. Then, performing the same task again leads to the
same performance of p. The junior’s utility of performing the same task again
equals
E [U | X = 1] = bγαp+ (1− bγ) p− c
where bγ is the posterior probability that the performed task is difficult
bγ = Pr (d = 1 | p) = g (p) γ
f (p) (1− γ) + g (p) γ
=
γ
2
√
p (1− γ) + γ
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The better is performance, the greater is the probability that the performed task is
easy. More precisely, for p > 1
4
, bγ < γ.
The junior can also decide to perform a new task. With probability bγ the junior
performed a difficult task in the first stage. Then a performance of p corresponds to
a junior with an ability of
√
p. In the second stage the junior employee’s contribution
to the organization of performing a new task equals αp if the new task is difficult
and equals
√
p if the new task is easy. With probability (1−bγ) the junior performed
an easy task in the first stage. Then a performance of p corresponds to a junior
with an ability of p. In this situation the junior’s contribution to the organization
of performing a new task in the second stage equals αp2 if the new task is difficult
and equals p if the new task is easy. Hence, the expected utility of performing a new
task is
E [U | X = 2] = bγ (γαp+ (1− γ)√p) + (1− bγ) ¡γαp2 + (1− γ) p¢− c
Finally not performing the task yields a payoff of zero.
First, we focus on the juniors choice between performing the same task again
(X = 1) and performing a new task (X = 2). The junior is indifferent between the
two options if
(1− bγ) γ ¡αp2 − p¢− bγ (1− γ) (αp−√p) = 0 (3.2)
Lemma 3.1 presents the roots of equation (3.2).
Lemma 3.1 The junior is indifferent between X = 1 and X = 2 if p = 0, p = pL
and p = pH, where pL ∈
³
0,
¡
1
α
¢2´
and pH ∈
¡
1
α , 1
¢
.
Proof. See Appendix B.
To understand the intuition behind Lemma 3.1 consider Figure 3.1. In the fig-
ure, curve A (curve B) gives the relationship between the junior’s ability and his
performance on a difficult task (an easy task). Curve C (B) gives for each ability
the corresponding junior’s utility derived from contributing to the firm by perform-
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ing a difficult task (an easy task).6 More precisely, curve C corresponds to αp. A
junior who has an ability equal to 1α (intersection between curve B and curve C) is
indifferent between performing an easy task and a difficult task.
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Figure 3.1
Suppose that the junior observes a performance of p ∈
h¡
1
α
¢2 , 1αi. This per-
formance corresponds either to a junior with an ability a ∈
h
1
α ,
q
1
α
i
performing a
difficult task or to a junior with an ability a ∈
h¡
1
α
¢2 , 1αi performing an easy task.
Let us consider the two cases separately. First, let us consider a junior with an abil-
ity a ∈
h
1
α ,
q
1
α
i
performing a difficult task. Ideally, a junior with an ability greater
than 1α performs a difficult task (see benchmark in section 3.4.1). Also the figure
6Notice that if the junior performs an easy task, then his contribution to the firm equals
his performance. Hence, the relationship between ability and performance and the relationship
between ability and the junior’s utility derived from his contribution to the firm, are represented
by B.
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shows that this junior derives a greater utility from performing a difficult task than
from performing an easy task (curve C lies above curve B). Hence, the junior is
performing the task that yields the highest possible utility. Second, let us consider
a junior with an ability a ∈
h¡
1
α
¢2 , 1αi performing an easy task. Ideally, a junior
with an ability smaller than 1α performs an easy task (curve C lies below curve B).
Hence, also in this case the junior is performing the task that yields the highest pos-
sible utility. Summarizing, a junior who observes a performance of p ∈
h¡
1
α
¢2 , 1αi
is performing the task he would perform under full information. Consequently, the
junior has no incentive to perform a new task and chooses X = 1.
Now suppose that the junior observes a p just below
¡
1
α
¢2
. Then, there are two
possibilities. First, a performance just below
¡
1
α
¢2
can result from a junior with an
ability just below 1α performing a difficult task. Ideally, this junior would like to
perform an easy task. In this situation performing a new task would reduce the
probability that the junior performs a difficult task in the second stage, increasing
the junior’s utility. With a probability of (1− γ) the new task is easy. Then the
gains of option X = 2 are given by the difference between curve C and curve B at
the point a = 1α − ε. The figure immediately shows that the gains are infinitesimally
small. With probability γ the new task is difficult and then there are no gains
from performing a new task. Hence, the gains from option X = 2 in this case are
nil. Second, a performance just below
¡
1
α
¢2
can result from a junior with an ability
just below
¡
1
α
¢2
performing an easy task. In this situation, the junior is performing
the task he would choose under full information. Choosing to perform a new task
increases the probability that the new task is difficult, resulting in a smaller utility
for the junior. With a probability of γ the new task is difficult. Then, the costs
of performing a new task are given by D. With a probability of (1− γ) the new
task is easy and there are no costs of choosing X = 2. When making the choice
between X = 1 and X = 2 the junior trades-off the costs of performing a new task
and the benefits. If performance is just below
¡
1
α
¢2
the costs exceed the benefits.
Consequently, the junior chooses to perform the same task again (X = 1). The
figure also illustrates that the smaller is the observed performance, the greater are
the benefits resulting from performing a new task and the smaller are the costs. More
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generally, there exists a value p = pL ∈
³
0,
¡
1
α
¢2´
at which the junior is indifferent
between performing the same task again and performing a new task.
Finally, suppose that the junior observes a p just above 1α . Then a similar
argument holds. Again, there are two possibilities. First, a performance just above
1
α can result from a junior with ability just above
1
α performing an easy task. Ideally,
the junior would like to perform a difficult task. In this situation performing a new
task would increase the probability that the junior performs a difficult task in the
second stage, increasing the junior’s utility. The gains of option X = 2 are that
with a probability of γ the new task is difficult and the additional utility derived
from option X = 2 is given by the difference between curve C and curve B at the
point a = 1α + ε. The figure immediately shows that the gains are infinitesimally
small. Second, a performance just above 1α , can result from a junior with an ability
just above
q
1
α performing a difficult task. Ideally this junior performs a difficult
task. Performing a new task increases the probability that the new task is easy,
decreasing the junior’s utility. The costs of performing a new task are that with a
probability of (1− γ) the new task is easy and the utility decreases by E. Again, the
junior trades-off the costs of performing a new task and the benefits, when making
a choice between X = 1 and X = 2 . If performance is just above 1α , the costs
exceed the benefits. If the observed performance is p = 1, then the left-hand side of
equation (3.2) is positive. This implies that if p = 1, then the junior prefers option
X = 2. More generally, there exists a value of p = pH ∈
¡
1
α , 1
¢
at which the junior
is indifferent between performing the same task again and performing a new task.
The following lemma summarizes the above discussion.
Lemma 3.2 Suppose the junior can choose between performing the same task again
and performing a new task. Then, the junior chooses to perform the same task again
if p = 0 or p ∈ [pL, pH ] and he chooses to perform a new task if p ∈ (0, pL) or if
p ∈ (pH , 1].
Until now we have focused on the choice between performing a new task and
performing the same task again. The junior, however, can also decide not to perform
a task. The utility a junior derives from not performing the task equals 0. A junior
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who observes a sufficiently low performance, will choose not to perform the task.
For these juniors, the costs of performing the task exceed the expected benefits of
performing the task. Depending on the costs of performing the task, two situations
can be distinguished. Let c = c be the cost for which the junior is indifferent between
X = 0, X = 1 and X = 2 if he observes p = pL. If the costs are sufficiently small
(c < c), the junior chooses to stop performing the task if p < pLc , where pLc solves
bγ ³γαpLc + (1− γ)ppLc ´+ (1− bγ)³γα ¡pLc ¢2 + (1− γ) pLc ´− c = 0
and if the cost are sufficiently high (c ≥ c), the junior decides to stop performing
the task if p < pHc , where pHc solves
bγαpHc + (1− bγ) pHc − c = 0
Figure 3.2 and Proposition 3.2 summarize the above discussion.
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Proposition 3.2 Suppose that the costs are sufficiently small (c < c), then (i) a
junior who observes p < pLc chooses to stop performing a task (ii) a junior who
observes p ∈
£
pLc , pL
¢
or p ∈ (pH , 1] chooses to perform a new task, and (iii) a junior
who observes p ∈ [pL, pH ] chooses to perform the same task again. Suppose that the
costs are sufficiently large (c ≥ c), then (i) a junior who observes p < pHc chooses to
stop performing the task, (ii) a junior who observes p ∈
£
pHc , pH
¤
chooses to perform
the same task again, and (iii) a junior who observes p ∈ (pH , 1] chooses to perform
a new task.
An implication of taking a decision based on observed performance, is that the
junior sometimes takes the wrong decision. The junior can make two types of mis-
takes. First, a highly talented junior who has performed a difficult task may decide
to perform a new task after observing his performance. Take, for example, a junior
with an ability equal to a0 and a performance of p0 > pH after performing a difficult
task. Then, according to Proposition 3.2, the junior, who has no information about
his ability and the difficulty of the performed task, decides to perform a new task.
However, if the junior, after performing the task, were to learn his ability and the
difficulty of the task, he would decide to continue with the same task.7 Second,
a talented junior who has performed a difficult task may decide to stop perform-
ing a task if performing a task is sufficiently costly. Take, for example, a junior
with ability ba > 1α and a performance of bp < pHc after performing a difficult task.
Furthermore, suppose that c > c. Then, according to Proposition 3.2, the junior
decides to stop performing the task. If the junior, however, were to learn his ability
and the difficulty of the task, he would decide to continue with the task. Hence,
sometimes a junior takes the wrong decision because he lacks information about his
ability and about the difficulty of the task. Both types of mistakes are costly for an
organization. The organization sometimes can prevent a junior from making these
mistakes by appointing a senior employee who acts as the junior’s mentor.
7The same type of mistake is made by a low ability junior. Take, for example, a junior with an
ability equal to a00 and a performance of p00 < pL after performing an easy task. Then, the junior
decides to perform a new task. However, if the junior after performing the task were to learn his
ability and the difficulty of the task, he would decide to continue with the same task.
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3.5 Extension: The role of a mentor
The role of a mentor in an organization is to help "the younger individual learn
to navigate in the adult world and the world of work" (Kram, 1985 p.2). A senior
employee has more experience and therefore is better able to discern easy tasks from
difficult tasks. Besides, she is better able to assess the junior’s ability. The infor-
mation a senior employee has at her disposal is valuable for the junior employee to
improve current and future decisions. Therefore, appointing a mentor who provides
this information to the junior employee may prevent juniors from taken mistaken
decisions. As Clutterbuck (1985) points out "most staff turnover occurs during the
first six months with a new employer and a major cause is inability to adjust rapidly
enough. Assigning a mentor to a new arrival helps overcome the counter-productive
problems of culture shock and the uncertainty most people feel as they find their
feet in the new environment."
We extend the model by introducing a mentor. The mentor is fully informed.
He knows the difficulty of the task (d ∈ {0, 1}) and he observes the junior’s ability.
The role of the mentor, in stage 0, is twofold. First, the mentor assigns no task
(t = n), assigns an easy task (t = 0) or assigns a difficult task( t = 1). Second, if
t ∈ {0, 1}, the mentor sends a message about the difficulty of the task m ∈ {0, 1},
m = 0 denoting "task is easy" and m = 1 denoting "task is difficult". After the
junior has received m, he decides whether or not to perform the assigned task. If he
performs the assigned task he learns his performance p1 ∈ [0, 1]. In the second stage,
the junior decides whether to (i) stop performing the task (X = 0), (ii) continue
performing the same task (X = 1), or (iii) perform a new task (X = 2). The
preferences of the junior are represented by (3.1).
In the present model the message is costless for the mentor. It is well-known in
cheap-talk games that if the preferences of the principal and the agent are perfectly
aligned, then communication between the principal and the agent can be perfect
(Crawford and Sobel, 1982). So, if the mentor has the same preferences as the junior,
introducing a fully informed mentor makes it possible for the junior to achieve the
first-best outcome in both stages. The mentor can perfectly match the difficulty of
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the task and the junior’s ability. So, the introduction of a mentor prevents a highly
talented junior from performing an easy task. Besides, it avoids that a low ability
junior performs a task.
In many settings, however, the preferences of the mentor and the junior are
not perfectly aligned. A reason may be that the mentor does not incur the costs
of performing a task. Therefore, she does not care about these costs. Then, the
mentor’s utility is given by
UM = dαp+ (1− d) p
The mentor wants a junior with an ability smaller than 1α to perform an easy
task, and she wants a junior with an ability larger than 1α to perform a difficult task.
Notice that the mentor always wants the junior to perform a task. Henceforth, we
assume that the mentor always assigns a task in stage 0. This implies that a junior
with a ∈ [0, c] is assigned a task, while he prefers to perform no task.
First, let us consider the case that the strategy of the mentor is
⎧
⎨
⎩
t = 0 and m = 0 if a < 1α
t = 1 and m = 1 if a ≥ 1α
What is the junior’s response to this strategy? The junior only observes the
mentor’s message. Suppose that he observes m = 1. Then, the junior knows that
the assigned task is difficult and that his ability is larger or equal to 1α . As a junior
with an ability greater than 1α wants to perform a difficult task, his best response
is to perform the assigned task. Now suppose the junior observes m = 0. The
mentor’s message tells the junior that the assigned task is easy and that his ability
is smaller than 1α . A junior with a ∈ [0, c] prefers to perform no task and a junior
with a ∈
£
c, 1α
¤
prefers to perform an easy task. As the junior does not observe his
ability, his decision to perform the assigned task depends on c. The higher are the
costs of performing the task, the greater is the proportion of juniors who prefer not to
perform the task. More precisely, performing the task yields 1
2
1
α − c+E [U2 | m = 0]
(where E [U2 | m = 0] = 12 1α − c+ 12αc2). Not performing the task yields zero. Then,
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if c ≤ cL = 2−
√
2
α , it is a best response for the junior to perform the task. Hence, if
c ≤ cL, the junior performs the assigned task.
After performing the task, the junior learns his performance. As the message re-
veals the difficulty of the task, the junior can determine his ability from the observed
performance. This implies that in the second stage he can take a fully informed de-
cision. Hence, in the second stage, the junior stops performing the task if a < c
and he continues with the task otherwise. The strategy of the junior, if c ≤ cL, can
be summarized as follows: In the first stage the junior performs the assigned task.
In the second stage he performs no task if a < c and he performs the same task
otherwise.
Finally, we have to show that given the strategy of the junior, the mentor’s
strategy is a best response. Notice that there exists only a conflict of interest between
the mentor and a junior with a < c. The mentor wants all juniors to perform a
task, while a junior with a < c decides not to perform a task in the second stage.
The question that arises is: Can the mentor prevent a junior with a < c from not
performing the task in stage 2 by assigning him an easy task but by claiming the task
is difficult? As long as the costs are sufficiently small, the answer is in the negative.
A junior who observes a performance smaller than
¡
1
α
¢2
knows, independent of the
mentor’s message, that the performed task was easy. The strategy of the mentor
tells us that a junior with a < 1α performs an easy task yielding a performance
in the range
£
0, 1α
¢
and a junior with a ≥ 1α performs a difficult task yielding a
performance in the range
h¡
1
α
¢2 , 1i. This implies that a performance of h0, ¡ 1α¢2´
can only correspond to a junior who has performed an easy task. So, the mentor
cannot influence the decision of a junior with ability a < c <
¡
1
α
¢2
by lying about
the difficulty of the task. Hence, if c <
¡
1
α
¢2
, the mentor has no incentive to deviate
from his strategy. The following Proposition summarizes the conditions under which
the mentor always sends a truthful message.
Proposition 3.3 Suppose that the costs are sufficiently small (c ≤ cL and c <¡
1
α
¢2
). Then a partially separating equilibrium exists in which the mentor in stage 0
assigns an easy task and sends m = 0 if a < 1α and she assigns a difficult task and
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sends m = 1 if a ≥ 1α . In stage 1, the junior performs the assigned task. In stage
2, the junior decides to stop performing the task if a < c and he performs the task
again otherwise.
As the preferences of the mentor and the junior are not perfectly aligned, some
juniors do not obtain the first best outcome. A junior with an ability smaller than
c will perform a task in the first stage, although performing a task is too costly
for him. Nevertheless, having a mentor with different preferences over the costs
of performing a task, yields a higher expected utility to the junior than having no
mentor at all. The reason is that the mentor can match difficulty of the task to the
junior’s ability. Therefore, highly talented juniors will never perform an easy task
and less talented juniors will never perform a difficult task.
Suppose that cL < c <
¡
1
α
¢2
.8 Then if the mentor were to reveal the true difficulty
of the task, the junior would not perform the task if m = 0 (E [U | m = 0] < 0).
Obviously, in this situation, the mentor has an incentive to lie about the difficulty
of the task to some juniors. In this way he can prevent these juniors from not
performing the task in the first stage. Let us consider the following strategy of the
mentor9
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
t = 0 and m = 1 if 0 ≤ a < c
t = 0 and m = 0 if c ≤ a < 1α
t = 1 and m = 1 if 1α ≤ a ≤ 1
Notice that the mentor still assigns an easy task to a junior with a < 1α and assigns
a difficult task to a junior with a ≥ 1α . The difference with respect to sending a
truthful message is that the mentor now sometimes has an incentive to lie about the
8We assume that α < 1
2−
√
2
, implying that cL <
¡
1
α
¢2
. Similar results hold if α > 1
2−
√
2
.
9There are several variants on this strategy. What is important is that by lying the mentor can
prevent a junior with 0 ≤ a < c from learning his ability after observing m = 0. A variant of this
strategy is (i) always send m = 1 and (ii) t = 0 if a < 1α and t = 1 if a ≥
1
α . The message contains
no information about the junior’s ability. We have assumed that without mentor, a junior performs
the task if he has no information about his ability and the difficulty of the task (Assumption 3.3).
Then with mentor the junior will also perform the task if he has no information about his ability
and the difficulty of the task. The reason is that the mentor takes care of a better match between
difficulty of the task and the junior’s ability. Hence, if the junior performs the task in the first
stage without a mentor then he also performs the task with a mentor.
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difficulty of the task. To prevent low-ability juniors from not performing a task in
the first stage, the mentor sends the message that the assigned task is difficult. In
this way a low-ability junior does not learn about his ability until after observing
his performance on the task.
What is the junior’s best response to the mentor’s strategy? Suppose the junior
observes m = 0, then he knows that his ability lies between c and 1α and that the
assigned task is easy. The best response of the junior is to perform the assigned
task. Now suppose the junior observes m = 1. There exist two possibilities: (i) the
assigned task is difficult and the junior’s ability is larger than 1α or (ii) the assigned
task is easy and the junior’s ability is smaller than c. Suppose that the costs are
such that E [U | m = 1] > 0. This implies that the best response to m = 1 is to
perform the assigned task.
After performing the task, the junior observes his performance and determines
his ability. In the second stage, the junior stops performing the task if a < c and
continues with the same task otherwise. We have already shown that, if c <
¡
1
α
¢2
,
a junior with ability a < c can determine his ability although the mentor lies about
the difficulty of the task. The reason is that a performance smaller than
¡
1
α
¢2
can
only correspond to a junior performing an easy task.
Next suppose that c ≥
¡
1
α
¢2
. Then a junior who observes a performance between
1
α and c cannot determine his ability, because he is uncertain about the difficulty
of the task. Figure 3.3 illustrates this situation. The relationship between observed
performance and ability is given by the lines AA and BB. The relationship consists
of two parts; a junior with an ability between 0 and 1α is assigned an easy task (AA)
and a junior with an ability between 1α and 1 is assigned a difficult task (BB).
The junior only observes his performance and the mentor’s message. Depending
on the observed performance we can distinguish three cases. First, suppose the
junior observes a performance larger than c. Then the mentor’s message reveals
the difficulty of the task and the junior can determine his ability; a = p if the task
is easy and a =
√
p if the task is difficult. Second, suppose the junior observes a
performance smaller than
¡
1
α
¢2
. Then, the junior knows that the performed task
was easy and that a = p. In both cases the decision for the second period is given in
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section 3.4.1. Third, suppose the junior observes a performance between
¡
1
α
¢2
and
c. Then the mentor’s message reveals no information about the difficulty of the task
and the junior is unable to determine his ability. In this situation the decision for
the second period is given in Proposition 3.2.
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Depending on the costs of performing a task, two cases can be distinguished: (i)
pHc ≤
¡
1
α
¢2 < c and (ii) ¡ 1α¢2 < pHc < c (see Proposition 3.2).10 First, suppose that
costs are such that pHc ≤
¡
1
α
¢2 < c. Then the strategy of the junior is: (i) stop
performing the task if p <
¡
1
α
¢2
and (ii) continue with the same task otherwise. The
following Proposition summarizes the above discussion.
10We have assumed that c > c, implying that the junior’s decision for the second stage is: (i)
a junior who observes p < pHc chooses to stop performing the task, (ii) a junior who observes
p ∈
£
pHc , pH
¤
chooses to perform the same task again, and (iii) a junior who observes p ∈ (pH , 1]
chooses to perform a new task.
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Proposition 3.4 Suppose that the costs are intermediate (c > cL and pHc ≤
¡
1
α
¢2 <
c). Then the mentor in stage 0 (i) assigns an easy task and sends m = 1 if 0 ≤ a < c,
(ii) assigns an easy task and sends m = 0 if c ≤ a < 1α , and (iii) assigns a difficult
task and sends m = 1 if 1α ≤ a ≤ 1. In stage 1, the junior performs the assigned
task. In stage 2, the junior stops performing the task if p <
¡
1
α
¢2
and he performs
the task again otherwise.
The benefit to the mentor of lying about the difficulty of the task is twofold.
First, the mentor prevents the junior from not performing the assigned task in stage
1. Second, the mentor prevents a junior with an ability between
¡
1
α
¢2
and c from not
performing the task in the second stage. As the mentor lies about the difficulty of
the task a junior with ability between
¡
1
α
¢2
and c is unable to determine his ability
and decides to continue with the task. Sofar, lying involves no costs for the mentor.
Second, suppose that
¡
1
α
¢2 < pHc < c. Furthermore suppose that the junior
observes a performance
¡
1
α
¢2 < p < pHc on a difficult task. Then, after observing
his performance, the junior, who does not know the difficulty of the task, chooses to
stop performing the task (see Proposition 3.2). Both a junior with
¡
1
α
¢2 < a < pHc
performing an easy task and a junior with 1α < a <
p
pHc performing a difficult task
decide to stop performing the task. Because of the conflict of interest between the
mentor and the junior, the mentor is unable to communicate the difficulty of the
task to talented juniors performing a difficult task. Consequently, talented juniors
decide to stop performing the task. This is costly for the organization and for the
mentor.
To prevent talented juniors from not performing a task, the mentor has to think
of a way to communicate the junior’s ability to him. One way, is to have a junior
with 1α < a <
p
pHc perform an easy task in the first stage. Then after observing his
performance on the task, the junior learns that his ability lies between 1α and
p
pHc
and in the second stage, the junior decides to perform a new task. As the junior, the
mentor prefers the junior to perform a difficult task. Hence, the junior will ask the
mentor to assign a new difficult task to him. The following Proposition summarizes
the equilibrium.
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Proposition 3.5 Suppose that the costs are sufficiently high (c > cL and
¡
1
α
¢2 <
pHc < c). Then an equilibrium exists in which the mentor (i) assigns an easy task
if a <
p
pHc and assigns a difficult task otherwise, and (ii) sends m = 1 if a < c,
sends m = 0 if c < a <
p
pHc , and sends m = 1 if a >
p
pHc . In stage 1, the junior
performs the task. In stage 2, the junior decides to (i) stop performing the task if
p < pHc , (ii) perform a new task if
1
α < p < p
H
c and m = 0 and asks mentor to assign
him a new task, and (iii) perform the same task again otherwise.
The Proposition shows that the mentor has an incentive to assign too often an
easy task. The intuition is that the mentor is unable to communicate the difficulty
of the task to the junior. To avoid that a talented junior gets discouraged after
observing his performance on a difficult task, the mentor assigns an easy task to
him. In this way the mentor prevents a talented junior from quitting a task.
3.6 Conclusion
We have developed a model that describes the self-assessment of a junior employee
after observing performance on a task. In this model, the junior has no information
about his ability, but he can use his performance on a task to make an inference.
The problem is that performance not only depends on the junior’s ability, but also
on the unknown difficulty of the task. We have shown that, in line with Kruger
(1999), a junior who has performed a difficult task underestimates his ability and a
junior who has performed an easy task overestimates his ability. An implication is
that a wrong self-assessment may result in a mistaken future decision. Sometimes
a talented junior after observing his performance on a difficult task may decide to
stop performing the task.
Having a talented junior leave the organization is costly. To prevent this from
happening, the organization can appoint a better informed senior employee who
acts as the junior’s mentor. The benefit of a mentor, if the preferences of the
mentor and the junior are perfectly aligned, is that the junior can achieve the first-
best outcome. The reason is that a fully informed mentor can perfectly match the
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junior’s ability and the difficulty of the performed task. If the preferences of the
mentor and the junior are not perfectly aligned, then sometimes the mentor does
not have an incentive to reveal the correct information to the junior. An implication
is that if performing a task is sufficiently costly, some talented juniors may decide
to stop performing the task after observing performance on a difficult task. The
reason is that the mentor is unable to communicate the difficulty of the task to
some talented juniors and based on the observed performance these juniors decide
to stop performing the task. To prevent talented juniors from not performing a task,
the mentor assigns an easy task to these juniors. After observing performance on
the easy task, the junior learns his ability and decides to continue performing a task.
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3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Appendix A
In this appendix we show two things. First, we show that the average ability re-
ported by juniors performing a difficult task is smaller than the average ability of
juniors in the model. In the main text we have determined that the average abil-
ity reported by juniors performing a difficult task equals aet1 =
1Z
0
aep · g (p) dp =
1Z
0
³
(2p(1−γ)+γ)√p
2
√
p(1−γ)+γ · 12√p
´
dp if the junior does not know the difficulty of the task.
If the junior were to know that the performed task is difficult, then using as-
sumption 3.1 he can determine a =
√
p. The average ability reported by ju-
niors equals aed=1 =
1Z
0
³√
p · 1
2
√
p
´
dp = 1
2
. We will have shown that the average
ability reported by juniors performing a difficult task is smaller than the average
ability of juniors in the model if
1Z
0
³
(2p(1−γ)+γ)√p
2
√
p(1−γ)+γ · 12√p
´
dp <
1Z
0
³√
p · 1
2
√
p
´
dp.
It is straightforward to show that (2p(1−γ)+γ)
√
p
2
√
p(1−γ)+γ <
√
p for all p, implying that
1Z
0
³
(2p(1−γ)+γ)√p
2
√
p(1−γ)+γ · 12√p
´
dp <
1Z
0
³√
p · 1
2
√
p
´
dp for all p.
Second, we show that the average ability reported by juniors performing an easy
task is greater than the average ability of juniors in the model. In the main text we
have determined that the average ability reported by juniors performing an easy task
equals aet2 =
1Z
0
aep ·f (p) dp =
1Z
0
³
(2p(1−γ)+γ)√p
2
√
p(1−γ)+γ · 1
´
dp if the junior does not know the
difficulty of the task. If the junior were to know that the performed task is easy, then
using assumption 3.2 he can determine a = p. The average ability reported by juniors
equals aed=0 =
1Z
0
(p · 1) dp = 1
2
. We will have shown that the average ability reported
by juniors performing an easy task is greater than the average ability of juniors in
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the model if
1Z
0
³
(2p(1−γ)+γ)√p
2
√
p(1−γ)+γ · 1
´
dp <
1Z
0
(p · 1) dp. It is straightforward to show
that (2p(1−γ)+γ)
√
p
2
√
p(1−γ)+γ > p for all p, implying that
1Z
0
³
(2p(1−γ)+γ)√p
2
√
p(1−γ)+γ · 1
´
dp <
1Z
0
(p · 1) dp
for all p. ¥
3.A.2 Appendix B
In this Appendix, we provide a proof for Lemma 3.1. Lemma 3.1 consists of two
parts. First it states that equation 3.2 has three roots. Second, it states that
pL ∈
³
0,
¡
1
α
¢2´
and that pH ∈
¡
1
α , 1
¢
.
To determine that equation (3.2) has three roots, first we fill bγ = γ
2
√
p(1−γ)+γ into
equation (3.2) and rewrite it in the following way
2
√
p (1− γ)
2
√
p (1− γ) + γγ
¡
αp2 − p
¢
− γ
2
√
p (1− γ) + γ (1− γ) (αp−
√
p) = 0
(1− γ) γ√p
2
√
p (1− γ) + γ
¡
2αp2 − 2p− α√p+ 1
¢
= 0
Now, we can determine that the first root of the equation is p = 0. Next, to
prove that 2αp2 − 2p − α√p + 1 = 0 has two roots, we take three steps. First, we
determine that r = 2αp2−2p−α√p+1 has a local minimum at p∗. Taking the first
derivative with respect to p we can determine the optimum p = p∗, where p∗ solves
4αp∗−2− α
2
√
p∗ = 0. The second derivative tells us that the optimum is a minimum,
d2r
dp2 = 4α+
α
4p
√
p > 0. Second, we have to show that the minimum is negative. Filling
p = 1α into r gives r = 2α
¡
1
α
¢2 − 2 ¡ 1α¢ − αq 1α + 1 < 0 (α > 1), implying that the
minimum has to be negative. Third, we have to show that r is positive for small
values of p and for high values of p. Filling p = 0 and p = 1 into r gives r > 0 for
p = 0 and for p = 1. Summarizing 2αp2 − 2p− α√p+ 1 = 0 has two roots. Let the
roots be pL and pH .
Second, we have to show that pL ∈
³
0,
¡
1
α
¢2´
and that pH ∈
¡
1
α , 1
¢
. The second part
we have already proven. We have shown that if p = 1α then r < 0 and that if p = 1,
60 The Effect of a Mentor on a Junior Employee’s Self-Assessment
then r > 0. Hence, pH ∈
¡
1
α , 1
¢
. What remains to be proven is that pL ∈
³
0,
¡
1
α
¢2´
.
Filling p =
¡
1
α
¢2
into r gives r = 2α
¡
1
α
¢4 − 2 ¡ 1α¢2 − α 1α + 1 < 0 (α > 1). We have
already shown that if p = 0, then r > 0. Hence, pL ∈
³
0,
¡
1
α
¢2´
. ¥
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Chapter 4
Disciplining and Screening Top
Executives
Co-authors: Otto H. Swank and Bauke Visser
4.1 Introduction
The literature on CEO turnover often rests on an important assumption: bad perfor-
mance means a bad CEO. As a consequence, the problem a board of directors faces
seems relatively simple: in case of bad performance, the CEO should be replaced.1
It is, however, a recurrent finding that substantially worse performance hardly leads
to an increase in the chances of dismissal.2 To explain this tenuous relation between
weak performance and turnover, boards are often characterized as “indolent” and
as “ineffective rubber stampers” of top management’s decisions.3 Such characteri-
zations typically invoke descriptions of cases and interviews with top management
and board members. We do not doubt the validity and accuracy of these case de-
scriptions. Rather, we want to argue that they point to a reality in which even
1The assumption usually remains implicit by using phrases like “dismising a CEO after poor
performance” and “firing an incompetent CEO” interchangeably, see e.g., Borokhovich et al. (1996,
p. 340), and Weisbach (1988, p. 431). In other parts of the literature, the gist seems to be that
dismissal following bad performance is an unproblematic implication, see, e.g., Warner et al. (1988)
and Kaplan (1994).
2See, e.g., Brickley’s (2003) discussion of the empirical research on turnover and performance.
3See Tirole (2006) for a survey of complaints.
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well-intended board members face thorny dilemmas rather than a simple problem
due to the need to balance the attainment of various goals and the availability of
scant information. As we will show, one important implication is that the inference
from bad performance to bad CEO becomes questionable. Also, the relationship
between bad performance and dismissal becomes tenuous.
Mace (1971) provides a classic account of what the relationship between a board
of directors and top executives is about in reality.4 Directors lack time, knowledge
and information to have an active involvement in decision-making.5 As a result, the
board performs two functions. First, a board “serves as some sort of discipline” (p.
13). When making decisions, top executives take into account what they feel the
board would consider acceptable actions, solutions and explanations. The second
function a board performs is to decide whether to retain or replace a top executive.
However, it is a very difficult task for a board to find out whether the top executive
is doing a good job. The board often does not know the problems the company
is facing, nor the possible actions it can take or the results it may expect, and by
and large it depends on the company for information on these matters. Moreover,
directors seem to dislike upsetting amiable relations with the top executives. As a
result, the board only decides to replace an executive if bad (financial) performance
has been apparent for a considerable time (pp. 27—33).
Performance related pay is also used to direct executives’ attention and effort.
There is no denying that incentive pay may work well. There is, however, some
evidence that observed incentive pay schemes do not provide a strong relationship
between firm performance and pay6. In a recent study, Dittmann and Maug (forth-
coming, p. 1) conclude that the “standard principal agent model typically used in
the literature cannot rationalize observed contracts”. One of the reasons may be
4Mace (1971) is based on interviews with executives and directors of American companies.
Lorsch and MacIver (1989), basing themselves on interviews held with directors of American com-
panies in the second half of the 1980s, and Stiles and Taylor (2001), using interviews with directors
of British companies conducted in the late 1990s, report findings that are by and large consistent
with those of Mace (1971).
5Directors refers to outside directors. Mace (1971, pp. 125-127) argues that inside directors
depend too much on the CEO to perform a critical role.
6See, e.g., Jensen and Murphy (1990) for a well known example of this. For a contrary view,
see Hall and Liebman (1998).
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that, in the words of Bebchuk and Fried (2003, p. 72), “managerial power and rent
extraction ... have an important influence on the design of compensation packages”.
This would imply that incentive pay is not a remedy to an agency problem, but part
of the problem itself.
In this chapter we focus on the use of retention strategies as a means to discipline
and screen executives in an environment in which the board has limited information
about the outcomes of executives’ actions. Our analysis sheds light on observed
empire building; on the tenuous relationship between performance and dismissal;
and casts doubt on the assumption that bad performance results from bad CEOs.
It has become one of the mainstays of the literature on corporate governance
that executives will turn into empire builders if not reined in by some tight form of
governance. Excessive growth or excessive investment are two forms empire building
may take on. It is invariably argued that the construction of such empires reflects
executives’ hunger for status, power and prestige, see, e.g., Marshall (1932), Bau-
mol (1959), Marris (1964), Williamson (1974), and Jensen (1986). Empire building,
then, stems from differences in preferences between board and executives in con-
junction with lack of observability, a typical moral hazard problem. Marris (1964,
p. 102) adds that there is a further reason for growth: “When a man takes decisions
leading to successful expansion,...he has demonstrated his powers as a manager and
deserves his reward. So personal ability also becomes judged by achieved growth”.
Such signalling can be useful to a board possessing only limited information on an
executive’s ability. How, then, does a board deal with a possible conflict between
soliciting information and thwarting empire building? What is the nature of possible
retention strategies? How do they differ in the way they trade-off the attainment of
the goals of the board?
To answer these questions, we use a simple two-period model, in which on behalf
of a board, in each period an executive designs a ‘project’ and decides whether or
not to implement it. A project can be anything that is meant to have a substantial
impact on the company, e.g., restructuring, diversification, acquisition. The quality
of the project depends on the competence of the executive and on exogenous cir-
cumstances. The executive knows his competence, but the board does not. When
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making the implementation decision, the executive observes the exogenous circum-
stances, but the board does not. The board observes the implementation decision.
It learns the quality of the project only when it is implemented and then only with
a probability. Once the executive has made the implementation decision in the first
period, the board can choose between keeping the executive and replacing him.
An important feature of our model is that a competent executive is more likely
to implement a project than a less competent one. The reason is that on average
a competent executive designs better projects, i.e. projects that are profitable in
more adverse circumstances. Activism signals competence. The implication of this
feature is that activism can be used as a screening device. As a result, the board
sometimes wants a competent executive to implement projects that are not desirable
per se. Moreover, the board wants incompetent executives sometimes to abstain from
implementing desirable projects. The consequence is that the relationship between
bad performance and low quality executive is weakened.
Having established the screening function of the implementation decision, we
then show that an executive’s desire to keep his job (because of prestige, power,
remuneration etc.) may lead him to exploit this function, and to distort the imple-
mentation decision.7 The executive may partially base the implementation decision
on the consequences this decision has for his career. The more the executive is
moved by prestige and power, the more he is willing to distort the implementation
decision–to build an empire. That is, by using the implementation decision as a
screening device, the board creates a moral-hazard problem. The board may reduce
this problem by dismissing an executive who has been found to have implemented
too bad a project. However, the signalling function of the implementation decision
implies that undesirable projects are implemented by competent executives in par-
ticular. As a result, a board will find it difficult to knowingly dismiss a competent
executive and replace him by one of unknown quality. To overcome this problem, a
board may have to stick to a norm or rule. If this is the case, dismissals stemming
7Prendergast and Stole (1996) show that a manager will initially exaggerate his information
to appear talented, but ultimately becomes unwilling to respond to new information. See also
Suurmond, Swank and Visser (2004) for the consequences of reputational concerns on decision
making.
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from bad performance will often be considered regrettable yet inevitable.
The board should also decide what to do when it does not learn the quality of an
implemented project. Again, it is on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, it
could stick to a ‘no news is good news’ norm, meaning that the executive is retained
in the absence of definite information on the value of the implemented project. This
would increase the probability that in period 2 a project will be designed by a
competent executive (after all, competent executives are more likely to implement
than incompetent ones). But it would also strengthen the incentive for the executive
in period 1 to distort the project implementation decision. In case the board were
to follow a ‘no news is bad news’ norm, implying the executive has to leave in the
absence of information, the reverse holds. We show that a ‘no news is good news’
norm is preferable, ceteris paribus, if an executive does not care too much about
power, if the likelihood that a replacement is highly competent is small, and if the
difference in competence between executives is large.
An important insight of our analysis, then, is that boards in order to address the
two main tasks they face, may have to stick to a norm to overcome a time incon-
sistency problem.8 In particular, under some conditions the board wants to commit
itself to a retention norm that may induce it to dismiss an executive who is likely
to be competent. Ex ante such a norm may be optimal as it discourages executives
to distort the implementation decision too much to signal competence. Though
perhaps surprising from a theoretical point of view, our result seems empirically rel-
evant. Consider Van der Hoeven, the former CEO of Ahold. In the ten years he had
been at the helm at Ahold, the company quickly expands through a corporate acqui-
sition strategy. As a result, Ahold had been hailed as the best Dutch company for 5
consecutive years by 2002, notably for its “consistent growth and strategy”. Van der
Hoeven himself had been elected manager of the year in 2001 and 2002, praised for
his “strategic insight and entrepreneurship”.9 He had to resign in the wake of the
bookkeeping fraud at Ahold’s daughter US Foodservices in 2003. Further judicial
8Lorsch and MacIver (1989) discuss how board room norms determine the effectiveness with
which boards can perform their tasks.
9SeeManagement Team, issues 17 of 2001 and 2002. This Dutch magazine publishes the results
of a questionnaire held among 400 Dutch managers.
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inquiries later showed that Ahold’s stake in companies in Sweden, Argentina, and
Chile had been exaggerated with a view to inflating revenues and profits. Simi-
larly, Bernard Ebbers, the former CEO of MCI Worldcom, received awards for his
leadership from, among others, Business Week, Financial World, Wired and Time
Magazine in the late 1990s and in 2000. As Van der Hoeven, he had grown the
business by going on a buying spree. He was dismissed in 2002 following serious
concerns about the company’s finances and accounting practices. It could be argued
that fraudulent practices and judicial probes led to their dismissal, not a negative
decision of the board following observed bad results. However, the fraudulent prac-
tices were meant to paint too rosy a picture of the situation either company found
itself in. This suggests that both executives were aware that had the real results of
their corporate acquisition activities become known dismissal by the board would
have been likely.
The trade-off between disciplining and screening is also felt in the relationship
that exists between a parliament and a minister. The “inevitable-yet-regrettable”
feeling that comes with the tension inherent in knowingly dismissing a competent
agent is well expressed by the Financial Times when commenting on the dismissal
of the then British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington in 1982. The Argentinian
invasion of the disputed Falkland Islands had made clear that his attempt at a
diplomatic solution to the Falkland crisis had failed. The newspaper commented
that “[t]he resignation of Lord Carrington is deeply regrettable — as regrettable as
the events which left him with no other honourable course. He has been a notable
Foreign Secretary, and has earned the highest regard internationally”10, and “[i]n
the public eye he was perhaps the most successful British Foreign Minister since the
war.”11 ,12
10See Lexis Nexis, ‘After Lord Carrington’ in The Financial Times, April 6, 1982, p.14.
11See Lexis Nexis, ‘The Resignation of Lord Carrington’ in The Financial Times, April 6, 1982,
p.15.
12The South-Korean Hwang Woo-Suk, who was “heralded as the world’s leading stem-cell re-
searcher” and was a “national hero” may well have fallen prone to the same pressure to show his
ability. He falsified data used in a Science publication in 2005. He was forced to resign in December
2005 (The Economist (2005, 2006))
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4.2 Related literature
Our analysis contributes to the literature on boards of directors. In their survey
article, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003, p. 8) observe that “the empirical literature
on boards in public corporations is fairly well developed, while theory is still in its
infancy”. Stiles and Taylor (2001), when surveying the literature on boards, reach
the same conclusion as to the dearth of theory. The paper most closely related to
ours is Hermalin (2005). He models how a board selects a candidate for an executive
position, forms an impression of the executive’s ability, and decides whether to retain
or replace him. Two important differences with this chapter should be mentioned.
First, Hermalin focuses on a single role of the board, screening executives’ abilities.
Second, the impression of the executive’s ability is based on, say, presentations and
interactions in board meetings, but not on observed organizational performance.
As a result, the board does not have to reconcile conflicting goals. Graziano and
Luporini (2003) model the same selection and retention-dismissal decision. As a
board may erroneously hire an incompetent executive at the selection stage, it may
be hesitant in the evaluation stage to dismiss the executive as this would signal its
own lack of competence and possibly trigger its own replacement due to a takeover.
We come back to some other related literature in the conclusion.
In this chapter, the board uses a retention contract to deal with the moral hazard
problem of the executive, analogous to the electorate using its re-election strategy
to discipline politicians in political agency models. As far as we know, it is the first
time that this analogy is exploited in the literature on corporate governance. As
in the political agency literature, the contracts we consider are implicit, and are
not enforced by some third party. They constitute expectations that are shared
among the principal (board, electorate, or parliament) and the agent (executive,
parliament or minister) about the situations in which an incumbent agent is retained
or dismissed.13 Much of our analysis amounts to the determination of the optimal
implicit contract. As noted above, such contracts could be considered norms. We
13See e.g. Persson and Tabellini (2000). Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) were the first to
argue that the power to replace agents disciplines agents who are inclined to use office as a means
of pursuing their own goals.
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argue that this (implicit contract) approach is also useful to understand certain
aspects of the relationship between a board of directors and its top executives. After
all, just as it is hard to gauge the contribution of, say, a minister of foreign affairs to
the well-being of a country it is also hard to pin down a top executive’s contribution
to the long-term profitability or survival of his organization. What is typically much
easier to observe is whether a minister or top executive has become active: whether
an agreement has been signed, a re-organization started, or a strategy implemented.
Furthermore, just as a parliament does not write an explicit contract specifying
when a minister will be dismissed, a typical board does not stipulate in a contract
what triggers the ousting of an executive.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.3 introduces the
model. In Section 4.4 and 4.5, we establish the trade-off the board faces between
disciplining and selecting executives. Section 4.6 discusses how the board shapes
the behaviour of the executive, given that it retains the executive when it does not
observe the value generated by an implemented project. Section 4.7 discusses how
the board shapes the behaviour of the executive, given that it dismisses the executive
when it does not observe the consequences of an implemented project. In Section
4.8, we identify the conditions under which the board wants to retain or dismiss
the executive when it does not observe the consequences of an implemented project.
Section 4.9 concludes.
4.3 The model
We consider a two-period principal-agent model. There is a pool of agents (‘execu-
tives’), a fraction ρ of which is ‘competent’, while the other executives are ‘incom-
petent’. At the beginning of period t = 1, an executive is randomly drawn from this
pool and becomes the incumbent. At the end of period t = 1, the principal (‘board’)
can dismiss the incumbent. If he is dismissed, an executive is randomly drawn from
the pool of executives14 and enters office in period t = 2. If the incumbent is not
14We assume that a dismissed period 1 incumbent has no chance of becoming the period 2
incumbent.
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dismissed, he will also hold office in period t = 2.
Once the incumbent has been determined for period t ∈ {1, 2}, he designs a
project, Xt. We view the value created by this project, Vt, as the addition to the
organization’s long term value, relative to business as usual. It depends on (i) the
incumbent’s competence, and (ii) the state of the world (‘market circumstances’),
μt. The random variable μt is uniformly distribution over [−h, h]. The executive
knows his competence, and observes μt. Once he knows the value of the project, he
can either decide to implement the project (‘change’), Xt = 1, or to maintain the
status quo (‘business as usual’), Xt = 0. An implemented project designed by an
incompetent executive yields a value Vt = VIC (μt) = p+ μt, while an implemented
project designed by a competent executive yields Vt = VC (μt) = p + f + μt. Of
course, f > 0, implying that on average, or for given market circumstances, a
competent executive designs a better project than an incompetent one. We assume
VC (μt = −h) = p+f−h < 0. As we will see, this implies that market circumstances
may be so averse that even a competent executive should maintain the status quo.
Similarly, we assume VIC (μt = h) = p+ h > 0, implying that market circumstances
may be favourable enough such that an incompetent executive should implement
the project.
Assumption 4.1 VC (μt = −h) < 0 < VIC (μt = h).
Information
As mentioned, we assume that the incumbent knows his competence, and that when
making the decision on Xt, he also knows μt. The board has limited information
on which it can base its decision to retain or dismiss the incumbent. It knows the
prior probability that a randomly drawn executive is competent, ρ, but it does not
know his actual level of competence.15 It may learn about an incumbent’s level of
competence on the basis of the actions the incumbent takes in period one. The board
observes the decision on Xt, but does not always observe whether the executive has
15What is essential in our model is that the incumbent is better informed about his level of
competence and the market circumstances than the board.
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made a good decision. Specifically, we assume that (1) if Xt = 0, the board does not
learn what would have been Vt; (2) if Xt = 1, the board learns Vt with probability
γ; and (3) if Xt = 1, with probability 1− γ the board remains ignorant about Vt.
Preferences
We model the board as a unitary actor. Its per period payoff is XtVt, and its goal
is to maximize the total (two-period) payoff by using its retention contract. The
possible retention strategies are discussed in the following sections. The executive
in our model represents a top executive of an organization. He derives utility from
holding office–power, prestige, visibility, remuneration etc.–to which we refer as
benefits from holding office, λ. Besides caring about these benefits, the executive
also cares to some degree about the value of the implemented project. We assume
that an executive’s per period payoff equals
⎧
⎨
⎩
XtVt + λ if in office in period t
XtVt otherwise
(4.1)
The goal of the incumbent in period t = 1 is to maximize his total (two-period)
payoff using his implementation decision and given the retention strategy of the
board; the goal of the incumbent in period t = 2 is to maximize period 2 payoff.
To minimize notation, preferences are represented by (4.1). Implicit in (4.1) is that
an executive who is dismissed in period 1 and an executive who is not dismissed in
period 1 care to the same extent about the value created in period 2. This is often
unrealistic. However, one can argue that the period 1 incumbent cares to some
extent about the value created in period 2, even if he has been dismissed. This may
result from identification with the organization one has been leading. Of course, the
degree of identification with an organization varies from person to person and from
organization to organization.16
Following the principal-agent literature, we assume that first the principal sets
the terms of the contract and next the agent determines his optimal behaviour given
16Our results do not change qualitatively if we were to assume that an executive does not care
about the organization if he has been dismissed.
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those terms. In our case, the board determines under what conditions an executive
is retained or dismissed (the implicit contract), and then the executive decides what
projects to implement.
Timing
Period 1
• Nature determines the type of incumbent, draws μ1, and reveals type and μ1
to the incumbent, but not to the board.
• The incumbent takes a decision on the project, X1 ∈ {0, 1}.
• The board observes the decision on X1. If X1 = 1, then with probability γ the
board observes V1.
• The board chooses either to keep the incumbent or to replace him.
Period 2
• If the incumbent was replaced in period 1, nature draws a type and reveals it
to the new incumbent, but not to the board.
• Nature draws μ2 and reveals it to the incumbent, but not to the board.
• The incumbent takes a decision on the project, X2 ∈ {0, 1}.
4.4 The need for selection
Suppose that the board does not select an executive on the basis of first-period
outcomes. Thus, no matter what, the board keeps the first-period incumbent.17 In
that case, strategic considerations stemming from the desire to hold office play no
role. A project is implemented in period t if and only if its value is positive. Given
the executive’s ability, the per period payoff is maximized. Suppose the incumbent is
competent. Then, Xt = 1 is chosen if and only if VC (μt) ≥ 0. Given the executive’s
17Alternatively, the principal could always dismiss the agent.
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ability, the per period payoff is maximal. Suppose the executive is competent. He
chooses to implement the project if and only if VC (μt) ≥ 0, or if μt ≥ −p− f . This
implementation decision yields a per period payoff to the board equal to
ΠC = Pr (VC (μt) ≥ 0)E (VC (μt) |VC (μt) ≥ 0) =
1
4h
(p+ h+ f)2
Similarly, an incompetent executive implements a project if μt ≥ −p, yielding a
per period profit equal to ΠIC = 14h (p+ h)
2. Clearly, this implies that a board
prefers a competent executive to an incompetent one. We have now arrived at the
drawback of always keeping the executive. Since a competent executive implements
a project in market circumstances in which an incompetent would refrain from doing
so, project implementation (activism) is a signal of competence. Maintaining the
status quo (passivity) is a signal of incompetence. The board could increase its
expected second period payoff by dismissing an executive who has maintained the
status quo.
Define Πρ := ρΠC + (1− ρ)ΠIC . This is the expected project payoff if an exec-
utive of unknown or ‘average’ quality were to hold office. We will assume that an
incompetent executive who holds office cares so much about being retained that he
does not ask to be replaced by an executive of unknown quality. This means that
[λ+ΠIC ] > [Πρ], where here and throughout the chapter second-period payoffs are
given in square brackets. If this inequality were not to hold, the board could simply
have asked the incumbent as to his competence level and would have obtained an
honest answer.
Assumption 4.2 The benefits of holding office are sufficiently high, λ > Πρ−ΠIC,
such that the board does not believe the executive’s claim as to his competence.
4.5 Selection induces moral hazard
The previous section shows that when the board always keeps the executive, a com-
petent executive is more likely to implement a project than an incompetent one
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(μC < μIC). As a result, executive activism signals competence. In this section we
assume that the board selects the second-period incumbent on the basis of the first-
period outcome. In line with the signalling function of the implementation decision,
activism is rewarded by retention, whereas an inactive executive is sent home. We
show that this influences the behaviour of the incumbent in period 1. Activism gives
way to ‘empire building’.
Consider a competent executive who has observed μ1 in period t = 1.18 He will
implement the project (rather than reject it) if and only if VC (μ1) +λ+ [ΠC + λ] ≥
λ + [Πρ]. This inequality determines a cut-off value V ∗C (λ) such that the project is
implemented if and only if
VC (μ1) ≥ V ∗C (λ) := − (ΠC −Πρ)− λ (4.2)
Note that because Πρ < ΠC, we have V ∗C (λ) < 0. Equation (4.2) says therefore that
in period 1 a competent executive is willing to make a loss on a project in order to
gain more in the second period. These gains are twofold: benefits from office, λ, and
a foregone drop in project payoff ΠC −Πρ.
Similarly, an incompetent executive implements the project if VIC (μ1) + λ +
[ΠIC + λ] ≥ λ+ [Πρ]. This determines a cut-off value V ∗IC (λ) such that the project
is implemented if and only if
VIC (μ1) ≥ V ∗IC (λ) := (Πρ −ΠIC)− λ (4.3)
Because of Assumption 4.2, V ∗IC (λ) < 0. A comparison of (4.2) and (4.3) shows that
a competent executive implements projects for lower values of V1. Furthermore, for
a given value of μ1, VC (μ1) > VIC (μ1). Implementation is therefore more likely with
a competent than with an incompetent executive.
To highlight the signalling function of the implementation decisions suppose that
even if λ = 0 an incumbent is able to signal his competence only through his im-
plementation decision. Equations (4.2) and (4.3) imply that the board would have
18Of course, as the game ends after period 2, the second-period incumbent chooses X2 = 1 if
and only if the expected project payoff is positive.
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wanted both a competent and an incompetent executive to deviate from the imple-
mentation decision that maximizes per period payoff. This can be seen from the
first part on the right hand side of (4.2) and (4.3): V ∗C (0) = − (ΠC −Πρ) < 0 and
V ∗IC (0) = (Πρ −ΠIC) > 0. A competent executive may decide to implement a bad
project, while an incompetent executive may decide not to implement a good project.
Such deviations from the first-best implementation decision are the price the board
is willing to pay for gaining information about the executive’s competence. These
deviations should therefore not be considered distortions. They perform a signalling
function. The only parts of (4.2) and (4.3) that are distortions from the board’s
point of view stem from the executive’s benefits from holding office concerns, λ.
Figure 4.1 illustrates our analysis so far. Panels A and B show the range of
values of V1 for which the project is implemented or the status quo is maintained by
a competent executive in case λ = 0 and λ > 0, respectively. Panels C and D show
the same for an incompetent executive. The desire to hold office widens the range of
parameters for which X1 = 1. The board does not want (i) a competent executive to
choose X1 = 1 if V1 ∈ [V ∗C (λ) , V ∗C (0)); nor (ii) an incompetent executive to choose
X1 = 1 if V1 ∈ [V ∗IC (λ) , V ∗IC (0)).
In comparison with always keeping the executive, the benefit of keeping the ex-
ecutive only if he has implemented a project is an increase in expected payoff in
the second period. This stems from the signalling function of the first-period imple-
mentation decision. In practice, the quality of executives improves. The downside
of keeping the executive only if he has implemented a project, however, is that he
distorts the implementation decision. Selecting on the basis of outcomes leads to
a moral hazard problem. In practice, executives become empire builders (see, e.g.,
Baumol (1959), Williamson (1974), and Jensen (1986)).
It is also clear from Figure 4.1, parts B and D, that the implementation of value-
destroying projects may result from both competent and incompetent executives.
The tie between bad performance and incompetent management is broken because
the board faces two tasks, both disciplining and screening.
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Figure 4.1
So far we have focused on two extreme possible strategies for the board. How-
ever, as the board occasionally observes the project value, V1, it may condition its
decision to keep the executive not merely on a project being implemented, but also
on information on the project value. By keeping the executive only if the value
of the project exceeds a threshold value, V1 > a, the board may discipline19 the
executive, that is, reduce the executive’s incentive to distort the implementation
decision. What remains to be decided is what to do in case the project is imple-
mented, but the project’s value remains unknown. In the next section, we assume
19This is the expression used by Mace (1971), see the introduction.
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the retention contract ‘no news is good news’: the board keeps the executive if it
observes implementation but does not observe the project value. In Section 4.7, we
assume ‘no news is bad news’. The executive is replaced if the board does not ob-
serve the project value. A remark on terminology is in order. We use threshold value
when discussing the board’s retention contract, and cutoff value when discussing the
executive’s implementation strategy.
4.6 Retention contract 1: ‘No news is good news’
Under retention contract 1 the board
• dismisses the executive in case no project has been implemented,
• dismisses the executive in case a project has been implemented, and observes
V1 ≤ a,
• keeps the executive in case a project has been implemented, and does not
observe V1
• keeps the executive in case a project has been implemented, and observes
V1 > a.
Our main concern is the determination of the threshold value a that is optimal
from the board’s point of view. The choice of a determines the degree to which an
executive is disciplined and also the likelihood that a competent executive is selected
for the second period.
To see how the board’s choice of a may affect the executive’s implementation
decision in period 1, consider panels B and D in Figure 4.1. Suppose that the board
chooses a ∈ [V ∗C (λ) , V ∗IC (λ)). Then, in case the incumbent is competent, his decision
on X1 may be affected by a. If the board observes V1 ≤ a, X1 = 1 leads to dismissal.
Hence, compared to the situation of the previous section, in which X1 = 1 always
leads to keeping the executive, the incentive to choose X1 = 1 is weakened. If the
executive in office in period 1 is incompetent, a ∈ [V ∗C (λ) , V ∗IC (λ)) does not affect his
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implementation decision, as a is non—binding. Now suppose that the board chooses
a ≥ V ∗IC (λ). Then, a is binding for both a competent and an incompetent executive.
Relative to (4.2) and (4.3), the incentive to choose X1 = 1 is weakened.
The upshot is that the board’s choice of a amounts to choosing between two
alternatives. First, by choosing a ∈ [V ∗C (λ) , V ∗IC (λ)), the board chooses to discipline
competent executives, taking for granted that if an incompetent executive is in
office, the implementation decision will be distorted, see (4.3). Second, by choosing
a ≥ V ∗IC (λ), the board affects the implementation decision of either type of executive.
We now first derive how the choice of a influences the behaviour of either type of
executive in isolation.
4.6.1 Case 1: disciplining a competent executive
Ideally, the board wants a competent incumbent to choose X1 = 1 if and only if
V1 > V ∗C (0). However, a competent executive chooses X1 = 1 if V1 ≥ V ∗C (λ),
see (4.2). By using a threshold value a in his retention contract, the board can
discipline the executive. We say that an executive is ‘fully disciplined’ if he no
longer distorts the implementation decision at all, while an executive is said to
be ‘partially disciplined’ if the distortion is merely reduced. Let bVC denote the
cut-off value used by a competent incumbent if the board sets a sufficiently large.
Notice that to have an effect on a competent executive’s implementation decision,
the board should set a ≥ bVC. Thus, assume a ≥ bVC. Now suppose that a competent
executive observes VC (μ1) < a. He will implement the project if VC (μ1) + λ +
[(1− γ) (ΠC + λ) + γ (Πρ)] ≥ λ+[Πρ]. Hence, the executive implements the project
if
VC (μ1) ≥ bVC (λ) := − (1− γ) (ΠC −Πρ)− (1− γ)λ (4.4)
Four remarks are in order. First, for V1 ∈
hbVC (λ) , ai the executive chooses im-
plementation in the hope that the board does not observe the project outcome, so
that he keeps office. Second, the board can change the value of a without affect-
ing the cutoff value used by the executive as long as it sets the threshold value a
80 Disciplining and Screening Top Executives
such that a ≥ bVC (λ). Third, a comparison between (4.2) and (4.4) shows that
V ∗C (λ) < bVC (λ). Hence, the executive is at least partially disciplined. Fourth, for
λ < λ∗ := γ
1−γ (ΠC −Πρ), the cutoff value would satisfy V ∗C (0) < bVC (λ). This
means that if the competent executive cares little about holding office, the effect of
setting a threshold may be too strong: the beneficial screening function of the im-
plementation decision is hampered. But this also implies that for λ < λ∗, the board
can induce the executive to use V ∗C (0) as his threshold value by setting a = V
∗
C (0).
This effectively stops the executive from distorting the implementation decision.
Lemma 4.1 Suppose the retention contract ‘no news is good news’. If λ < λ∗
holds, then a = V ∗C (0) is the unique threshold value that guarantees that a competent
executive is fully disciplined. If instead λ ≥ λ∗ holds, then the board can only partially
discipline a competent executive, by setting a ≥ bVC (λ). The cut-off value used by
the disciplined executive is
bVC =
⎧
⎨
⎩
V ∗C (0) if λ < λ
∗bVC (λ) = − (1− γ) (ΠC −Πρ)− (1− γ)λ if λ ≥ λ∗ (4.5)
with bVC ∈ (V ∗C (λ) , V ∗C (0)].20
4.6.2 Case 2: disciplining an incompetent executive
We now turn to the possibility that the board sets the threshold value a such that
the behaviour of an incompetent executive is affected, a ≥ V ∗IC (λ).
Lemma 4.2 Suppose the retention contract ‘no news is good news’. It is not possible
to fully discipline an incompetent executive. An incompetent executive can be par-
tially disciplined by setting a ≥ bVIC (λ) = (1− γ) (Πρ −ΠIC)− (1− γ)λ. Then, the
board induces an incompetent executive to choose X1 = 1 if and only if V1 ≥ bVIC (λ),
where bVIC (λ) ∈ (V ∗IC (λ) , V ∗IC (0)).
20If λ < λ∗, the disciplined executive implements the project if and only if V1 > V ∗C (0). Hence,
to be precise, the cut-off value should be lim
ε↓0
V ∗C (ε).
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Proof. Suppose a is such that the incompetent executive’s implementation strategy
is affected (i.e., a > V ∗IC (λ)). Clearly, for VIC (μ1) ≥ a, the project will be imple-
mented. For VIC (μ1) < a, implementation yields VIC (μ1)+λ+[γΠρ + (1− γ) (ΠIC + λ)],
while maintaining the status quo yields λ+ [Πρ]. It is now straightforward to check
that X1 = 1 is preferred to X1 = 0 if VIC (μ1) ≥ bVIC (λ) = (1− γ) (Πρ −ΠIC) −
(1− γ)λ, where V ∗IC (λ) < bVIC (λ) < V ∗IC (0). As a result, disciplining is partial, not
full.
Lemma 4.2 states that the board can only partially discipline an incompetent
executive. To understand why the board cannot fully discipline an incompetent
executive, suppose that the threshold value set by the board equals a = V ∗IC(0) and
that the executive observes μ1 such that VIC (μ1) = V ∗IC (0), and λ > 0. Recall
that V ∗IC (0) is the cut-off value the executive uses if he does not care about the
benefits from office, and if implementation is sufficient for re-appointment. In the
current situation, the executive does care about holding office, and implementation
is merely necessary for re-appointment. As a result of λ > 0, the executive now
strictly prefers implementation to maintaining the status quo from a benefits point
of view. Now take the project value point of view. If implementation is sufficient
to be retained, an incompetent incumbent has to maintain the status quo to ensure
that he is replaced by someone of ‘average’ quality such that expected payoff goes
up in the second period. However, with retention contract 1, implementation no
longer guarantees retention. Therefore, the benefits of dismissal (a higher expected
period two payoff) can now be combined with implementation of a profitable project
in period 1 (recall that V ∗IC(0) > 0). As a result, the executive now strictly prefers
implementation to maintaining the status quo. As the executive prefers X = 1 to
X = 0 both from a project and a career point of view when VIC (μ1) = V ∗IC (0), he
cannot be fully disciplined.
4.6.3 Choice of threshold value a
Above we have analysed the effect of a threshold value a on the behaviour of each
type of incumbent in isolation. We now analyse how the choice of a influences
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the board’s utility. To do so, we look both at the effect of the choice of a on the
discipline exerted in the first period and on the likelihood that a competent executive
is selected for the second period.
Proposition 4.1 Suppose the retention contract ‘no news is good news’. The board
has two options. It either disciplines a competent executive as much as possible (be
it fully or partially) by setting a = bVC. Or it disciplines both types of executive by
setting a ∈ [bVIC (λ) , VIC (μ1 = h)].
The Proposition follows, to a large extent, from Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2.
Therefore, we only provide an informal proof of the Proposition. To grasp the basic
ideas behind Proposition 4.1 consider Figure 4.2.
0=X  1=X
( )hVC −=1μ  ( ) CC VV ˆ0* =  ( )hVC =1μ  ( )λ*CV  
0=V  
0=X  1=X
( )hVIC −=1μ  ( )0*ICV  ( )hVIC =1μ  ( )λ*ICV  ( )λICVˆ  
Figure 4.2
Figure 4.2 describes a situation where bVC < V ∗IC (λ).21 Suppose that the board
sets a < V ∗IC (λ). The implication is that the board sets a so as to influence the
21If V ∗IC (λ) ≤ bVC , then the board’s dominant strategy is to discipline also the incompetent
executive. In this case setting a = bVC also affects the behavior of an incompetent executive.
Hence, disciplining only a competent executive is not an option.
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behaviour of a competent executive, taking for granted that an incompetent exec-
utive’s implementation decision is based on V ∗IC (λ). In Section 4.5 we have argued
that, given that the board does not know the executive’s ability, ideally it wants
a competent executive to choose implementation only if V1 > V ∗C (0). Lemma 4.1
states that if λ < λ∗, the board can reach this goal by setting a = V ∗C (0): a com-
petent incumbent can be fully disciplined. If instead λ ≥ λ∗, the board can only
partially discipline a competent executive, bVC (λ) < V ∗C (0), by setting a ≥ bVC (λ).
Has the board an incentive to set a > bVC (λ), rather than a = bVC (λ)? The answer
is in the negative. When the board observes that V1 ∈
hbVC (λ) , V ∗IC(λ)´, it knows
the incumbent is competent. The incumbent executive should be kept.
Now suppose that the board sets a ≥ bVIC (λ). Then, the board disciplines an
incompetent executive, and since bVC < bVIC (λ), it also disciplines a competent ex-
ecutive. Thus, by choosing a ≥ bVIC (λ), the board maximally uses the disciplining
possibilities within the ‘no news is good news’ contract. Notice that if the board
observes a value V1 ∈ [bVC , bVIC (λ)), it is aware that the executive is competent, but
nevertheless dismisses him. The price of a contract that disciplines an incompe-
tent executive is that the possibilities for selecting a competent executive are not
fully exploited. At which value should the board set a? Recall from Section 4.5
that ideally the board wants an incompetent executive to choose implementation
if VIC (μ1) ≥ V ∗IC (0). However, as Lemma 4.2 states, within the ‘no news is good
news’ contract the board cannot fully discipline an incompetent executive. The best
it can do is to partially discipline an incompetent executive by setting a ≥ bVIC (λ).
Does the board have an incentive to set a > bVIC (λ), rather than a = bVIC (λ)?
For a ∈
hbVIC (λ) , VIC (μ1 = h)i, the value of a has no effect on the implementa-
tion decision of either type of executive, nor on selection. The board should not
set a > VIC (μ1 = h), as V1 > VIC (μ1 = h) is clear evidence that the executive is
competent.
The upshot is as follows. Recall that equating project implementation and reten-
tion induces the executive to become overly active. The board can use information
on the value of implemented projects that occasionally becomes available to condi-
tion its retention decision. The contract ‘no news is good news’ offers two options
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for a board to guide the behaviour of an executive. First, the board can focus on
disciplining a competent executive only (a = bVC). We refer to this option as the
selection option, as this option maximally exploits the selection possibilities. Sec-
ond, the board can focus on disciplining an incompetent executive and thereby also
on disciplining a competent executive (a = bVIC (λ)). We refer to this option as the
disciplining option. The benefit of the selection option is a higher probability that
in period two the incumbent will be competent. This probability is directly related
to the length of the interval
hbVC , V ∗IC (λ)i, see Figure 4.2. The benefit of the disci-
plining option is that an incompetent executive distorts the implementation decision
less. This benefit depends positively on the length of the interval
h
V ∗IC (λ) , bVIC (λ)i.
One important question remains: Which option does the board choose? Propo-
sition 4.2 describes how the answer to this question depends on the parameters of
the model.
Proposition 4.2 Suppose bVC < V ∗IC(λ). Then, an increase in λ or γ, or a decrease
in ΠC − ΠIC or ρ, widens the range of parameters for which the board chooses the
disciplining option, rather than the selection option. If instead V ∗IC (λ) ≤ bVC, the
board’s dominant strategy is to choose the disciplining option by setting a = bVIC (λ).
Proof. Appendix
Clearly, if V ∗IC (λ) ≤ bVC, then the board chooses the disciplining option. The
reason is that in that case, if the board were to choose a = bVC , it would also affect
an incompetent executive’s behaviour. Therefore, disciplining a competent executive
only, the selection option, is not a real option. Another way of looking at this result
is that, as discussed earlier, the benefit of the selection option is directly related to
the length of the interval [a, V ∗IC (λ)]. Obviously, if V
∗
IC (λ) ≤ a, then there is no
benefit of the selection option.
Now suppose that bVC < V ∗IC (λ), so that the board really can choose between
the selection and disciplining option. To determine how a change in the parameters
affects the board’s choice as to the two options, we compare the effects of such a
change on the lengths of the intervals
hbVC , V ∗IC (λ)i and hV ∗IC (λ) , bVIC (λ)i. We focus
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on the situation where λ ≥ λ∗ (and so bVC = bVC (λ)22). It is easy to show that
V ∗IC (λ)− bVC = ΠC −ΠIC − γ (ΠC −Πρ)− γλ (4.6)
= (1− γ (1− ρ)) (ΠC −ΠIC)− γλ
and
bVIC (λ)− V ∗IC (λ) = −γ (Πρ −ΠIC) + γλ (4.7)
= −γρ (ΠC −ΠIC) + γλ
The larger is the value of (4.6), the more attractive is the selection option. In
contrast, the larger is the value of (4.7), the more attractive is the disciplining
option.23
An increase in benefits from holding office λ decreases the value the board at-
taches to the selection option, see (4.6), and increases the value of the disciplining
option, see (4.7). The reason for this result is clear. As explained in Section 4.5,
the executive’s desire to hold office is the reason the board wants to discipline in the
first place.
In our model, the board wants a competent, rather than an incompetent, execu-
tive to design a project. It is therefore hardly surprising that an increase in ΠC−ΠIC
widens the range of parameters for which the board chooses the selection option. It
is worth noting that an increase in ΠC −ΠIC decreases (4.7). The reason is that an
increase in ΠC − ΠIC raises the cost of distorting the implementation decision for
the executive. As a result, the need for disciplining the executive diminishes.
An increase in γ implies that the probability that the board learns the project
outcome increases. Important for the effect of γ on the choice between the selection
and disciplining option is that the possibility of observing V is a prerequisite for
disciplining executives. It is therefore quite intuitive that a rise in γ increases the
attractiveness of the disciplining option. This is borne out by the fact that the value
22The analysis of the case λ < λ∗ with bVC = V ∗C (0) is analogous.
23Recall from Assumption 4.2 that λ > Πρ − ΠIC , and so the expression in (4.7) is strictly
positive.
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of the disciplining option, (4.7), increases in γ. By the same token, the value of the
selection option, (4.6), goes down as a higher likelihood of the project value being
observed reduces a competent executive’s eagerness to implement.
The parameter ρ denotes the probability that an executive is competent. The
direct effect of an increase in ρ is a smaller loss stemming from not disciplining
incompetent executives. This is why an increase in ρ widens the range of parameters
for which the board chooses the selection option ((4.6) goes up in ρ, while (4.7) goes
down).
4.7 Retention contract 2: ‘No news is bad news’
Under retention contract 2 the board
• dismisses the executive in case no project has been implemented,
• dismisses the executive in case a project has been implemented, and observes
V1 < a,
• dismisses the executive in case a project has been implemented, and does not
observe V1
• keeps the executive in case a project has been implemented, and observes
V1 ≥ a.
Notice that the main difference between contracts 1 and 2 resides in the board’s
decision in case it does not observe the value of an implemented project. With
contract 1, the executive is kept in office. This makes sense from a selection per-
spective. After all, a competent executive is more likely to implement a project than
an incompetent one. It has the disadvantage of inducing the incumbent to distort
the implementation decision as he hopes a project of low value will go unnoticed.
Retention contract 2 dashes any such hopes. By dismissing the incumbent in case
activism does not lead to any visible results, it becomes easy to discipline the in-
cumbent. However, it still is the case that a competent executive is more likely
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to implement a project than an incompetent one. The consequence is that in the
absence of visible results, the board is more likely to send home a competent than
an incompetent executive.
Consider the executive’s behaviour if the board retains him if and only if he
implements a project and the project’s payoff becomes visible. Suppose the in-
cumbent is competent. He implements a project of value VC (μ1) if and only if
VC (μ1) + λ+ [γ (ΠC + λ) + (1− γ)Πρ] > λ+ [Πρ] or if
VC (μ1) ≥ eVC (λ) := −γ (ΠC −Πρ)− γλ (4.8)
An incompetent incumbent implements a project if and only if
VIC (μ1) ≥ eVIC (λ) := γ (Πρ −ΠIC)− γλ (4.9)
Note that eVC (λ) < eVIC (λ). As in the previous section, a competent incumbent opts
for X1 = 1 for more values of V1 and therefore of μ1 than an incompetent incumbent.
It is useful to compare (4.8) and (4.9) with (4.2) and (4.3), respectively. Recall
that the latter equations describe the cut-off values in case project implementation
(activism) is sufficient for re-appointment. With λ = 0, (4.8) and (4.9) denote
the optimal implementation decisions from the board’s point of view, given that
the executive is dismissed if outcomes are not observed. Clearly, as a competent
incumbent is sent home with probability 1−γ if he implements a project, the board
is now less willing to accept a first-period loss. Analogously, the board is now less
willing to forego a profitable project in period one to find out that the incumbent
is incompetent: with probability 1 − γ the incumbent would have been replaced
anyway. This comparison shows that ‘no news is bad news’ allows for a lower degree
of screening than ‘no news is good news’. The advantage of the retention contract
‘no news is bad news’ is that it gives weaker incentives to executives to distort the
implementation decision (γλ in (4.8) and (4.9) instead of λ in (4.2) and (4.3)).
If the board uses the ‘no news is bad news’ retention contract, it can fully disci-
pline a competent executive, independent of the degree to which an executive derives
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benefits from holding office.
Lemma 4.3 Suppose ‘no news is bad news’. The board can fully discipline a com-
petent executive by setting a = eVC (0). A competent executive then uses the cut-off
value eVC (0).
Proof. Consider a project with VC (μ1) < eVC (0). Implementation leads to a project
loss (as eVC (0) < 0, see Eq (4.8)), and dismissal in period 1. Maintaining the
status quo is better as the project loss is foregone. Now suppose VC (μ1) ≥ eVC (0).
Implementation yields VC (μ1) + λ+ [γ (ΠC + λ) + (1− γ)Πρ] whereas maintaining
the status quo yields λ+[Πρ]. Implementation is best as VC (μ1) ≥ −γ (ΠC −Πρ)−
γλ = eVC (0)− γλ holds.
Now consider the case that the board wants to discipline an incompetent execu-
tive, a ∈
³eVIC (λ) , VIC (μ1 = h)i. It can at most partially discipline an incompetent
executive. As with retention contract 1, if it decides to discipline an incompetent
executive, it also disciplines a competent executive.
Lemma 4.4 Suppose ‘no news is bad news’. If the board decides to discipline an in-
competent executive, its (weakly) dominant strategy is to set a = 0, thereby inducing
both types of executive to implement only profitable projects in period 1.
The intuition for this result is as follows. By setting a ∈
heVIC (λ) , 0´, the
board induces either type of executive to implement a project only if V1 ≥ a. By
setting a ∈ [0, VIC (μ1 = h)], it induces either type of executive to implement only
profitable projects, V1 ≥ 0. As in either case both types of executives use the same
implementation strategy, a change in a leaves the likelihood of selecting a competent
executive unaffected. The best the board can do is to induce either type of executive
to implement only profitable projects. This can be guaranteed by setting a = 0.24
Whether the board wants to discipline the competent executive only (the selec-
tion option) or both types of executive (the disciplining option) is described in the
next proposition.
24To be precise, the board can choose any a ∈ [0, VIC (μ1 = h)], whence a = 0 being a weakly
dominant strategy, see Lemma 4.4. In what follows we will ignore the other weakly dominant
strategies a ∈ (0, VIC (μ1 = h)].
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Proposition 4.3 Suppose ‘no news is bad news’. If λ < ΠC−ΠIC, the board has two
options. It either chooses the selection option by setting a = eVC (0), or it chooses the
disciplining option by setting a = 0. An increase in λ, or a decrease in ΠC −ΠIC or
ρ widens the range of parameters for which the board chooses the disciplining option.
The parameter γ does not affect the choice of option. If instead λ ≥ ΠC −ΠIC, the
board’s dominant strategy is to choose the disciplining option by setting a = 0.
Proof. Appendix
As under the retention contract ‘no news is good news’, the board’s choice of a
under ‘no news is bad news’ is a choice between putting emphasis on disciplining or
selecting. For instance, an increase in benefits λ strengthens executives’ incentives
to distort the implementation decision. Therefore, an increase in λ makes the disci-
plining option more important (choose a = 0). In contrast, the higher is ΠC −ΠIC ,
the more important it is that a competent executive keeps office. Consequently,
the higher is ΠC − ΠIC , the more the board would like to emphasize the selection
function of the retention contract (choose a = eVC (0)).
Qualitatively, Proposition 4.3 only differs from Proposition 4.2 in the effects of γ.
The reason is that under the retention contract ‘no news is good news’ an increase in
γ facilitates disciplining an incumbent. However, under ‘no news is bad news’, the
board can always discipline the incumbent. Consequently, under the latter retention
contract, γ does not influence the choice between the two options concerning a.
4.8 The two retention contracts compared
Boards of directors perform two main functions. They influence what top executives
consider acceptable actions, and they screen incumbents with a view to retaining
competent ones and dismissing incompetent ones. We have argued that within a
retention contract or norm the board faces a trade-off between increasing the likeli-
hood of selecting a competent executive on the one hand, and weakening executives’
incentives to distort the implementation decision on the other hand. Essentially the
same trade-off exists when comparing the effectiveness of the two retention norms.
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The main difference between the two norms is the board’s reaction to an executive
who has implemented an important project the outcomes of which are not known
yet. From a narrow selection point of view, the board’s adequate reaction is to keep
the executive. As shown in Section 4.3, it is more likely that a project is imple-
mented by an executive who is competent than incompetent. Thus, a benefit of ‘no
news is good news’ is that in case of no news the executive is retained. This im-
proves the expected quality of projects implemented in the second period. However,
from a disciplining perspective, the board benefits from announcing and sticking to
a ‘no news is bad news’ norm, as it reduces an executive’s incentive to distort the
implementation decision.
It is now easy to determine which type of retention norm performs better de-
pending on the value of λ. For small values of λ, executives hardly have incentives
to distort the implementation decision. The implication is that for small values of
λ the retention contract ‘no news is bad news’ is relatively unattractive. It scores
badly on selecting, while the benefits of disciplining are small. More generally, one
can show that if λ is smaller than a certain threshold λ < λL, then the board prefers
‘no news is good news’ to ‘no news is bad news’. The opposite holds for very high
values of λ. Lemma 4.1 and 4.2 show that with ‘no news is good news’ and very
high values of λ, both competent and incompetent executives virtually always im-
plement the project in period 1. Clearly, disciplining is then desired. By choosing
‘no news is bad news’ with a = 0 the board assures that only profitable projects are
implemented. One can show that if λ is sufficiently high λ > λH , then the board
prefers ‘no news is bad news’ to ‘no news is good news’.
For moderate values of λ, the relative performance of the two retention norms
is less clear. All parameters play a role. Numerical analysis suggests that a rise
in ΠC − ΠIC always makes ‘no news is good news’ a more attractive choice. This
difference in profit is the reason for having a selection procedure before period two.
It is therefore quite intuitive that an increase in this difference makes the retention
contract focusing on selection relatively more attractive. An increase in γ, the
likelihood with which the value of the project becomes known before the board
decides on retention, also makes the choice for ‘no news is good news’ more appealing.
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The reason is that an increase in γ lowers the cost (distortion of the implementation
decision) of the ‘no news is good news’ retention contract.
Apart from how the parameters of the model affect the choice between the two
retention contracts, another feature of the retention contracts is worth emphasizing.
In the introduction, we have discussed examples of top executives who were acknowl-
edged as competent, but who were nevertheless dismissed. Our model provides an
explanation. First consider the ‘no news is good news’ retention contract. Suppose
that within this contract the board chooses the disciplining option, affecting the
implementation decision of either type of executive. Then, as argued in Section 4.6,
a competent executive chooses implementation for a wider range of parameters than
an incompetent executive. Consequently, when the board observes that the project
outcome falls in this range, it can infer that the executive is competent. Never-
theless, it will dismiss him. The reason is that following a strict retention contract
weakens executives’ incentives to distort the implementation decision. Occasionally
dismissing competent executives is the price the board has to pay for discipline. Un-
der the ‘no news is bad news’ retention contract a similar phenomenon exists. Again,
a competent executive chooses implementation for a wider range of parameters than
an incompetent one. This result is independent of the choice of the board between
only disciplining the competent executive and disciplining either type of executive.
Hence, implementation signals competence. Therefore, dismissing, rather than re-
taining, an executive when a project has been implemented but outcomes remain
unobserved makes it quite probable that the dismissed executive is competent.
4.9 Conclusion
Boards of directors have limited information that can be used to discipline and
screen the top executives of their companies. In this chapter we have analysed a
simple model that shows the dilemmas that result. The desire to screen executives
to improve the future wellbeing of the organization induces executives to become
overly active to show their credentials. The board can counter this tendency by
dismissing an executive whose projects are proven to destroy value. Besides, it can
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decide to replace the incumbent if it knows that a project has been implemented,
but its results remain as yet unobserved. Either decision will reduce the temptation
to implement loss-generating projects. But unfortunately, if it decides to dismiss the
incumbent on either ground, the board can deduce that the expected quality of the
incoming executive will be lower than that of the incumbent who is forced to leave.
We have shown under what circumstances one retention contract is preferred over
another.
Mace (1971) noticed that only in case of repeatedly observed bad performance is
an executive ousted. One way of interpreting this finding is that, by and large, the
parameter values in the real world are such that boards prefer a “no news is good
news” retention norm. After all, if executives identify themselves with the wellbeing
of their company, or if it is very hard to find a capable executive that could replace
the current one, “no news is good news” is the more adequate norm. There may
be other reasons for the pattern observed by Mace. First, note that if the board
follows this norm, it does not face a dilemma in case the benefits of a project are still
unknown: the incumbent stays and this is best from a screening perspective. For a
board that does not want to upset amiable relations with the executive, this norm–
granting the executive the benefit of the doubt–may well be preferred to “no news is
bad news”. Second, a board that uses a “no news is bad news” contract may induce
executives to focus on projects and investments that generate visible results quickly.
This short-termism may pose a threat to the long-term viability of the organization.
We did not discuss this possibility, but it should not be hard to integrate it into
the current set-up. Third, in our modelling approach we see the executive as the
agent, and the board as its principal, albeit a badly informed one. Hermalin and
Weisbach (1998) argue that it may be better to replace this approach by one in
which an executive influences the composition of the board and negotiates about its
pay. The better the executive performed in the past, the more leeway he will have.
Bebchuk and Fried (2003) argue that a managerial power approach to the relation
between a board and an executive should complement the standard principal-agent
approach. Again, board members who are selected by the top executive and who
enjoy substantial pay and prestige because of their position are unlikely to “rock the
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boat” and come into action unless some egregious and obvious problem cannot be
denied any longer. Future research that aims at integrating retention strategies as
used in the current chapter and a bargaining or managerial power approach seems
to be a worthwhile undertaking.
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4.A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4.2: Proposition 4.2 consists of two parts. First, it defines
a parameter space (V ∗IC (λ) ≤ bVC) for which the principal’s dominant strategy is to
discipline an agent irrespective of his type and a parameter space (V ∗IC (λ) > bVC)
for which the principal sometimes chooses the selection option and sometimes the
disciplining option. Second, for V ∗IC (λ) > bVC, the proposition gives the comparative
statics results. In the main text the conditions on the parameter space are derived.
So, what remains to be proven are the comparative statics results.
To derive the comparative statics results if V ∗IC (λ) > bVC, we distinguish two cases.
First, if λ < λ∗ = γ
1−γ (ΠC −Πρ), the principal can fully discipline the competent
agent. Second, if λ ≥ λ∗, the principal can only partially discipline the competent
agent.
Comparative statics results for λ < λ∗
To derive the comparative statics results for λ < λ∗, we take two steps. First, we
determine the principal’s expected utility if she chooses the selection option. Next,
we determine the principal’s expected utility if she chooses the disciplining option.
Suppose the principal chooses the selection option and sets a = V ∗C (0), implying
that a competent agent implements the project iff V1 > V ∗C (0) and an incompetent
agent implements the project iff V1 ≥ V ∗IC (λ). Then the principal’s expected utility
equals
Πρ −
1
4h
¡
ρ (V ∗C (0))
2 + (1− ρ) (V ∗IC (λ))
2¢
+
∙
Πρ +
ρ (1− ρ)
2h
(f + V ∗IC (λ)− V ∗C (0)) (ΠC −ΠIC)
¸
Filling in V ∗IC (λ) (see (4.3)) and V
∗
C (0) (see (4.2) with λ = 0) and rewriting gives
Πρ −
1− ρ
4h
¡
ρ (ΠC −ΠIC)2 + λ2 − 2ρ (ΠC −ΠIC)λ
¢
+
∙
Πρ +
ρ (1− ρ)
2h
(f + (ΠC −ΠIC)− λ) (ΠC −ΠIC)
¸
(4.10)
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Now suppose the principal chooses the disciplining option and sets a ∈
hbVIC (λ) , VIC (μ1 = h)i,
implying that a competent agent implements the project iff V1 ≥ bVC (λ) and an in-
competent agent implements the project iff V1 ≥ bVIC (λ). Then the expected utility
to the principal equals
Πρ −
1
4h
µ
ρ
³bVC (λ)´2 + (1− ρ)³bVIC (λ)´2¶
+
∙
Πρ +
ρ (1− ρ)
2h
³
f + (1− γ)
³bVIC (λ)− bVC (λ)´´ (ΠC −ΠIC)¸
Filling in bVIC (λ) (see lemma 4.2) and bVC (λ) (see (4.5) and rewriting gives
Πρ −
(1− γ)2
4h
¡
ρ (1− ρ) (ΠC −ΠIC)2 + λ2
¢
+
∙
Πρ +
ρ (1− ρ)
2h
¡
f + (1− γ)2 (ΠC −ΠIC)
¢
(ΠC −ΠIC)
¸
(4.11)
Now the choice between the selection option and the disciplining option amounts to
a comparison between (4.10) and (4.11). The principal chooses the selection option
if
(γ (2− γ)− ρ)λ2 − ρ (1− ρ) γ (2− γ) (ΠC −ΠIC)2 < 0 (4.12)
Notice that inequality (4.12) always holds if
γ (2− γ)− ρ ≤ 0 (4.13)
Thus if (4.13) holds, the principal always chooses the selection option. Given
γ (2− γ)− ρ > 0, then the principal chooses the selection option iff
λ < λ1 = (ΠC −ΠIC)
s
ρ (1− ρ) γ (2− γ)
(γ (2− γ)− ρ) (4.14)
where λ1 is the value of λ at which the principal is indifferent between disciplining
only the competent agent and disciplining either type of agent.
We are now ready to determine the effect of λ, f , ρ and γ on the choice between the
selection option and the disciplining option.
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• An increase in λ widens the range of parameters for which the principal chooses
to discipline either type of agent. This result follows directly from (4.14).
• The higher is the parameter f , the less attractive is the disciplining option.
An increase in f , has a positive effect on λ1
∂λ1
∂f
=
∂ (ΠC −ΠIC)
∂f
s
ρ (1− ρ) γ (2− γ)
(γ (2− γ)− ρ)
where ∂(ΠC−ΠIC)∂f = 2 (h+ p+ f) > 0.
• The higher is the parameter ρ, the less attractive is the disciplining option.
First, note that an increase in ρ widens the range for which the principal always
chooses selection ( ∂∂ρ (γ (2− γ)− ρ) = −1 < 0). Second, if γ (2− γ)− ρ > 0,
an increase in ρ, has a positive effect on λ1.
∂λ1
∂ρ
=
(ΠC −ΠIC) γ (2− γ) ((1− 2ρ) (γ (2− γ)− ρ) + ρ (1− ρ))
2 (ρ (1− ρ) γ (2− γ))
1
2 (γ (2− γ)− ρ)
3
2
> 0
To prove that ∂λ1∂ρ > 0, we must show that (1− 2ρ) (γ (2− γ)− ρ)+ρ (1− ρ) >
0. Define t = (1− 2ρ) (γ (2− γ)− ρ) + ρ (1− ρ). We can prove that t > 0 by
showing that the lowest possible value of t is positive. The proof consists of
two steps. First, we can show that ∂t∂ρ = − (2− γ) 2γ + ρ < 0. Recall that ρ <
γ (2− γ). Hence, by taking ρ = lim
ε↓0
(γ (2− γ)− ε) = γ (2− γ) we obtain the
lowest value of t. Let tmin be this value of t. Then tmin = γ (6− 9γ + 4γ2 − γ3).
The sign of tmin depends on the sign of t0 = (6− 9γ + 4γ2 − γ3). Taking the
derivative with respect to γ we get ∂t
0
∂γ = 9 + 8γ − 3γ2 < 0, where 0 < γ < 1.
Hence, by taking γ = lim
ε↓0
(1− ε) = 1 we find that in the limit the minimum
value of t0 equals 0. This implies that in the limit the lowest possible value of
t is zero. Hence, we can conclude that ∂λ1∂ρ > 0.
• The higher is the parameter γ, the more attractive is the disciplining option.
First, note that an increase in γ, narrows the range of parameters for which
the principal always chooses selection ( ∂∂γ (γ (2− γ)− ρ) = 2 (1− γ) > 0).
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Second, if γ (2− γ)− ρ > 0 an increase in γ has a negative effect on λ1.
∂λ1
∂γ
=
− (1− γ) (1− ρ) ρ2 (ΠC −ΠIC)
(γ (2− γ) ρ (1− ρ))
1
2 (γ (2− γ)− ρ)
3
2
< 0
Comparative statics results for λ ≥ λ∗
To derive the comparative static results for λ ≥ λ∗, we again have to compare the
principal’s expect utility if she chooses the selection option and the principal’s ex-
pected utility if she chooses the disciplining option. In the previous case we have
already determined the expected utility if the principal chooses the disciplining op-
tion. So, let us now determine the principal’s expected utility if she chooses the
selection option. This means that (i) the principal sets a = bVC (λ), (ii) a compe-
tent agent implements the project iff V1 ≥ bVC (λ), and (iii) an incompetent agent
implements the project iff V1 ≥ V ∗IC (λ). The principal’s expected utility then equals
Πρ −
1
4h
µ
ρ
³bVC (λ)´2 + (1− ρ) (V ∗IC (λ))2¶+
∙
Πρ +
ρ (1− ρ)
2h
³
f + V ∗IC (λ)− bVC (λ)´ (ΠC −ΠIC)¸
Filling in the values of bVC (λ) (see (5)) and V ∗IC (λ) (see (4)) and rewriting gives
Πρ −
1
4h
¡
ρ (− (1− γ) (1− ρ) (ΠC −ΠIC)− (1− γ)λ)2 + (1− ρ) (ρ (ΠC −ΠIC)− λ)2
¢
+
∙
Πρ +
ρ (1− ρ)
2h
(f + (1− γ (1− ρ)) (ΠC −ΠIC)− γλ) (ΠC −ΠIC)
¸
(4.15)
The choice between the selection option and the disciplining option amounts to
comparing (4.15) and (4.11). The principal chooses the selection option if
λ < λ2 =
(ΠC −ΠIC)
2− γ
³
ρ (1− γ) +
p
ρ (2 (1− γ) (2− γ) + ρ)
´
(4.16)
We can now determine the effect of λ, f , ρ and γ on the choice between selection
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and disciplining.
• An increase in λ widens the range of parameters for which the principal chooses
to discipline either type of agent, rather than only disciplining a competent
agent. This result follows directly from (4.16).
• The higher is f , the less attractive is the disciplining option. An increase in
f , has a positive effect on λ2.
∂λ2
∂f
=
∂ (ΠC −ΠIC)
∂f
³
ρ (1− γ) +
p
ρ (2 (1− γ) (2− γ) + ρ)
´
2− γ
where ∂(ΠC−ΠIC)∂f = 2 (h+ p+ f) > 0.
• The higher is ρ, the less attractive is the disciplining option. An increase in ρ,
has a positive effect on λ2.
∂λ2
∂ρ
=
(ΠC −ΠIC)
2− γ
Ã
(1− γ) + 1
2
2 (ρ+ (1− γ) (2− γ))p
ρ (2 (1− γ) (2− γ) + ρ)
!
> 0
• The higher is γ, the more attractive is the disciplining option. An increase in
γ has a negative effect on λ2.
∂λ2
∂γ
=
(ΠC −ΠIC)
(2− γ)2
Ã
−ρ+ − (2− γ − ρ) ρp
ρ (2 (1− γ) (2− γ) + ρ)
!
< 0
¥
Proof of proposition 4.3: Proposition 4.3 consists of two parts. First, it defines
a parameter space (λ < ΠC − ΠIC) for which the principal’s dominant strategy is
to discipline either type of agent and a parameter space (λ ≥ ΠC −ΠIC) for which
the principal can choose between the selection option and the disciplining option.
Second, for λ < ΠC − ΠIC , the proposition gives the comparative statics results.
First, we derive the conditions on the parameter space. If eVC (0) ≥ eVIC (λ) (that is
λ ≥ (ΠC −ΠIC)), setting a = eVC (0) also affects an incompetent agent’s behavior.
In this situation disciplining only a competent agent is not a real option. Therefore,
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the principal’s dominant strategy is to discipline either type of agent by setting
a ∈ [0, VIC (μ1 = h)]. If λ < (ΠC −ΠIC), then the principal can choose to discipline
only the competent agent or she can discipline either type of agent. What remains
to be proven are the comparative statics results in the last situation.
To derive the comparative statics results we take two steps. First, we determine the
expected utility if the principal chooses the selection option. Second, we determine
the principals expected utility if she chooses to discipline either type of agent.
Suppose the principal chooses the selection option and sets a = eVC (0), implying
that a competent agent implements the project iff V1 ≥ eVC (0) and an incompetent
agent implements the project iff V1 ≥ eVIC (λ). Then the principal’s expected utility
equals
Πρ −
1
4h
µ
ρ
³eVC (0)´2 + (1− ρ)³eVIC (λ)´2¶
+
∙
Πρ +
γρ (1− ρ)
2h
³
f + eVIC (λ)− eVC (0)´ (ΠC −ΠIC)¸
Filling in eVIC (λ) (see (4.9)) and eVC (0) (see (4.8) with λ = 0) and rewriting gives
the following expression
Πρ −
(1− ρ) γ2
4h
¡
ρ (ΠC −ΠIC)2 + λ2 − 2ρ (ΠC −ΠIC)λ
¢
+
∙
Πρ +
γ2ρ (1− ρ)
2h
(f + (ΠC −ΠIC)− λ) (ΠC −ΠIC)
¸
(4.17)
Now suppose the principal chooses the selection option and sets a ∈ [0, VIC (μ1 = h)],
implying that an agent implements the project iff V1 ≥ 0. Then the principal’s
expected utility equals
Πρ +
∙
Πρ +
γρ (1− ρ)
2h
f (ΠC −ΠIC)
¸
(4.18)
Now the choice between the selection option and the disciplining option can be
analyzed by comparing (4.17) and (4.18). The principal prefers the selection option
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to the disciplining option if
λ2 < ρ (ΠC −ΠIC)2
λ < λ3 =
√
ρ (ΠC −ΠIC) (4.19)
where λ3 is the value of λ for which the principal is indifferent between the selection
option and the disciplining option.
Now we can determine how the parameters λ, f , ρ and γ affect the choice between
selection and disciplining.
• An increase in λ, widens the range of parameters for which the principal
chooses to discipline either type of agent. This result follows directly from
(4.19).
• An increase in f , narrows the range of parameters for which the principal
chooses to discipline either type of agent. An increase in f has a positive effect
on λ3
∂λ3
∂f
=
∂ (ΠC −ΠIC)
∂f
√
ρ
where ∂(ΠC−ΠIC)∂f > 0.
• The higher is ρ, the smaller is the range for which the principal chooses to
discipline either type of agent and the larger is the range for which the principal
chooses to discipline only the competent agent. An increase in ρ has a positive
effect on λ3
∂λ3
∂ρ
=
(ΠC −ΠIC)
2
√
ρ
> 0
• The parameter γ has no effect on the choice between disciplining the competent
agent only or disciplining either type of agent. An increase in γ has no effect
on λ3 (∂λ3∂γ = 0).
¥
Chapter 5
Does Electoral Competition create
Incentives for Political Parties to
collect Information about the Pros
and Cons of Alternative Policies?
Co-author: Otto H. Swank
5.1 Introduction
In most democratic societies, policy decisions are delegated to elected politicians:
in practice democracy is representative rather than direct. A well-known rationale
for representative democracy is that direct democracy leads to a serious free-rider
problem as to the collection of information. The reason is simple. The analysis
of the full consequences of policy alternatives is complicated and costly. When in
communities with many citizens decisions are made through referenda, individuals
lack incentives to examine policy consequences. The cost of collecting information
almost always exceeds the benefit, because the probability that one’s vote is decisive
is negligible. A problem with this rationale for representative democracy is that it
takes for granted that representatives do collect information.
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In this chapter we examine whether or not electoral competition induces political
parties or candidates to collect information about policy consequences. To this end,
we employ a simple spatial voting model, in which two parties compete for office. The
elections revolve around a single issue. As to this issue, there are three options, say,
cut spending, maintain spending and increase spending. Partly, voters’ preferences
over the three alternatives are exogenous. However, voters may change preferences
over policies when new information about their pros and cons becomes available.
Because of "rational ignorance", voters do not search for information that bears on
the pros and cons of policy options. Before elections are held, parties may collect
information. Collecting information is costly. After the two parties have had the
opportunity to find information, they simultaneously select a party platform (one of
the policy alternatives). Next, the parties campaign. In the campaign, parties can
try to make a case for their platform. Arguments in favor of one’s own platform or
arguments against the platform of the opponent, if found, can be supplied in the
campaign. After the campaign, elections are held. The winning party takes office
and implements its program.
We derive two main results. Our first result is not very surprising. Whether
or not parties collect information depends on the cost of information. If this cost
is sufficiently low, each party searches for both arguments in favor and arguments
against policy alternatives. If this cost is sufficiently high, neither party collects
information. In the intermediate case an equilibrium exists, in which one party
searches for arguments in one direction, say increase spending, whereas the other
party searches for arguments in the other direction.
Our second result is more interesting. In the equilibrium in which one party
searches for arguments in favor of one alternative, while the other party searches
for arguments in favor of another alternative, divergence of platforms may occur.
One party either chooses "increase spending" or "status quo", depending on the
information it has found, while the other party either chooses "decrease spending"
or "status quo". It is worth emphasizing that this result is obtained under the
assumption that parties primarily care about winning the elections.
This chapter is closely related to the literature on pre-election politics. In this
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literature, the essential policy decisions are made before the elections (Persson and
Tabellini, 2000). An important result is that electoral competition between two
parties or candidates leads to convergence of platforms (Downs, 1957). Calvert
(1985) argues that this result is robust by pointing out that if parties care about
policy outcomes (rather than about winning elections) they also tend to choose
the same policy platform.1 We show that endogenizing information may affect the
convergent result.
This chapter also builds on Dewatripont and Tirole (1999), henceforth DT. DT
consider a situation in which a decision maker is uncertain about the pros and cons
of alternative policies. They argue that it could be efficient for an organization to
let advocates of specific interests collect information about the pros and cons of
alternative policy options. The reason is that stakes in the decision process create
strong incentives for agents to collect information. An important difference between
DT and this chapter is that, in this chapter agents are driven by electoral motives,
whereas in DT agents are driven by monetary rewards.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses the model.
Section 5.3 describes the equilibria. Section 5.4 concludes.
5.2 The model
We consider a society inhabited by a continuum of voters. Each voter i has quadratic
preferences over policy, X. There are three alternative policies: X ∈ {−1, 0, 1}.
Voter i’s preferences are represented by
Ui = −
£
X −
¡
Xdi + θ
¢¤2
(5.1)
1Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) argue that the convergent result is not as robust as Calvert
suggests. A basic assumption underlying Calvert’s result is that parties can make credible commit-
ments to carry out announced campaign promises after being elected. If parties are unable to make
precommitments, even a small amount of policy preferences breaks down the convergent outcome.
Alesina (1988) shows that complete or partial convergence can only occur if the interaction between
parties is modelled as an infinitely repeated game.
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where Xdi denotes the voter’s type and θ is a stochastic term. This term consists of
two parts:
θ = θA + θB
where θA is equal to −z or 0 with equal probability, and θB is equal to z or 0 with
equal probability. In (5.1), Xdi + θ denotes voter i’s bliss point. The stochastic term
θ reflects that voters are uncertain about policy consequences. A straightforward
interpretation of θA is that there might be arguments for restrictive policy (X = −1).
Likewise, θB captures that there might be arguments for intensifying policy (X = 1).
We assume that θA and θB contain hard information that can be conveyed to voters.
The position of the median voter is given by Xdm = 0.
Two parties, denoted by L and R, compete for office. Before the elections,
each party can learn the values of the stochastic terms. For each party, there are
four alternatives. First, at a cost C2 (j = L,R) party J learns both θA and θB,
LJ = AB. Second and third, at a cost C1 < C2, party J learns either θA (LJ = A)
or θB (LJ = B). Finally, party J can decide to learn nothing (LJ = 0).
After the parties have had the opportunities to learn the stochastic terms, they
simultaneously select their party platforms,XJ = {−1, 0, 1}. We assume that parties
select XJ with a view to win the election. Formally, party J selects XJ so as to
maximize πJ , where πJ is the probability that party J wins the election. Parties
care about policy outcomes in case policy outcomes do not affect their chances of
winning the elections. In that case, party L prefers X = −1 to X = 0 and X = 0
to X = 1, while party R prefers X = 1 to X = 0 and X = 0 to X = −1. Parties
have thus lexicographic preferences: policy outcomes matter only if they do not
affect parties’ chances of winning the elections. We assume that party platforms
are binding. If elected, party J implements the platform it has announced. The
preferences of party J are represented by
UJ = λπJ − C
where λ denotes the value of holding office.
Before the elections, the parties campaign. In the campaign, parties try to make
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a case for their platform. Depending on what parties have learned about the sto-
chastic terms, they can supply arguments in favor of their own platform or supply
arguments against the platform of their opponent. We assume that information
about the stochastic terms can be concealed, but cannot be forged. After the cam-
paign elections are held, in which voters choose between the two parties. In our
model, preferences are single-peaked. It is well-known that in such a model the
choice of the median voter is decisive. From now on, we will treat our model as a
game with three players, Party L, party R and the median voter, voter M .
5.3 Equilibrium
This section presents the equilibria of our game. Each equilibrium identifies the
strategy of each party, i.e. it describes a party’s decision about the information
it collects, the platform it selects and the information it supplies in the campaign.
Moreover, an equilibrium describes how the median voter updates his beliefs about
the stochastic terms, and for which party he votes. In equilibrium, the strategies of
the parties and the median voter are optimal responses to each other, and beliefs
are updated according to Bayes’ Rule.
On the basis of the cost of information collection and the value of z, three equilib-
ria in pure strategies and one equilibrium in mixed strategies can be distinguished.
Proposition 5.1 gives the conditions under which an equilibrium exists in which both
parties investigate both stochastic terms.
Proposition 5.1 Suppose C2 < 14λ and z >
1
2
. Then, an equilibrium exists in which
LL = LR = AB; the following platforms are chosen: XL = XR = 0 if θA = 0 and
θB = 0, XL = XR = −1 if θA = −z and θB = 0, XL = XR = 1 if θA = 0
and θB = z and XL = XR = 0 if θA = −z and θB = z. If found, parties supply
information about the pros and cons of policy alternatives.
Proof. The proof of this proposition and other propositions can be found in the
Appendix.
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Proposition 5.1 states that if the cost of collecting full information is low and
z is sufficiently large, then parties are willing to incur the cost of learning the full
consequences of alternative policies. Moreover, under those conditions parties choose
the same platforms. The intuition behind Proposition 5.1 is straightforward. If z
is sufficiently large, information about the pros and cons of policies may convince
the median voter that X = 0 is not optimal. Being better informed about policy
consequences may thus be the key to office. If a party finds arguments in favor or
against a policy, supplying this information to voters weakly dominates not supplying
this information. Weakly, because the other party may supply the same information.
Under the conditions stated in Proposition 5.1, parties and voters are eventually
fully informed. It is therefore not surprising that, as in conventional spatial voting
models, party platforms fully converge.
In the case that the cost of collecting full information is sufficiently high, parties
will only collect partial information if the cost of collecting partial information is
low and z is sufficiently large. The conditions under which this equilibrium holds,
are discussed in Proposition 5.2.
Proposition 5.2 Suppose 1
4
λ + C1 < C2 < 12λ, C1 <
1
4
λ and z > 1
2
. Then, an
equilibrium exists in which LL = A and LR = B; the following platforms are chosen:
party L chooses XL = 0 if θA = 0 and XL = −1 if θA = −z and party R chooses
XR = 0 if θB = 0 and XR = 1 if θB = z. If found, party L supplies information
about the pros of X = −1 and party R supplies information about the pros of X = 1.
Proposition 5.2 describes an equilibrium in which party L searches for arguments
in favor of restrictive policy (θA) and party R searches for arguments in favor of
intensifying policy (θB). In this case parties have asymmetric information, party L
learns θA and party R learns θB. The choice of platforms depends on the information
parties find. Party L chooses "decrease spending" if it finds arguments in favor of
this policy alternative and else it chooses "status quo". Party R, on the other hand,
chooses "increase spending" if it finds arguments in favor of this policy alternative
and else it chooses "status quo". Full convergence of political platforms only occurs
if neither one of the parties finds arguments in favor of the policy alternative it has
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investigated.
Finally, if collecting information is too costly, parties decide to learn nothing.
Proposition 5.3 shows under which conditions both parties decide to learn nothing.
As in conventional spatial-voting models, the choice of platforms depends only on
the position of the median voter. It is not surprising that both parties choose the
platform X = 0. Parties also decide not to search for information if z is small
enough.
Proposition 5.3 Suppose collecting information is too costly (C1 > 14λ) or z <
1
2
.
Then, an equilibrium exists in which parties decide not to collect information (LL =
LR = 0). The following platforms are chosen: XL = XR = 0.
In Propositions 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 we have seen under which conditions political
parties collect full information, partial information or no information. There is one
equilibrium that we have not discussed yet. Suppose that the costs of collecting
information are 1
4
λ < C2 < 14λ + C1 and C1 <
1
4
λ, then an equilibrium in pure
strategies does not exist. There exists an equilibrium in which parties randomize
between collecting full information, collecting partial information and collecting no
information. This equilibrium is described in Proposition 5.4.
Proposition 5.4 Suppose 1
4
λ < C2 < 14λ + C1, C1 <
1
4
λ and z > 1
2
. Then, an
equilibrium in mixed strategies exists. Party L (R) chooses LL = AB (LR = AB)
with probability
1
4
λ−C1
1
4
λ , LL = A (LR = B) with probability
C2− 14λ
1
4
λ and LL = 0 (LR =
0) with probability C1−C2+
1
4
λ
1
4
λ . The choice of platforms depends on the information
parties have collected. There are nine possible outcomes.
To understand proposition 5.4 let us first consider the payoff matrix parties face
in the first stage.
LR = AB LR = B LR = 0
LL = AB 12λ− C2,
1
2
λ− C2 34λ− C2,
1
4
λ− C1 34λ− C2,
1
4
λ
LL = A 14λ− C1,
3
4
λ− C2 12λ− C1,
1
2
λ− C1 34λ− C1,
1
4
λ
LL = 0 14λ,
3
4
λ− C2 14λ,
3
4
λ− C1 12λ,
1
2
λ
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Proposition 5.4 states that there does not exist an equilibrium in pure strategies if
1
4
λ < C2 < 14λ+ C1, C1 <
1
4
λ and z > 1
2
. The reason is that parties always have an
incentive to deviate. Suppose that party L collects full information, then party R
prefers to collect no information. But, given that party R collects no information,
party L achieves a higher payoff by collecting partial information. And, given that
party L collects partial information, party R prefers to collect full information.
In equilibrium both parties randomize between collecting full information, par-
tial information and no information. The intuition behind this equilibrium is that
collecting full information is costly. Therefore parties only want to collect full infor-
mation if the other party is collecting partial information. In the other cases parties
prefer to collect either partial information or no information. Because parties de-
cide simultaneously how much information to collect, they are uncertain about the
amount of information the other party is going to collect. Therefore collecting full
information, collecting partial information and collecting no information can all be
a best response. Parties play each of the three actions with positive probability.
Proposition 5.4 presents the probabilities of collecting full information, partial
information and no information. The probabilities depend on the value of holding
office (λ) and on the costs of collecting information. First we consider the effect of
a change in λ on the probability of collecting full, partial or no information. The
parameter λ has a positive effect on the probability of collecting full information.
So, political parties have a stronger incentive to collect full information if the value
of office (λ) increases. The intuition is that as λ increases, winning the elections
becomes more important to parties. And, by collecting full information, parties can
increase the probability of winning the elections. Besides the effect on the probability
of collecting full information, changing λ also affects the probability of collecting
partial information and the probability of collecting no information. The parameter
λ has a negative effect on the probability of collecting partial information and a
positive effect on the probability of collecting no information. These findings can be
explained by the positive effect of λ on the probability of collecting full information.
We have already seen that given that one party collects full information, the other
party is best off collecting no information. This means that if the probability of
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collecting full information increases as λ increases, the probability of collecting no
information also increases. In a similar way we can explain that the probability of
collecting partial information decreases as λ increases.
Next, let us consider the effect of a change in the cost of information on the prob-
ability of collecting full information. The probability of collecting full information
only depends on the cost of collecting partial information. As the cost of collecting
partial information increases, the probability of collecting full information decreases.
The reason is that as the cost of collecting partial information increases, collecting
partial information becomes more costly resulting in a weaker incentive to collect
partial information. We have already shown that collecting full information is only
a best response if the other party collects partial information. This means that a
weaker incentive to collect partial information reduces the probability of collecting
full information. Surprising is that the probability of collecting full information
does not depend on the cost of collecting full information. The reason is that two
opposite effects play a role. On the one hand, parties have a weaker incentive to
collect full information if the cost of collecting full information increases. On the
other hand, the cost of collecting full information has a positive effect on the proba-
bility of collecting partial information. And, collecting partial information is a best
response, given that the other party collects no information. In a similar way we
can explain the effect of a change in the cost of information on the probability of
collecting partial information and on the probability of collecting no information
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we have analyzed under which conditions electoral competition in-
duces political parties to collect information. We have considered a model of electoral
competition in which parties are allowed to collect information before elections take
place. In the electoral campaign, parties can use the information, if found, to make
a case for their platform. With respect to the preferences of parties we have assumed
that parties care only about winning the elections.
We have shown that whether or not parties collect information depends on the
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cost of information. More surprisingly, we find that endogenizing information may
lead to divergence of policy platforms.
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5.A Appendix
In this appendix, we show under which conditions parties collect full information,
partial information or decide to learn nothing. Parties face nine feasible outcomes.
We treat each outcome separately.
Case 1. Suppose LL = LR = AB. Each party has full information about the
alternative policies. If z > 1
2
, party L and R choose XL = XR = 0 if θA = 0 and
θB = 0, XL = XR = −1 if θA = −z and θB = 0, XL = XR = 1 if θA = 0 and
θB = z and XL = XR = 0 if θA = −z and θB = z. The payoffs of both parties equal
1
2
λ − C2. If z < 12 , the parties choose XL = XR = 0. The payoffs of both parties
equal 1
2
λ− C2.
Case 2. Suppose LL = AB and LR = B. Then party L learns θA and θB and party
R only learns θB. If z > 12 , party L chooses XL = 0 if θA = 0 and θB = 0, XL = −1
if θA = −z and θB = 0, XL = 1 if θA = 0 and θB = z and XL = 0 if θA = −z and
θB = z. Party R chooses XR = 1 if θB = z and XR = 0 if θB = 0. If party R learns
that θB = z, X = 0 and X = 1 yield the same expected probability of winning the
elections. Because of the lexicographic preference relation of parties, party R prefers
X = 1. If θB = 0, X = 0 and X = −1 yield the same probability of winning. In this
case party R prefers X = 0. The payoff of party L equals 3
4
λ−C2 and the payoff of
party R equals 1
4
λ− C1. If z < 12 , the parties choose XL = XR = 0. The payoff of
party L equals 1
2
λ− C2 and the payoff of party R equals 12λ− C1.
Case 3. Suppose LL = AB and LR = 0. Then only party L learns θA and θB and
party R learns nothing. If z > 1
2
, party L chooses XL = 0 if θA = 0 and θB = 0,
XL = −1 if θA = −z and θB = 0, XL = 1 if θA = 0 and θB = z and XL = 0 if
θA = −z and θB = z. Party R choosesXR = 0. The payoff of party L equals 34λ−C2
and the payoff of party R equals 1
4
λ. If z < 1
2
, the parties choose XL = XR = 0.
The payoff of party L equals 1
2
λ− C2 and the payoff of party R equals 12λ.
Case 4. Suppose LL = A and LR = AB. Then party L only learns θA and party R
learns θA and θB. If z > 12 , party R chooses XR = 0 if θA = 0 and θB = 0, XR = −1
if θA = −z and θB = 0, XR = 1 if θA = 0 and θB = z and XR = 0 if θA = −z and
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θB = z. Party L chooses XL = −1 if θA = −z and XL = 0 if θA = 0. The payoff
of party R equals 3
4
λ− C2 and the payoff of party L equals 14λ− C1. If z <
1
2
, the
parties choose XL = XR = 0. The payoff of party R equals 12λ− C2 and the payoff
of party L equals 1
2
λ− C1.
Case 5. Suppose LL = 0 and LR = AB. Then only party R learns θA and θB and
party L learns nothing. If z > 1
2
, party R chooses XR = 0 if θA = 0 and θB = 0,
XR = −1 if θA = −z and θB = 0, XR = 1 if θA = 0 and θB = z and XR = 0
if θA = −z and θB = z. Party L chooses XL = 0. The payoff of party R equals
3
4
λ−C2 and the payoff of party L equals 14λ. If z <
1
2
, parties choose XL = XR = 0.
The payoff of party R equals 1
2
λ− C2 and the payoff of party L equals 12λ.
Case 6. Suppose LL = A and LR = B. Then party L learns θA and party R learns
θB. If z > 12 , party L chooses XL = −1 if θA = −z and XL = 0 if θA = 0. Party R
chooses XR = 1 if θB = z and XR = 0 if θB = 0. The payoffs of both parties equal
1
2
λ − C1. If z < 12 , the parties choose XL = XR = 0. The payoffs of both parties
equal 1
2
λ− C1.
Case 7. Suppose LL = A and LR = 0. Then party L learns θA and party R learns
nothing. If z > 1
2
, party L chooses XL = −1 if θA = −z and XL = 0 if θA = 0.
Party R chooses XR = 0. The payoff of party L equals 34λ − C1 and the payoff of
party R equals 1
4
λ. If z < 1
2
, the parties choose XL = XR = 0. The payoff of party
L equals 1
2
λ− C1 and the payoff of party R equals 12λ.
Case 8. Suppose LL = 0 and LR = B. Then party L learns nothing and party R
learns θB. If z > 12 , party R chooses XR = 1 if θB = z and XR = 0 if θB = 0. Party
L chooses XL = 0. The payoff of party R equals 34λ − C1 and the payoff of party
L equals 1
4
λ. If z < 1
2
, parties choose XL = XR = 0. The payoff of party R equals
1
2
λ− C1 and the payoff of party L equals 12λ.
Case 9. Suppose LL = LR = 0. Then parties choose XL = XR = 0. The payoffs of
both parties equal 1
2
λ.
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For z > 1
2
we have summarized the cases in a payoff matrix.
LR = AB LR = B LR = 0
LL = AB 12λ− C2,
1
2
λ− C2 34λ− C2,
1
4
λ− C1 34λ− C2,
1
4
λ
LL = A 14λ− C1,
3
4
λ− C2 12λ− C1,
1
2
λ− C1 34λ− C1,
1
4
λ
LL = 0 14λ,
3
4
λ− C2 14λ,
3
4
λ− C1 12λ,
1
2
λ
Proof of Proposition 5.1
Suppose z > 1
2
and C2 < 14λ. Then investigating both parts of the stochastic term
strictly dominates not investigating the stochastic term. The strategy investigate
both parts also dominates the strategy investigate only one part of the stochastic
term (C2 < 14λ+ C1). This means that independent of the choice of party L, party
R always chooses to investigate both parts if C2 < 14λ. The same is true for party
L.
If z > 1
2
, both parties collect full information if C2 < 14λ. The following platforms
are chosen: XL = XR = 0 if θA = 0 and θB = 0, XL = XR = −1 if θA = −z and
θB = 0, XL = XR = 1 if θA = 0 and θB = z and XL = XR = 0 if θA = −z and
θB = z. ¥
Proof of Proposition 5.2
Suppose z > 1
2
, 1
4
λ + C1 < C2 < 12λ and C1 <
1
4
λ. Then investigating both parts
is too costly. Neither one of the parties will collect full information. The strategy
investigate both parts of the stochastic term is dominated by the strategy investigate
only one part. We can restrict our attention to the last four cases (case 6, 7, 8 and
9). If C1 < 14λ, the strategy investigate one part of the stochastic term strictly
dominates the strategy not investigate the stochastic term. Given that party L
investigates θA, party R will investigate θB if 12λ − C1 >
1
4
λ (C1 < 14λ). Given
that party L does not investigate θA, party R will investigate θB if 34λ − C1 >
1
2
λ
(C1 < 14λ). The same can be done to determine the optimal strategy of party L.
If z > 1
2
, parties investigate one part of the stochastic term if C1 < 14λ and
1
4
λ+C1 <
C2 < 12λ. The following platforms are chosen: party L chooses XL = −1 if θA = −z
and XL = 0 if θA = 0 and party R chooses XR = 1 if θB = z and XR = 0 if θB = 0.¥
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Proof of Proposition 5.3
Suppose z > 1
2
and C1 > 14λ. Then both parties decide to learn nothing. Both
parties choose the platform which lies closest to the median voter, XL = XR = 0.
Also if z < 1
2
, parties decide not to collect information. If z < 1
2
, investigating
the stochastic term is strictly dominated by not investigating the stochastic term
(1
2
λ− C1 < 12λ). ¥
Proof of Proposition 5.4
Suppose z > 1
2
, 1
4
λ < C2 < 14λ + C1 and C1 <
1
4
λ. Then there is no equilibrium
in pure strategies. To find an equilibrium in mixed strategies we define α as the
probability that LR = AB, β as the probability that LR = B and γ = 1 − α − β
as the probability that LR = 0. The payoff to party L, of choosing respectively
LL = AB, LL = A and LL = 0, is:
Π (AB) =
µ
1
2
λ− C2
¶
α+
µ
3
4
λ− C2
¶
β +
µ
3
4
λ− C2
¶
(1− α− β)
=
3
4
λ− C2 −
1
4
λα
Π (A) =
µ
1
4
λ− C1
¶
α+
µ
1
2
λ− C1
¶
β +
µ
3
4
λ− C1
¶
(1− α− β)
=
3
4
λ− C1 −
1
2
λα− 1
4
λβ
Π (0) =
1
4
λα+
1
4
β − 1
2
(1− α− β)
=
1
2
λ− 1
4
λα− 1
4
λβ
For a mixed strategy to be an equilibrium we must have that party L is indifferent
between LL = AB, LL = A and LL = 0. This occurs if:
α =
1
4
λ− C1
1
4
λ
β =
C2 − 14λ
1
4
λ
γ =
1
4
λ+ C1 − C2
1
4
λ
5.A Appendix 115
Due to symmetry we find the same probabilities for party L. Party L (R) chooses
LL = AB (LR = AB) with probability
1
4
λ−C1
1
4
λ , LL = A (LR = B) with probability
C2−14λ
1
4
λ and LL = 0 (LR = 0) with probability
C1−C2+ 14λ
1
4
λ . The choice of platforms
depends on the information parties have collected in the first stage. All nine cases
have a positive probability of occurring. The probabilities of collecting full informa-
tion, collecting partial information and collecting no information lie between 0 and
1 if the following conditions hold:
0 < α < 1 if 0 < C1 <
1
4
λ
0 < β < 1 if
1
4
λ < C2 <
1
2
λ
0 < γ < 1 if C1 < C2 <
1
4
λ+ C1
If one of the conditions is not satisfied, parties choose one of three equilibria in pure
strategies discussed in Propositions 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. Suppose C1 > 14λ. Then both
parties decide to learn nothing, because it gives the highest payoff. This equilibrium
is discussed in Proposition 5.3. Suppose that C1 < 14λ and C2 >
1
4
λ + C1. Then
both parties collect partial information. This equilibrium is discussed in Proposition
5.2. Finally, suppose that C1 < 14λ and C2 <
1
4
λ. Then both parties will collect full
information (Proposition 5.1). ¥

Chapter 6
Polarization, Information
Collection and Electoral Control∗
Co-author: Otto H. Swank
6.1 Introduction
In the economics literature, polarization of preferences of political parties generally
leads to sub-optimal outcomes. The reason is twofold. First, polarization introduces
uncertainty, because it usually implies that (economic) outcomes will depend on
electoral outcomes. It is well-known that when voters are risk-averse, they prefer
a certain outcome X to a gamble for which the expected outcome is X (Myerson,
1995, Persson and Tabellini, 2000, chapter 5). Second, polarization of preferences
prevents information revelation. Schultz (1996, 1999) shows that polarization may
induce the incumbent party to bias its policies to increase its chances of re-election.
An important feature of his model is that parties have better information on how
the economy works than voters.
This chapter shows that besides costs, there is a benefit of polarization of pref-
erences: it encourages political parties to make a case for their policies. As a conse-
∗This chapter is a version of an article published in Social Choice and Welfare, 2006, vol. 26
(3), pp. 527-545.
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quence, in a polarized political system, the incentives of parties to collect information
are stronger than in a political system in which parties are purely office motivated.
When the cost of acquiring information is high relative to the rents from office, vot-
ers prefer a polarized political system to a system with office motivated parties. To
make our point, we employ a principal-agent model in which two parties compete
for office. We examine two cases: the case that the sole aim of parties is holding of-
fice, and the case that parties are ideologically driven.2 In our model, the electorate
wants parties to perform two tasks. The first task is acquiring information. The
idea is that the electorate wants parties to make a case for their policy. Each party
can search for two pieces of information: an argument that justifies intensifying
policy and an argument that justifies restricting policy. Both the incumbent party
and the opposition party can collect information.3 It is also possible that one party
searches for one piece of information and the other party searches for the other piece
of information. The second task is making a decision about policy. The incumbent
party performs this task. We examine to what extent alternative voting rules induce
political parties to pursue the voters’ interests.
We derive several results. First, in case the parties are office motivated, voting
rules should focus on information collection. The reason is that since the incumbent
party is not concerned with policy, it always selects the policy voters want. The
problem is to encourage parties to collect information. One could interpret this result
as a variation on the median voter theorem. As to the determination of policies, office
motivated parties tend to act in accordance with the wishes of a majority of voters.
Second, a voting rule that encourages the opposition party to collect information
may be at least as good as a voting rule that stimulates the incumbent party to
2The reason for analyzing office motivated parties and policy motivated parties separately is
to highlight the forces at work. We are aware that these are extreme cases. Combining them is
straightforward, but tedious.
An other extension of the model is to allow for different types of politicians, for example, allowing
for office motivated parties and policy motivated parties. In this set-up, elections can be seen as
a mechanism used by the voter to select the type of politician that provides the largest utility to
the electorate.
3In principal-agent models of politics, the opposition party usually does not play an active
role. In the words of Ferejohn (1986, p. 14): “The importance of challengers lies entirely in their
availability”.
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collect information. The intuition of this result is that charging the opposition with
the task of collecting information increases the value of office (the incumbent party
enjoys the rents from office, while the opposition party incurs the cost of effort).
This second result is similar to one of the main results of tournament theory that a
bigger spread of payoffs leads to higher effort levels (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). Our
second result suggests that the role of the opposition party in a democracy might
be much bigger than “being available”.
Our next two results are related to the case that parties are policy motivated.
We show that policy motivated parties need to be given weaker incentives to collect
information than office motivated parties. The main reason is that information about
policy consequences may warrant particular policies. For instance, a party that is
biased towards selecting restrictive policy will search for arguments that support
restrictive policy. An implication of this result is that in a polarized party system,
as to information collection there is a natural division of tasks. One party collects
information about the pros of restrictive policy; the other party collects information
about the pros of intensifying policy. Finally, when parties are policy motivated, the
voter cannot always induce the incumbent party to select a policy in her interest.
At most, the voters can induce the incumbent party sometimes to select the policy
that is optimal from her point of view. The reason is that a policy motivated party
desires office because of the influence it wields in determining policy. If this influence
is not present, the party will simply select its optimal policy, taking for granted that
it will be sent away. How often the incumbent party should be allowed to select its
own optimal policy depends on the costs of collecting information.
This article builds on the literature on electoral competition in two-party sys-
tems. On the basis of the way voters are modeled, two strands in this literature can
be distinguished. First, in spatial models of elections, each voter compares the plat-
forms of the political parties, and votes for the party whose platform yields highest
expected utility. This literature gives the conditions under which in a two-party
system the platforms of parties converge (see for a survey of this literature Mueller,
2003, chapter 11 and 12), or diverge (Wittman, 1977, Calvert, 1985, Alesina, 1988).
Second, in principal-agent models of politics, voters are modeled as a principal who
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has to keep an officeholder, the agent, in check. The relationship between voters
and the officeholder is modeled as an implicit contract (or voting rule). This con-
tract stipulates the conditions under which the office holder stays in office or is
replaced by another one. This literature also has provided several insights. For
example, Ferejohn (1986) shows how voters can control moral hazard on the part of
the incumbent. Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997) use a principal-agent model
to analyze the pros and cons of alternative political institutions.
An attractive feature of the literature using spatial models of politics is its em-
pirical relevance. For example, Alesina and Rosenthal (1989) provide evidence that
U.S. macroeconomic data are consistent with the predictions of a model in which
parties cater to the interests of their core constituencies. Another attractive feature
of spatial models is their focus on competition: both the incumbent and the oppo-
sition party play a role. A nice feature of principal-agent models is that they build
on the basic idea of representative democracy that there might be huge benefits
of delegating authority over policy to a relatively small number of representatives.
However, a serious problem resulting from delegating authority is abuse of power.
Elections may discipline officeholders, because voters can send them away if they do
a poor job or keep them when they do a good job. Another attractive feature of
principal-agent models is that they can do justice to the complexity of the policy-
decision process. As a rule, the consequences of policy decisions are difficult to
foresee. It is in the voters’ interest that the officeholder makes informed decisions.
Voters want political parties to collect information and to act upon this informa-
tion. Principal-agent models are suitable for analyzing whether or not voters can
encourage political parties to collect information. By (1) allowing for polarization;
(2) giving a role to the opposition party; and (3) giving parties multiple tasks, this
chapter tries to combine the attractive features of the two strands in the literature
on electoral competition in two-party systems.
As mentioned before, this chapter is closely related to Schultz (1996,1999) who
shows that polarization of preferences prevents information revelation and may lead
to Pareto inferior equilibria. An important difference between our model and the
ones studied by Schultz is that in Schultz it is assumed that parties have better
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information about how the economy works, while in our model the distribution of
information is endogenous. In fact, we show that polarization of preferences may be
the reason why political parties are better informed than voters. Thus, in Schultz
asymmetric information and polarization lead to manipulation of information, while
in this chapter polarization induces parties to collect information. As a consequence,
in our model polarized preferences may lead to Pareto superior equilibria.
This chapter is also closely related to Dewatripont and Tirole (1999). They
show that using two competing agents defending their own special interest improves
the quality of decision-making compared to using a single agent. They thus pro-
vide a rationale for advocacy.4 Following Dewatripont and Tirole, we assume that
information is hard, i.e. once found, information can costlessly be verified. As a con-
sequence, information cannot be forged or manipulated. We are aware that much of
the information supplied by political parties is not hard. Often, it is very difficult
for the voter to distinguish relevant from irrelevant information. However, we do
believe that at elections voters want political parties to make a case for their policies.
Our assumption of hard information reflects that it is easier for a party to convince
voters when it has actual information than when it has forged information.5
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses the model.
Section 6.3 and 6.4 describe the equilibria of the model. In Section 6.3 we consider
parties that are purely office motivated and in Section 6.4 we consider purely policy
motivated parties. Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2 The model
We consider an infinitely repeated game. In each period t, a political party has to
make a decision about a public project, Xt. There are three alternatives: Xt = −1,
Xt = 0 and Xt = 1. One could interpret Xt = −1 as restricting policy, Xt = 0 as
4Ossokina and Swank (2004) also show that voters may benefit from advocacy. Their model
revolves around uncertainty about the median voter’s preferences.
5Swank and Visser (2003) show that if information is soft, it is hard for voters to encourage
office motivated politicians to collect information (see also Dur and Swank (2005), and Beniers and
Swank (2004) for the question how alternative types of information influence agents’ incentives to
collect information).
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maintaining status quo, and Xt = 1 as intensifying policy. In each period, there are
three players: party L, party R and a representative (middle of the road) voter, to
which we refer as ‘the voter’. The voter’s preferences are represented by
−E
∞X
t=0
δt (Xt − θt)2 (6.1)
where E is the expectations operator, δ is the discount factor (0 < δ < 1), and θt
is a stochastic term. The term θt consists of two parts: θt = θA,t + θB,t, with
θA,t ∈ {−1, 0}, Pr(θA,t = −1) = Pr (θA,t = 0) = 12 and θB,t ∈ {0, 1}, Pr(θB,t =
0) = Pr (θB,t = 1) = 12 . The terms θA,t and θB,t are independent of each other and
independent of their previous values. The idea behind the stochastic term is that
the consequences of policy are uncertain. Under full information, the voter would
prefer Xt = 1 if θt = 1, Xt = 0 if θt = 0 and Xt = −1 if θt = −1. However, the
voter does not know θA,t and θB,t. Without further information about the stochastic
terms, the voter prefers Xt = 0. Notice that the voter wants policy to be based on
θt.
In each period, policy is selected by the party which won the last elections.
Before the governing party selects policy, the two parties may collect information
about policy consequences. At cost C2, a party learns both θA,t and θB,t. At cost
C1, a party can learn the value of either θA,t or θB,t. In a policy debate, information
about policy consequences, if collected, can be communicated. We assume that if
a party learns that θA,t = −1 or θB,t = 1, it can convey this information to the
other party and the voter. For example, if a party puts forward an argument for
intensifying policy (θB,t = 1), this reveals that that party has collected information
about θB,t. However, if a party collects information about, say, θB,t and learns
that θB,t = 0, it cannot show that it has collected information. The basic idea
about the information structure is that with some probability arguments in favor
(θB,t = 1) or against (θA,t = −1) intensifying policy exist. Costs have to be made
to find arguments. If a party puts forward an argument, then it is clear that the
party tried to find an argument. If a party does not put forward an argument, then
one cannot infer that the party did collect information. It is possible that θA,t = 0
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and/or θB,t = 0.
As to the objectives of the parties, we make two assumptions. First, we assume
that parties receive rents from holding office. In the next section, the preferences of
party L are represented by
UL = E
∞X
t=0
δt (dtλ− Ct,L) (6.2)
where dt is a variable taking the value one if party L is in office in period t and taking
the value zero otherwise, λ denotes the value of holding office, and Ct,L ∈ {0, C1, C2}.
Analogously, the preferences of party R are represented by
UR = E
∞X
t=0
δt ((1− dt)λ− Ct,R) (6.3)
where Ct,R ∈ {0, C1, C2}. Next, we assume that parties have ideological preferences.
In Section 6.4, the preferences of party L are given by
UL = E
∞X
t=0
δt
£
−(Xt − (−1 + θt))2 − Ct,L
¤
(6.4)
and the preferences of party R are given by
UR = E
∞X
t=0
δt
£
−(Xt − (1 + θt))2 − Ct,R
¤
(6.5)
Equation (6.4) reflects that, without further information about θt, party L prefers
Xt = −1. Only if party L learns that θt = 1, it prefers Xt = 0. Without information
about θt, party R prefers Xt = 1. Only if θt = −1, party R prefers Xt = 0. Equa-
tions (6.4) and (6.5) capture the main idea behind models with partisan politicians
(Hibbs, 1977, Wittman, 1977, Alesina, 1988), in which political parties differ in their
ideological preferences.
At the end of each period, the voter decides whether or not to re-elect the in-
cumbent party. We assume that the voter applies a simple retrospective voting rule.
This rule conditions re-election of the incumbent on outcomes in the current period.
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When voting, the voter observes the policy selected by the incumbent party, and
whether or not parties have found arguments in favor of restricting policy (θA,t = −1)
or intensifying policy (θB,t = 1). The voting rule is meant to motivate the parties
to collect information and to motivate the incumbent party to select the policy that
maximizes equation (6.1).
Let us summarize the timing in each period. (1) The party that won the elections
in period t− 1 takes office. (2) Nature chooses θA,t and θB,t. (3) Each party decides
whether to learn the value of either θA,t or θB,t, to learn both values or none of
them. (4) The parties reveal the information they collected. (5) The incumbent
party selects policy. (6) Elections are held.
6.3 Office motivated parties
In this section we identify the conditions under which the voter can induce political
parties to pursue her interest in case parties are purely office motivated. From
the voter’s point of view, the first best situation is attained if (i) information about
both θA,t and θB,t is collected, and, (ii) given the available information, Xt maximizes
(6.1). With office motivated parties, the incumbent party has never an incentive to
select a policy that does not accord with the voter’s interest. For this reason, in
this section we assume that the incumbent always selects the policy that maximizes
(6.1), given the available information about θt. The problem that remains is the
design of a voting rule that gives incentives to the parties to collect full information.
The idea behind any voting rule is that good behavior must be rewarded and
bad behavior must be punished. Clearly, collecting full information is good, and
not collecting information is bad. The main problem is that the voter does not
always observe whether or not a party really collected information. A party can
only show that it collected information if it found arguments in favor and/or against
intensifying policy.
With office motivated parties, voting rules can be distinguished on the basis of
two features. The first feature is the party on which the rule focuses. For example,
if a rule focuses on the incumbent party, that rule stipulates what the incumbent
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party should do to get re-elected. The second feature of the voting rule concerns the
question of how demanding the voting rule is.
We first consider a voting rule that focuses only on the incumbent party and is
highly demanding. After that, we will discuss voting rules that demand less of the
incumbent party or that focus (partially) on the opposition party:
Voting rule I: Re-elect the incumbent party if and only if it showed that θA,t = −1
and θB,t = 1.
To examine the consequences of this voting rule, we identify the conditions un-
der which it induces the incumbent to collect full information. Notice that if the
incumbent party collects full information, the voter attains the first-best situation.
A direct implication is that once we have shown that collecting full information is
an optimal reply to voting rule I, we have identified an equilibrium of the game.
Suppose that in each period, the incumbent collects full information. Does the
incumbent have an incentive to deviate? It is easy to see that collecting partial
information cannot be an optimal response to voting rule I. The reason is that
collecting partial information is costly but never leads to re-election under voting
rule I. In other words, collecting partial information is dominated by collecting no
information. Therefore, if an incumbent deviates, it collects no information. If the
incumbent collects no information, its payoff equals
λ+ V NEt+1 (6.6)
where V NEt+1 is the equilibrium continuation value for the incumbent if it is not re-
elected. If the incumbent collects full information, then voting rule I implies that
with probability 1
4
it will be re-elected. Thus, collecting full information delivers a
payoff equal to
λ− C2 +
1
4
V ELt+1 +
3
4
V NEt+1 (6.7)
where V ELt+1 is the equilibrium continuation value for the incumbent if it is re-elected.
From (6.6) and (6.7) it immediately follows that the incumbent prefers collecting
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full information to collecting no information if
C2 ≤
1
4
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
(6.8)
In the Appendix we show that V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = 2δ2+δ (λ− C2). Lemma 6.1 summarizes
our discussion about rule I.
Lemma 6.1 Suppose voting rule I. Furthermore suppose that C2 ≤ 14
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
,
with V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = 2δ2+δ (λ− C2). Then, (i) the opposition party does not collect
information; (ii) the incumbent party collects full information.
Proof. The proof of this lemma and other lemmas can be found in the Appendix.
Basically Lemma 6.1 states that if parties care sufficiently about holding office,
the cost of collecting information is sufficiently low, and parties are patient enough,
then voting rule I leads to a first-best situation for the voter. Of course a high λ is
not always good. For example, Dur (2002) shows that electoral concerns may induce
parties not to repeal policies that hurt society.
Let us now consider a less demanding voting rule:
Voting rule II: Re-elect the incumbent party if it showed that θA,t = −1 and
θB,t = 1, or it showed that θA,t = −1, or it showed that θB,t = 1.
Along the same lines as we derived (6.8), we can derive that under voting rule II
the incumbent prefers collecting full information to collecting no information if
C2 ≤
3
4
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
(6.9)
with V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = 2δ2−δ (λ− C2) (see the Appendix). Clearly condition (6.9) is
weaker than condition (6.8). The reason is that if the incumbent party collects full
information under voting rule II, it will be re-elected with probability 3
4
. Therefore,
the expected benefits of collecting full information are higher under rule II than
under rule I. Since showing partial information suffices for getting re-elected, voting
rule II has the drawback that the incumbent party may be tempted to collect partial
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rather than full information.6 If the incumbent party collects partial information in
period t, its expected payoff equals
λ− C1 +
1
2
V ELt+1 +
1
2
V NEt+1 (6.10)
Collecting full information yields a higher expected payoff than collecting partial
information if
C2 − C1 ≤
1
4
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
(6.11)
Equation (6.11) shows that the smaller is the difference between C2 and C1, the
weaker is the incumbent’s incentive to collect partial information. Lemma 6.2 de-
scribes the conditions under which voting rule II induces the incumbent party to
collect full information.
Lemma 6.2 Suppose voting rule II. Furthermore, suppose that C2 ≤ 34
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
and C2−C1 ≤ 14
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
, with V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = 2δ2−δ (λ− C2). Then, (i) the op-
position party does not collect information; (ii) the incumbent party collects full
information.
It is easy to see that both conditions (6.9) and (6.11) are weaker than (6.8).
Hence, voting rule II leads to full information collection for a wider range of para-
meters than voting rule I. To put it differently, voting rule II (weakly) dominates
voting rule I.
Voting rule I and II focus on the incumbent party. The same type of voting rules
can be applied to the opposition party. Voting rule II applied to the opposition
party can be formulated as7
Voting rule III: Elect the opposition party if it showed that θA,t = −1 and θB,t = 1,
or it showed that θA,t = −1, or it showed that θB,t = 1.
6We assume that a political party that collects full information, searches for both pieces of
information simultaneously. If political parties were allowed to collect information sequentially,
voting rule II would induce the parties to stop searching for information, once they have found a
piece of information.
7Voting rule I can also be rewritten for the opposition party. It is easy to show that such a
rule is weakly dominated by voting rule III.
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Clearly, under voting rule III, the incumbent party has no incentive to collect
information. Lemma 6.3 presents the conditions under which voting rule III induces
the opposition party to collect full information.
Lemma 6.3 Suppose voting rule III. Furthermore suppose that C2 ≤ 34
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
and C2 −C1 ≤ 14
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
, with V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = 2δ2+δ (λ+ C2). Then, (i) the in-
cumbent party does not collect information; (ii) the opposition party collects full
information.
Now we can compare voting rule II to voting rule III. Lemma 6.2 and 6.3 show
that under voting rule III holding office is more attractive than under voting rule II,
if 2C2 > δλ. The reason is that under voting rule III, the incumbent party enjoys
the rents from holding office, while the opposition party incurs the cost of collecting
information. Therefore, the value of holding office increases as the costs of collecting
full information increase. In the case that voting rule II is applied, the opposite is
true.
A comparison between the conditions in the Lemma 6.2 and 6.3 shows that
voting rule III dominates voting rule II. Hence, the conditions in Lemma 6.3 are
weaker than the conditions in Lemma 6.2. This means that the incentives to collect
information are stronger if the opponent incurs the cost of information, while the
incumbent enjoys the rents from office. We can compare this result to one of the
main results in tournament theory. Lazear and Rosen (1981) show that giving a
relatively high salary to an individual in a senior position, induces individuals in
more junior positions to exert higher effort.
Finally, consider a voting rule which focuses on both the incumbent party and
the opposition party.8
Voting rule IV: Elect the opposition if and only if it showed that θB,t = 1, while
the incumbent did not show θA,t = −1.
8There are several variants on voting rule IV. For example, the voting rule can require that
the opposition party must show that θB,t = 1. Another variant is that the opposition party is
elected unless the incumbent party shows that θA,t = −1. It is straightforward to check that all
such variants lead to the same type of conditions for full information collection.
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Notice that under rule IV the incumbent is re-elected if both the incumbent
and the opponent supply information. Consequently, under voting rule IV both the
incumbent party and the opposition party must have an incentive to collect partial
information. Let us first check under which conditions the incumbent party has no
incentive to shirk. Collecting partial information yields an expected payoff equal to
λ− C1 +
3
4
V ELt+1 +
1
4
V NEt+1
Not collecting information yields an expected payoff equal to
λ+
1
2
V ELt+1 +
1
2
V NEt+1
It is now easy to see that collecting partial information yields a higher payoff than
collecting no information if
C1 ≤
1
4
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
with V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 =
2δ
2− δλ (6.12)
An identical condition can be derived for the opposition party. Lemma 6.4 presents
the conditions for which voting rule IV leads to full information collection.
Lemma 6.4 Suppose voting rule IV. Furthermore suppose that C1 ≤ 14
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
with V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = 2δ2−δλ. Then, (i) the incumbent party collects information about
θA,t and (ii) the opposition party collects information about θB,t.
A comparison between Lemma 6.3 and 6.4 shows that without further informa-
tion about C1 and C2, one cannot say whether or not voting rule III dominates voting
rule IV. If C2 is close to C1, then rule III dominates rule IV. If instead C2 is much
higher than C1, then one should avoid that one party has to collect all information.
Consequently, rule IV dominates rule III. The following proposition summarizes the
main results of this section.
Proposition 6.1 Suppose parties are purely office motivated. Then, a voting rule
that only induces the incumbent to collect information (voting rule I and II) is dom-
inated by a voting rule that requires that the opposition collects information (voting
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rule III). If C1 ≤ 13C2, then the optimal voting rule induces both the incumbent and
the opposition to collect partial information.
So far, we have focused on voting rules which lead to full information collection.
If the conditions are such that none of the voting rules leads to full information
collection, then the voter prefers the incumbent party always to choose Xt = 0.
To see why, suppose an equilibrium in which one of the parties collects information
about θA,t, but no party investigates θB,t. Then, the parameters of the model are
such that the voter weakly prefersXt = 0, irrespective of the value of θA,t. Therefore,
if only one term is investigated, the voter does not want that the information about
this term will affect policy. The implication is that from the voter’s point of view,
a voting rule that leads to no information collection is at least as good as a voting
rule that leads to partial information collection. Hence, if the conditions for voting
rules III and IV are violated, one optimal voting rule is re-elect the incumbent party
if it chooses Xt = 0.
6.4 Policy motivated parties
This section describes the conditions under which the voter can induce political
parties to pursue her interest in case parties are purely policy motivated [see eqs.
(6.4) and (6.5)]. In contrast to office motivated parties, policy motivated parties have
an incentive to select policies which do not always accord with the voter’s interest.
For this reason, a voting rule should not only give incentives to the parties to collect
information, but should also give incentives to the incumbent party to select the
policy which, given the available information, maximizes (6.1). An implication is
that a voting rule should mainly focus on the incumbent party.
Before analyzing alternative voting rules in detail, we first present two more
general results.
Lemma 6.5 The voter (weakly) prefers a situation in which party L examines θA,t
and party R examines θB,t to a situation in which the incumbent party examines
both θA,t and θB,t, and the other party examines nothing.
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The reason for Lemma (6.5) is that policy motivated parties may have an in-
centive to conceal information. Suppose, for instance, that the incumbent party
examines both θA,t and θB,t, and discovers that θA,t = −1 and θB,t = 1. Further-
more suppose that party L is in office. Then, the incumbent party prefers Xt = −1
while the voter prefers Xt = 0. As a consequence, for a reasonable voting rule, party
L has no incentive to reveal that θB,t = 1. It is easy to verify that for any reasonable
voting rule, neither party L nor party R has an incentive to conceal information if
party L examines θA,t and party R examines θB,t.
Lemma 6.6 There does not exist a voting rule that induces (i) party L to investigate
θA,t, (ii) party R to investigate θB,t, and (iii) the incumbent party to select the policy
that maximizes the voter’s payoff function given the available information.
To understand Lemma 6.6, suppose that a voting rule exists that does lead to
a first-best situation from the voter’s point of view. Call this voting rule V. A
direct implication of rule V is that the equilibrium continuation value of the game
is independent of the election result. To put it differently, the payoff to a party is
independent of whether or not it wins the next election. But then the incumbent
party has no reason not to select its first-best policy.
An implication of Lemma 6.6 is that the incumbent must gain something from
promoting the voter’s interest. To put it in a more popular way, there should
be something in it for the incumbent party. Thus, a voting rule must allow the
incumbent to sometimes pursue its own interest. However, as we will show the voter
should not be too generous. The voter might be better off if no decision is made
and the status quo is retained in each period. Then, the voter achieves an expected
utility of −2
4
. Hence, the voter only has an incentive to delegate the policy decision
to political parties, if it yields and expected utility larger than −2
4
.
With policy motivated parties, voting rules can be distinguished on the basis
of one feature, namely how demanding the voting rule is. In Lemma 6.6 we have
already shown that the voter can never achieve a first-best situation. Below, we
discuss some voting rules that permit the incumbent party sometimes to pursue its
own interest. Let us first consider voting rule VI.
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Voting rule VI: Re-elect the incumbent party unless Xt 6= 0 if θt = 0.
Under voting rule VI the incumbent party is allowed to select its optimal policy
if θt = −1 or θt = 1. However, the voter wants the incumbent party to select her
optimal policy if θt = 0. To examine how voting rule VI shapes the policy decision,
suppose that party L is in office and that both parties collect information.9 Clearly,
unless θt = 0, party L will select the policy which maximizes its current payoff,
for there is no trade-off between current and future policy. Hence, party L chooses
Xt = −1 if θt = −1, andXt = 0 if θt = 1. If θt = 0, thenXt = −1 yields an expected
payoff to party L equal to −C1+V NEt+1 , while Xt = 0 delivers −C1+V ELt+1 −1. Hence,
when θt = 0, party L chooses Xt = 0 if V ELt+1−V NEt+1 ≥ 1. Notice that if this condition
holds, party L will always win the next election. If V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 < 1, then rule VI
does not give incentives to party L to behave in accordance with the voter’s interest.
Let us now identify the conditions under which party L investigates θA,t and party
R investigates θB,t. Suppose an equilibrium in which both parties investigate and
select policy in accordance with voting rule VI. What are the incentives for party L
to deviate? Investigating yields a payoff equal to −3
4
−C1+V ELt+1 , if V ELt+1 −V NEt+1 ≥ 1.
To derive the payoff to party L if it does not investigate θA,t, we first have to
determine which policy it would select in that case. Notice that if party L did not
collect information, the voter would conclude that party L found θA,t = 0. Suppose
that θB,t = 1. Then, it is optimal for party L to select Xt = 0. Now suppose
that θB,t = 0. Then, party L faces a trade-off between optimal policy in period t
(Xt = −1) and losing the next election on the one hand and suboptimal policy in
period t (Xt = 0) and winning the next election on the other hand. It is easy to
verify that if party L is sufficiently concerned with the future (V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = δ1−δ >
2),10 then it chooses Xt = 0. In that case not investigating θA,t yields a payoff to
party L equal to −6
4
+ V ELt+1 . Hence, given that V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 > 2, party L prefers
investigating to not investigating if C1 ≤ 34 . In case V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 < 2, then party
L selects Xt = −1 if θB,t = 0, and not investigating θA,t yields a payoff equal to
−1
2
+ 1
2
V ELt+1+
1
2
V NEt+1 . Consequently, party L prefers investigating to not investigating
9The analysis of the case that party R is in office is analogous.
10See the Appendix for the proof that V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = δ1−δ .
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if C1 ≤ 12
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
− 1
4
.
We have now identified the conditions under which the incumbent party collects
information. Let us now analyze under which conditions the opposition party, say
party R, collects information. It is easy to verify that investigating θB,t yields an
expected payoff to party R equal to −7
4
− C1 + V NEt+1 , while not investigating yields
−10
4
+ V NEt+1 . Hence, party R investigates if C1 ≤ 34 .
Lemma 6.7 summarizes our discussion about voting rule VI.
Lemma 6.7 Suppose voting rule VI. If 2
3
< δ < 1 and C1 ≤ 34 , or
1
2
< δ < 2
3
and
C1 ≤ 12
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
− 1
4
, with V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = δ1−δ , then (i) the incumbent party
collects information about θA,t and (ii) the opposition party collects information about
θB,t, and (iii) the incumbent party implements Xt = −1 if θt = −1, Xt = 0 if θt = 0
and Xt = 0 if θt = 1.
Basically, Lemma 6.7 states that if the costs of collecting information are suffi-
ciently low, and parties are sufficiently concerned with the future, then voting rule
VI leads to full information collection, and party L (R) selects policy in accordance
with the voter’s interest unless θt = 1 (θt = −1). If the conditions presented in
Lemma 6.7 are satisfied, then the voter’s expected payoff equals −1
4
in each period.
Under voting rule VI, the incumbent party, say party L, is always re-elected if
the conditions in Lemma 6.7 are satisfied. Also in the case that the incumbent party
implements Xt = 0 if θA,t = 0 and θB,t = 1, he is re-elected. A variant of this voting
rule is a voting rule under which the opposition is elected if θA,t = 0 and θB,t = 1.
Let us consider this rule.
Voting rule VII: Suppose party L is in office. Then re-elect the incumbent party if
it implements the policy that maximizes the voter’s utility given the available infor-
mation unless θA,t = 0 and θB,t = 1; if θA,t = 0 and θB,t = 1, the opposition party
is elected.
If party R is in office, then re-elect the incumbent party if it implements the policy
that maximizes the voter’s utility given the available information unless θA,t = −1
and θB,t = 0; if θA,t = −1 and θB,t = 0, the opposition party is elected.
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Along the same lines as we derived the conditions in Lemma 6.7, we can derive the
conditions under which rule VII induces parties to investigate the full consequences
of policy (see Appendix). These conditions are presented in Lemma 6.8.
Lemma 6.8 Suppose voting rule VII. If 2
3
< δ < 1 and C1 ≤ 34
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
− 1
4
,
with V ELt+1 −V NEt+1 = 2δ2−δ , then (i) the incumbent party collects information about θA,t
and (ii) the opposition party collects information about θB,t, and (iii) the incumbent
party implements Xt = −1 if θt = −1, Xt = 0 if θt = 0 and Xt = 0 if θt = 1.
A comparison between the conditions in Lemma 6.7 and Lemma 6.8 shows that
voting rule VII dominates voting rule VI if δ > 4
5
. This means that, if the future
is very important, voting rule VII gives a stronger incentive to parties to collect
information. The reason is that under voting rule VII the probability of being re-
elected depends on the information the incumbent has collected. Under voting rule
VI, on the other hand, the probability of being re-elected is independent of the
information presented by the incumbent if δ > 2
3
. Hence, under voting rule VII the
incumbent has a stronger incentive to collect information. Also the opponent party
has a stronger incentive to collect information. Under voting rule VI, the opponent
only collects information to influence the choice of policy made by the incumbent
party. Under voting rule VII collecting information has a second objective. By
collecting information the opponent party can increase the probability of being in
office next period and in this way be able to determine future policy.
Apart from voting rules VI and VII, there are several other voting rules that may
give incentives to policy motivated parties. Like rule VI and VII, two similar voting
rules yield an expected payoff to the voter equal to −1
4
in each period. We briefly
discuss those rules.
Voting rule VIII: Re-elect the incumbent party if it implements the policy that
maximizes the voter’s utility given the available information unless θA,t = θB,t = 0;
if θA,t = θB,t = 0, the incumbent is always re-elected.
A direct implication of voting rule VIII is that the incumbent party selects a
policy which conflicts with the voter’s preferences if θA,t = θB,t = 0. Rule VIII is
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clearly a variant of rule VI. For one event, the incumbent party may do what it
wishes. Because voting rules VI and VIII are essentially the same, they work under
the same conditions.
A variation on voting rule VIII is a voting rule according to which the opposition
party is elected if θA,t = θB,t = 0. Call this voting rule IX. It is easy to show that
voting rule IX is dominated by voting rule VIII. The reason is that under rule IX,
the opposition party is elected if no information is presented. Hence, under rule IX
the opposition has a weaker incentive to collect information than under rule VIII.
Until now we have considered voting rules that yield an expected payoff to the
voter equal to −1
4
. Next we want to determine what happens if the conditions
in lemmas 6.7 and 6.8 are not satisfied. This means that either the future is less
important or collecting information is too costly. We focus on the situation in
which the future is less important.11 In this situation the incumbent has a weaker
incentive to implement the policy that maximizes voter’s utility given the available
information. Consequently, the voter has to allow the incumbent to pursue its own
interest more often. Let us consider the following voting rule.
Voting rule X: Re-elect the incumbent party if it implements Xt = −1 if θA,t = −1
and Xt = 0 if θA,t = 0.
Voting rule X allows the incumbent to deviate in two cases, namely if θA,t = −1
and θB,t = 1 and if θA,t = 0 and θB,t = 1. Hence, voting rule X allows the incumbent
party to ignore θB,t = 1. Consequently, the opponent has no incentive to collect
information. The reason is that collecting information has no effect for the opponent.
Lemma 6.9 presents the results under which voting rule X induces the incumbent to
follow the interests of the electorate.
Lemma 6.9 Suppose voting rule X. Furthermore suppose that 1
3−C1 < δ < 1 and
C1 < 1. Then, (i) the incumbent party collects information about θA,t and (ii) the
opposition party collects no information. With respect to policy, the incumbent party
implements Xt = −1 if θA,t = −1 and Xt = 0 if θA,t = 0.
11The case in which collecting information is too costly leads to similar results.
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A comparison of Lemma 6.9 and the other lemmas in this section, shows that
the conditions under which the incumbent pursues the interest of the electorate are
weaker in lemma 6.9. However, we cannot conclude that voting rule X dominates
the other rules. The reason is that the voter achieves a lower expected utility under
voting rule X. If the conditions in Lemma 6.9 are satisfied, the voter achieves an
expected utility of −2
4
. This means that in order to make a less patient incumbent
party pursue the interests of the electorate, the voter has to give up some utility.
We have already shown that if no policy decision is made, the payoff to the voter
equals −2
4
. This means that no policy decision leads to at least as good results as
voting rules like rule X.12
The following proposition summarizes the main results of this section.
Proposition 6.2 Suppose parties are purely policy motivated. Then, the voter can
never achieve a first-best outcome. The voter can achieve an expected utility equal
to −1
4
, if parties care enough about the future (δ > 1
2
). If δ > 4
5
, then a voting rule
in which the incumbent is not always re-elected (rule VII) dominates a voting rule
that always re-elects the incumbent (rule VI). For 1
2
< δ < 4
5
, the opposite is true.
If the conditions of rule VI and VII are not satisfied, the voter is better off making
the decision herself. This leads to an expected utility equal to −2
4
.
6.5 Concluding remarks
In this chapter we have analyzed to what extent voters can motivate political parties
to collect information about policy consequences and to select good policies. We have
designed a model in which the incumbent party determines policy. The consequences
of policies are uncertain. To reduce this uncertainty both the incumbent and the
opposition party can collect information. With respect to the preferences of parties
we have distinguished two situations. Parties are either office motivated or policy
12There are several variants on voting rule X. These variants lead to an expected utility of at
most −24 . The intuition is that in order to have a less patient incumbent party pursue the voter’s
interest, the voter has to apply a less demanding voting rule as compared to the other voting rules
in this section. A less demanding voting rule, yields a lower expected utility to the voter. A similar
argument applies if collecting information is too costly.
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motivated.
We have shown that office motivated parties choose policies that, given the avail-
able information, promote the interest of the representative voter. Information col-
lection requires that parties sufficiently value office. One interesting result is that
voting rules that focus on both the incumbent party and the opposition party per-
form at least as well as voting rules that exclusively focus on the incumbent party.
In case parties are policy motivated, the voter does not always need to induce
parties to collect information. As parties derive utility from the implemented policy,
they already have an incentive to collect information. The problem with policy
motivated parties is that they tend to select sub-optimal policies. The voter must
induce the incumbent party to implement the policy that maximizes her utility. An
interesting result is that if parties are policy motivated, the voter can never achieve a
first-best outcome. The incumbent must gain something from promoting the voter’s
interest.
We have argued that if parties are policy motivated, the voter never achieves a
first-best outcome. In contrast, if parties are office motivated the voter can achieve a
first-best outcome. It is too early to conclude from these results that a system with
policy motivated parties is inferior to a system with office motivated parties. With
office motivated parties, attaining the first best situation requires that the rents of
holding office are large enough. This raises the question where do these rents come
from? Possibly these rents are paid by the voter as in Persson, Roland and Tabellini
(1997). Then, a system with policy motivated parties might be superior to a system
with office motivated parties.
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6.A Appendix
6.A.1 Appendix A: Present discounted value of office
In this appendix we determine the present discounted value of office. Suppose that
in period 1 party L will be in office. With a probability of α, the incumbent is
re-elected in each future period. Let V ELt+1 be the equilibrium continuation value for
the party if he is elected in period t and V NEt+1 be the equilibrium continuation value
for the party if he is sent home in period t. Let ρt be the probability that party L
is in office in period t, then
ρt+1 = αρt + (1− α) (1− ρt)
= (2α− 1) ρt + (1− α) (6.13)
The general solution of this first-order difference equation is
ρt = A (2α− 1)t +
(1− α)
1− (2α− 1)
= A (2α− 1)t + 1
2
(6.14)
where A is an arbitrary constant. Recall that in period t = 1, party L is in office,
implying that for t = 1, ρ1 = 1. Now A directly follows from (6.14) A =
1
2
1
(2α−1) .
Hence the particular solution of (6.14) is
ρt =
1
2
(2α− 1)t−1 + 1
2
It is now straightforward to calculate V ELt+1 :
V ELt+1 =
∞X
t=1
δt
µ
1
2
(2α− 1)t−1 + 1
2
¶¡
U I − UO
¢
=
(1− αδ) δ
(1− δ) (1− 2αδ + δ)
¡
U I − UO
¢
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where U I is the utility a party receives if he holds office and UO is the utility a party
receives if he does not hold office.
Now suppose that in t = 0 party L is not re-elected. Then, in period t+ 1 party R
will enter office, implying that ρ1 = 0. From (6.14) it follows that A = −12
1
(2α−1) .
Hence, the particular solution of (6.14) is
ρt = −
1
2
(2α− 1)t−1 + 1
2
We can now write the equilibrium continuation value if party L is not re-elected in
period t = 0 as
V NEt+1 =
∞X
t=1
δt
µ
−1
2
(2α− 1)t−1 + 1
2
¶¡
U I − UO
¢
=
(δ − αδ) δ
(1− δ) (1− 2αδ + δ)
¡
U I − UO
¢
Hence,
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 =
δ
1− 2αδ + δ
¡
U I − UO
¢
(6.15)
6.A.2 Appendix B: Proofs of lemmas
In this appendix we provide the proofs of the lemmas that are discussed in the
chapter.
Proof of Lemma 6.1: A proof was provided in the text above the lemma. The
present discounted value of office, V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 , can be determined making use of
equation (6.15). Under voting rule I the incumbent party is re-elected if and only if
he shows that θA,t = −1 and θB,t = 1. Suppose that in equilibrium the party in office
collects full information and the opponent collects no information. In equilibrium,
the probability that the incumbent is elected equals α = Pr (θA,t = −1, θB,t = 1) = 14 .
The utility a party gets if he holds office
¡
= U I
¢
equals λ − C2 and the utility he
gets if he is out of office equals 0. Substituting this into equation (6.15) gives
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = 2δ2+δ (λ− C2). ¥
Proof of Lemma 6.2: A proof was provided in the text above the lemma. Again,
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V ELt+1−V NEt+1 follows from (6.15). Under voting rule II the incumbent party is re-elected
if he shows that θA,t = −1 and θB,t = 1 , or it showed that θA,t = −1, or it showed
that θB,t = 1. Suppose that in equilibrium the party in office collects full information
and the opponent collects no information. In equilibrium, the probability that the
incumbent is elected equals α = Pr (θA,t = −1, θB,t = 1)+Pr (θA,t = −1, θB,t = 0)+
Pr (θA,t = 0, θB,t = 1) = 34 . The utility a party achieves if he holds office
¡
= U I
¢
equals λ − C2 and the utility he achieves if he is out of office equals 0. Hence,
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = 2δ2−δ (λ− C2). ¥
Proof of Lemma 6.3: Along the same lines as we derived the conditions in lemma
6.2, we can derive the conditions in lemma 6.3. The main difference is that now the
opponent has to decide whether or not to collect information. Under voting rule
III, the opponent prefers collecting full information to collecting no information if
C2 ≤ 34
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
. He prefers to collect full information to collecting partial
information if C2 − C1 ≤ 14
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
. The incumbent has no incentive to
collect information. Next, we have to determine V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 . Under voting rule III
the incumbent party is only re-elected if θA,t = 0 and θB,t = 0. Suppose that in
equilibrium the opposition party collects full information and the incumbent party
collects no information. In equilibrium, the probability that the incumbent is elected
equals α = Pr (θA,t = 0, θB,t = 0) = 14 . The utility a party receives if he holds office¡
= U I
¢
equals λ and the utility he receives if he is out of office
¡
= UO
¢
equals −C2.
Hence, V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = 2δ2+δ (λ+ C2). ¥
Proof of Lemma 6.4: A proof was provided in the text above the lemma. The
present discounted value of holding office, V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 , can be determined making
use of (6.15). Under voting rule IV the incumbent party is re-elected if θA,t = 0 and
θB,t = 0, θA,t = −1 and θB,t = 0 or θA,t = −1 and θB,t = 1. Suppose that in equilib-
rium each party collects partial information. In equilibrium, the probability that the
incumbent is elected equals α = Pr (θA,t = −1, θB,t = 1)+Pr (θA,t = −1, θB,t = 0)+
Pr (θA,t = 0, θB,t = 0) = 34 . The utility a party receives if he holds office
¡
= U I
¢
equals λ − C1 and the utility he receives if he is out of office
¡
= UO
¢
equals −C1.
Hence, V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = 2δ2−δλ. ¥
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Proof of Lemma 6.7: A proof was provided in the text above the lemma. Again,
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 can be determined making use of (6.15). Under voting rule VI the
incumbent party is re-elected if he implements Xt = 0 if θt = 0. Suppose that in
equilibrium each party collects partial information and that V ELt+1 −V NEt+1 > 1. Then,
in equilibrium, the probability that the incumbent is re-elected equals α = 1. The
utility a party receives if he holds office
¡
= U I
¢
equals −3
4
− C1 and the utility he
receives if he is out of office
¡
= UO
¢
equals −7
4
− C1. Hence, V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = δ1−δ . ¥
Proof of Lemma 6.8: Suppose voting rule VII. Furthermore suppose that in equi-
librium each party collects partial information. First we determine which policy the
incumbent party implements given the value of the stochastic term. The incumbent
party implements Xt = −1 if θt = −1 and Xt = 0 if θt = 1. If θt = 0, the incumbent
implements Xt = 0 if and only if V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 > 1, else he implements Xt = −1.
Now, we can determine the expected payoff if the incumbent investigates θA,t and
the opponent investigates θB,t. If V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 > 1, the expected payoff to the in-
cumbent equals −3
4
−C1 + 34V ELt+1 +
1
4
V NEt+1 and the expected payoff to the opponent
equals −7
4
− C1 + 14V ELt+1 +
3
4
V NEt+1 .
To identify the conditions under which both parties collect partial information, we
have to determine whether or not the incumbent has an incentive to deviate. Let
us determine the expected payoff achieved by the incumbent if he does not collect
information. In this case the incumbent implements Xt = 0 if θB,t = 1. If θB,t = 0,
the incumbent implements Xt = 0 if and only if V ELt+1 −V NEt+1 > 2, else he implements
Xt = −1. If V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 > 2, the expected payoff to the incumbent equals −64 +
2
4
V ELt+1+
2
4
V NEt+1 . If V ELt+1−V NEt+1 < 2, the expected payoff to the incumbent equals −24+
V NEt+1 . Hence, the incumbent collects partial information if (i) V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 > 2 and
C1 ≤ 34+
1
4
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
, and, (ii) 1 < V ELt+1 −V NEt+1 < 2 and C1 ≤ 34
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
−
1
4
.
Next, we can determine whether or not the opponent has an incentive to deviate. Let
us determine the expected payoff to the opponent if he does not collect information.
Then the incumbent implements Xt = 0 if θA,t = 0 and Xt = −1 if θA,t = −1. The
expected payoff to the opponent equals −10
4
+ V NEt+1 . Hence, the opponent collects
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partial information if and only if C1 ≤ 34 +
1
4
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
.
Finally, we can determine the relative value of holding office. Suppose that in
equilibrium each party collects partial information and that V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 > 1.
Then, in equilibrium, the probability that the incumbent is re-elected equals α =
Pr (θA,t = −1, θB,t = 1) + Pr (θA,t = −1, θB,t = 0) + Pr (θA,t = 0, θB,t = 0) = 34 . The
utility a party receives if he holds office
¡
= U I
¢
equals −3
4
− C1 and the utility he
receives if he is out of office
¡
= UO
¢
equals −7
4
− C1. Hence, V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = 2δ2−δ .
Because 0 < δ < 1, the following always holds V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = 2δ2−δ < 2. Therefore,
we only need to consider the case in which 1 < V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 < 2, say 23 < δ < 1. ¥
Proof of Lemma 6.9: Suppose voting rule X. Furthermore suppose that in equilib-
rium the incumbent investigates θA,t and the opponent does not collect information.
First we determine which policy the incumbent party implements given the value of
the stochastic term. The incumbent implements Xt = 0 if θA,t = 0 and Xt = −1 if
θA,t = −1. The expected payoff to the incumbent equals −24 + V ELt+1 − C1 and the
expected payoff to the opponent equals −10
4
+ V NEt+1 .
To identify the conditions under which the incumbent collects partial information,
we have to determine whether or not the incumbent has an incentive to deviate. Let
us determine the expected payoff achieved by the incumbent if he does not collect
information. In this case the incumbent implementsXt = 0 if V ELt+1−V NEt+1 > 1, else he
implementsXt = −1. The expected payoff to the incumbent if V ELt+1−V NEt+1 > 1 equals
−6
4
+V ELt+1 . Hence, the incumbent collects partial information if V ELt+1 −V NEt+1 > 1 and
C1 ≤ 1.
Next we can determine whether or not the opponent has an incentive to deviate. Let
us determine the expected payoff to the opponent if he collects partial information.
In this case the incumbent implements Xt = −1 if θA,t = −1 and θB,t = 0, Xt = −1
if θA,t = −1 and θB,t = 1 and Xt = 0 if θA,t = 0 and θB,t = 1. If θA,t = 0 and
θB,t = 0, the incumbent implements Xt = 0 if and only if V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 > 1, else
he implements Xt = −1. If V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 > 1, the expected payoff to the opponent
equals −10
4
+ V NEt+1 − C1.
Finally, we can determine the relative value of holding office. Suppose that in equi-
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librium the incumbent party collects full information and the opponent does not
collect information and V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 > 1. Then, in equilibrium, the probability that
the incumbent is re-elected equals α = 1. The utility a party achieves if he holds
office
¡
= U I
¢
equals −2
4
− C1 and the utility he gets if he is out of office
¡
= UO
¢
equals −10
4
. Hence, V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = δ1−δ (2− C1). ¥

Chapter 7
Main Findings
In this thesis we have considered a variety of principal-agent problems. A key feature
of each chapter has been the information asymmetry. In this chapter we summarize
the main findings.
In chapter 2 we have developed a model that describes the interaction between
a junior and a senior. The junior does not know his ability, but he can learn about
his ability from the senior and from experience. In line with findings in the social
psychology literature, we have shown that if communication is imperfect, then (i) the
senior, on average, exaggerates the junior’s ability, and (ii) overconfidence leading to
too much activism is more likely than underconfidence leading to too much passivity.
In chapter 3 we have considered the benefits a junior may derive from having
a mentor. Frequently the only information available to a junior employee to make
a self-assessment is his performance. Performance, however, not only depends on
the junior’s ability, but also on the difficulty of the performed task. We have shown
that a junior who has performed a difficult task underestimates his ability and a
junior who has performed an easy task overestimates his ability. An implication
is that some talented juniors decide to stop performing the task after observing
performance on a difficult task. Appointing a better informed senior employee who
acts as the juniors mentor can prevent talented juniors from leaving the organization.
Furthermore, a mentor can prevent less talented juniors from performing a difficult
task.
145
146 Main Findings
Chapter 4 has examined the relationship between the board of directors and
top executives. Boards of directors face the twin task of disciplining and screening
executives. To perform these tasks directors do not have detailed information about
executives’ behaviour, and only infrequently have information about the success or
failure of initiated strategies, reorganizations, mergers etc. We have analysed the
nature of (implicit) retention contracts boards use to discipline and screen executives.
Consistent with empirical observation, we have shown that executives may become
overly active to show their credentials; that the link between bad performance and
dismissal is weak; and that boards occasionally dismiss competent executives.
In Chapter 5 and 6 we have analysed the relationship between voters and politi-
cians. In chapter 5 we have shown that whether or not electoral competition induces
political parties or candidates to collect information about policy consequences de-
pends on the cost of information collection. Besides, we have shown that endoge-
nizing information may lead to divergence of policy platforms. In chapter 6 we have
identified the conditions under which voters can induce political parties to collect
information and to select policies which are optimal from the representative voter’s
point of view. We have shown that it is easier to stimulate policy motivated par-
ties to collect information than office motivated parties. However, in contrast to
office motivated parties, policy motivated parties will sometimes select policies that
conflict with the representative voter’s interest.
Samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
Elke dag nemen mensen talrijke beslissingen. Belangrijk voor het maken van keuzen
is dat men weet wat de gevolgen van de verschillende mogelijkheden zijn. Het
verzamelen van informatie over deze gevolgen is echter gecompliceerd en kostbaar.
Daarom beschikken mensen soms niet over alle relevante informatie om een beslissing
te nemen.
Dit proefschrift bespreekt en modelleert situaties waarin individuen niet over
alle relevante informatie beschikken om een beslissing te nemen. We onderschei-
den twee delen in het proefschrift. In het eerste deel kennen individuen hun eigen
bekwaamheid niet. Om een beslissing te nemen moeten individuen een inschatting
maken van hun bekwaamheid. We bespreken de gevolgen van het maken van een
verkeerde inschatting. Het tweede deel bespreekt de interactie tussen de contro-
lerende macht (bijvoorbeeld de raad van bestuur of de burger) en de uitvoerende
macht (bijvoorbeeld de manager of de politicus). De manager neemt, namens de
raad van bestuur, een beslissing. Omdat de preferenties van de manager en de raad
van bestuur niet altijd overeenkomen, handelt een manager niet altijd in het belang
van de raad van bestuur. We analyseren hoe de raad van bestuur ervoor kan zorgen
dat de manager in het belang van de raad van bestuur handelt.
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7.1 Zelfevaluatie
Er is een behoorlijke hoeveelheid bewijs dat individuen hun eigen bekwaamheid,
gemiddeld genomen, te hoog inschatten op sommige domeinen. Bijvoorbeeld, de
meerderheid van de autobestuurders in de VS vindt zichzelf beter dan de gemiddelde
autobestuurder in de VS (Svenson, 1981). Als een individu echter wordt gevraagd
naar zijn bekwaamheid in schaken dan schat een meerderheid van de individuen
zichzelf als beneden gemiddeld in (Kruger, 1999).
Sociaal psychologen hebben laten zien dat de keuzen die individuen maken, beïn-
vloed worden door de perceptie die individuen hebben over hun bekwaamheid. Fel-
son (1984) laat zien dat middelbare school jongens met een positief zelfbeeld over hun
bekwaamheid betere resultaten behalen op school dan jongens met een negatiever
zelfbeeld. Een mogelijke verklaring voor het tekort aan vrouwen in de wetenschap
is dat vrouwen hun wetenschappelijke bekwaamheid onderschatten (Ehrlinger en
Dunning, 2003).
Economen bestuderen hoe mensen keuzen maken. Gegeven dat de perceptie die
een individu heeft over zijn bekwaamheid zo belangrijk is voor de keuzen die iemand
maakt, is het nauwelijks verrassend dat economen geïnteresseerd zijn in dit onderw-
erp. Recentelijk zijn er meerdere economische artikels verschenen die de zelfevaluatie
van bekwaamheid onderzoeken.1 Een tekortkoming van deze studies is dat ze alleen
overschatting verklaren. We kunnen echter niet ontkennen dat sommige mensen een
zeer negatief zelfbeeld hebben. In hoofdstuk 2 en 3 proberen we een verklaring te
vinden voor zowel overschatting als onderschatting. Het enige economische artikel
waarin een negatief zelfbeeld theoretisch mogelijk is, is Santos-Pinto en Sobel (2005).
Hoofdstuk 2 bespreekt een model dat de zelfevaluatie van bekwaamheid be-
schrijft. In overeenstemming met de self-assessment theorie in sociale psycholo-
gie (Trope, 1979; Dunning, 1995; Taylor et al., 1995) willen individuen hun be-
kwaamheid leren om betere beslissingen in de toekomst te nemen. Individuen krij-
gen informatie over hun bekwaamheid door beoordelingen van anderen en door het
uitvoeren van taken. We laten zien dat als communicatie niet perfect is (i) de be-
1Bijvoorbeeld, Benabou en Tirole (2004), Weinberg (2005) en Zabojnik (2004).
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oordelingen van anderen te positief zijn, en (ii) overschatting waarschijnlijker is dan
onderschatting.
Het model beschrijft de interactie tussen een senior medewerker en een junior
medewerker. De senior medewerker heeft de neiging om te negatief te zijn over
de bekwaamheid van een junior medewerker die net bekwaam is. Op deze manier
probeert de senior ervoor te zorgen dat de junior zich niet teveel inspant. Voor dit
type junior zijn de kosten van overschatting (teveel inspanning) groter dan de kosten
van onderschatting (misplaatste passiviteit). Daarnaast heeft de senior medewerker
de neiging om de bekwaamheid van een getalenteerde junior te overdrijven. De senior
wil voorkomen dat dit type junior besluit om geen taak uit te voeren. Gemiddeld
genomen overdrijft de senior medewerker de bekwaamheid van junior medewerkers.
De reden is dat de kosten van onderschatting (misplaatste passiviteit) permanent
zijn, terwijl de kosten van overschatting (teveel inspanning) tijdelijk zijn omdat
individuen leren van het uitvoeren van een taak en deze informatie gebruiken om
hun perceptie aan te passen.
In hoofdstuk 3 maken individuen een inschatting van hun bekwaamheid op basis
van de behaalde prestaties bij het uitvoeren van een taak. Prestaties hangen af
van de bekwaamheid van een individu en de onbekende moeilijkheidsgraad van de
taak. In overeenstemming met Kruger (1999) laten we zien dat een individu (bij-
voorbeeld een junior medewerker) die een moeilijke taak heeft uitgevoerd, gemiddeld
genomen, zijn bekwaamheid onderschat, terwijl een individu die een makkelijke taak
heeft uitgevoerd zijn bekwaamheid overschat. Het gevolg van het onderschatten van
bekwaamheid na het uitvoeren van een moeilijke taak is dat een getalenteerde junior
soms besluit om geen taak uit te voeren. Een organisatie kan voorkomen dat dit
gebeurt door een senior medewerker aan te stellen die optreedt als de mentor van
de junior. De senior medewerker heeft meer ervaring en is daarom beter in staat
de bekwaamheid van een junior vast te stellen. Daarnaast is zij beter op de hoogte
van de moeilijkheid van verschillende taken in de organisatie. Als de preferenties
van de mentor en de junior overeenkomen zorgt de mentor ervoor dat het niveau
van de taken en de bekwaamheid van een junior beter op elkaar worden afgestemd.
Als de preferenties van de mentor en de junior niet overeenkomen, omdat de junior
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kosten moet maken om een taak uit te voeren en de mentor deze kosten niet hoeft
te maken, dan heeft de mentor soms een prikkel om te liegen. De reden is dat een
junior soms geen taak wil uitvoeren, omdat het uitvoeren van een taak te kostbaar
is. De mentor, daarentegen, wil dat de junior altijd een taak uitvoert. Door te liegen
voorkomt de mentor dat sommige junioren geen taak uitvoeren.
7.2 Retention contracts
Het delegeren van taken is noodzakelijk om meerdere redenen. In een organisatie,
bijvoorbeeld, beschikt de raad van bestuur niet over voldoende tijd om beslissing-
en te nemen over de dagelijkse routine. Daarom delegeert de raad van bestuur
(principaal) deze beslissingen aan een manager (agent). Een ander voorbeeld is de
representatieve democratie. Burgers beschikken over zwakke prikkels om informatie
te verzamelen over alle beleidsalternatieven. Daarom delegeren burgers politieke
besluiten aan politici. In beide gevallen zijn de voordelen van het delegeren van
beslissingen duidelijk. Echter, het delegeren van besluiten kan problematisch zijn
als de agent niet dezelfde preferenties heeft als de principaal.
Het klassieke voorbeeld van principaal-agent problemen is het conflict tussen
aandeelhouders en managers. De raad van bestuur beschikt over de macht om, na-
mens de aandeelhouders, het bedrijf te runnen. De raad van bestuur beschikt echter
niet over de tijd en informatie om besluiten te nemen. Daarom is de besluitvorming
gedelegeerd aan de manager. De raad van bestuur heeft twee taken. In de eerste
plaats moet de raad van bestuur een manager selecteren en aanstellen. In de tweede
plaats moet de raad van bestuur managers controleren en vervangen als dit nood-
zakelijk is. Het probleem is dat de raad van bestuur beperkte informatie heeft om
deze taken uit te voeren. Om ervoor te zorgen dat managers handelen in het belang
van de raad van bestuur, is de raad van bestuur soms gedwongen om zich aan een
norm te houden. In hoofdstuk 4, 5 en 6 bespreken we het gebruik van retention con-
tracts als een middel om managers en politici te disciplineren en te screenen. Een
retention contract specificeert onder welke condities een manager of een politicus
herkozen wordt en onder welke condities hij vervangen wordt.
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In hoofdstuk 4 bekijken we een omgeving waarin de raad van bestuur beschikt
over beperkte informatie over de kwaliteit van projecten die managers hebben uit-
gevoerd. Elke periode moet een manager besluiten om een taak uit te voeren of
niet. De kwaliteit van een project hangt af van de bekwaamheid van de manager
en van exogene omstandigheden. De manager kent zijn eigen bekwaamheid en leert
de exogene omstandigheden. Dit impliceert dat de manager volledig geïnformeerd is
over de gevolgen van zijn beslissing. De raad van bestuur, daarentegen, observeert
alleen of een project uitgevoerd is en soms leert zij de kwaliteit van het project. Een
belangrijk element is dat competente managers betere projecten ontwikkelen dan
incompetente managers. Daarom is het waarschijnlijker dat een competente mana-
ger een project uitvoert. Het feit dat een project geïmplementeerd is, is een teken
van competentie. De raad van bestuur kan deze informatie gebruiken om mana-
gers te screenen. Een nadeel van het gebruiken van de implementatie beslissing om
managers te screenen is dat managers een prikkel hebben om slechte projecten te
implementeren om competentie te seinen. De raad van bestuur kan deze prikkel
verkleinen door managers te ontslaan die te slechte projecten hebben uitgevoerd.
Vanwege de seinfunctie van de implementatie beslissing is het waarschijnlijker dat
de weggestuurde manager competent is. Het af en toe wegsturen van een compe-
tente manager is de prijs die de raad van bestuur moet betalen om managers te
disciplineren.
Hoofdstuk 5 en 6 richten zich op de interactie tussen burgers en politici. Een re-
den voor burgers om bevoegdheden te delegeren aan politici is dat politici over betere
informatie beschikken. Maar beschikken politici ook daadwerkelijk over betere in-
formatie? In hoofdstuk 5 onderzoeken we of verkiezingen voldoende prikkels geven
aan politici om informatie te zoeken. We bespreken een model met twee politieke
partijen. Voordat verkiezingen plaatsvinden kunnen de partijen informatie verza-
melen. Tijdens een verkiezingscampagne kunnen partijen de verzamelde informatie
gebruiken om hun standpunten te verdedigen. Een welbekend theoretisch resultaat
in de politieke economie is dat, als politieke partijen alleen maar geven om het win-
nen van verkiezingen, politieke partijen hetzelfde standpunt kiezen. In hoofdstuk 5
laten we zien dat, als partijen de mogelijkheid krijgen om informatie te verzamelen,
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politieke partijen soms gepolariseerde standpunten kiezen.
In hoofdstuk 6 moeten politieke partijen twee taken uitvoeren. In de eerste
plaats kunnen zowel de regeringspartij als de oppositie partij informatie verzamelen.
In de tweede plaats moet de regeringspartij een taak uitvoeren. We identificeren
de voorwaarden waaronder burgers de politieke partijen kunnen aanzetten tot het
verzamelen van informatie en tot het uitvoeren van het project dat optimaal is van-
uit het oogpunt van de burger. We laten zien dat als politieke partijen alleen maar
geven om macht, de burger een kiesregel moet gebruiken die partijen aanmoedigt
om informatie te verzamelen. Daarbij geldt dat de oppositie soms sterkere prikkels
heeft om informatie te verzamelen. Als politieke partijen alleen geven om beleid, dan
moeten de partijen ook aangemoedigd worden om goed beleid te kiezen. Beleids-
gerichte partijen hebben sterkere prikkels om informatie te verzamelen dan partijen
die alleen geven om macht. Maar, in tegenstelling tot politieke partijen die alleen
geven om macht, zullen beleidsgerichte partijen soms beleid kiezen dat in strijd is
met de belangen van burgers.
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